State freedom and international relations by HERRON, Patrick
  
State Freedom and International Relations 
 
Patrick Herron 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences 
of the European University Institute 
Florence, March, 2015 

European University Institute 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
State Freedom and International Relations 
 
Patrick Herron 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences 
of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Professor Christian Reus-Smit, University of Queensland (Supervisor) 
Professor Jennifer Welsh, EUI 
Professor Thomas Biersteker, Graduate Institute, Geneva 
Professor Edward Keene, University of Oxford 
  
© Patrick Herron, 2015 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 
permission of the author 
  
iii 
 
Abstract 
 
Much of both the academic and practical discourse about international politics implies conceptions 
of states as, in one way or another, free or unfree. We talk about state autonomy, suggesting states 
have the capacity to deliberate and determine their own destiny. We discuss constraints on state 
action and debate the legitimacy of interference in the affairs of other states. We also measure and 
assess state development, suggesting a potential in states for self-realisation. The concept of 
sovereignty, and the belief that this principle demands the rejection of the subjection of states to 
higher authority, frames much of our thinking about world politics. Such issues lie at the heart of 
much of our theorising of IR: in realism's security dilemma, for example; in liberal debates about 
humanitarian intervention; or in constructivist analyses of the relationship between sovereignty and 
state identity. It is a central contention of this thesis that conceptions of state freedom are present 
in the deep analytical and normative presumptions of much of the theory of international relations. 
The conceptions of state freedom that inform such theorising remain, however, for the large part 
implicit. The principal purpose of this thesis is to remedy the absence of sustained, explicit 
consideration of the concept of state freedom, and it does this by historically excavating ideas about 
what it means for states to be free. 
 
While explicit discussion of the freedom of states was prominent in the 17th and 18th century, as 
the state's position as the locus of political authority was gradually consolidated the terminology of 
state freedom diminished in salience. Ideas of state freedom did not disappear, however; they 
continued to be expressed in analogous areas of international discourse. Drawing on philosophical 
ideas about individual freedom, this thesis presents a theoretical approach to making such implicit 
ideas visible. It makes the case for a 'grammar' of freedom, which, it is argued, enables one to 
distinguish ideas about freedom from other species of ideas but does not prejudice their substance. 
The thesis then employs this grammar to identify ideas of state freedom in international debate 
surrounding three cognate concepts: non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-determination. 
Through analysis of the arguments made by states-people about these three concepts, the thesis 
articulates a number of evolving ideas about what it means for states to be free and unfree. That 
historical investigation uncovers both a strong normative preference among practitioners of 
international relations for the freedom of states and sharp disagreement about what constitutes 
that freedom. The thesis argues that the contestation surrounding ideas of state freedom have 
played an important role structuring legitimate relations of control between states. The thesis 
concludes by reflecting on the implications of these observations for the approaches of theorists of 
international relations to the key concepts of sovereignty and the state. 
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Introduction 
 
When Sweden formally entered the Thirty Years War in 1630, King Gustav II Adolph issued a 
manifesto denouncing the hegemonic aspirations of the Holy Roman Empire. In it he contrasted 
hegemony with the freedom of polities and argued that had he not “bestirred himself” the Empire 
would have “pushed her ambition and arms to the most distant kingdoms and provinces, which 
*had+ hitherto preserved and maintained their liberty”.1 When that bloody conflict was eventually 
resolved in 1648, the Treaty of Munster declared the “Lords states General of the United 
Netherlands and the respective provinces thereof” to be “free and sovereign states”.2 
 
Around a hundred years on from the Peace of Westphalia, the lawyer and diplomat Emmerich de 
Vattel, in his hugely influential treatise The Law of Nations, argued that “sovereign states are to be 
considered as so many free persons living together in the state of nature”. At the core of his 
approach to the law of nations was the idea that “the body of the nation, the state, remains 
absolutely free and independent with respect to all other men, all other nations, as long as it has not 
voluntarily submitted to them”.3 
 
In the mid-19th century, at the height of the influence of the balance of power as an institution of 
interstate order, Lord Palmerston, twice British Foreign Secretary, asserted the doctrine to mean 
simply “that a number of weaker states may unite to prevent a stronger one from acquiring a power 
which should be dangerous to them, and which should overthrow their independence, their liberty, 
and their freedom of action”.4  
 
In 1949, in its Essentials of Peace resolution, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) called 
upon “every nation” to “refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the 
freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will 
of the people in any State.” 
                                                          
1
 Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), XIV, p. 27. 
2
 ‘Treaty of Westphalia’, ed. by The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp. 
3
 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and 
Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on 
Luxury (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc, 2008). 
4
 Martin Wight, ‘Balance of Power and International Order’, in The Bases of international order: essays in 
honour of C.A.W. Manning, ed. by Alan James (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 101. 
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In these quotes, which span the modern period of international relations, King Gustav, Vattel, Lord 
Palmerston and the UN General Assembly all stress the “freedom” or “liberty” of states. They are 
exemplary of a way of thinking about states that is often suggested by the public discourse of 
international relations. When we discuss human freedom we often talk of the ability of people to 
make choices, set and pursue goals and desires, and the social (or internal) constraints and 
inhibitions they face. Likewise, everyday discussion of world politics often starts from a conception 
of the state as independent; an agent with the capacity to determine its own political form and 
pursue its self-set interests and goals. We also talk of obstacles to this state autonomy, either 
through a lack of sufficient development, the interference and control of other states, or the 
authority of supra-national institutions. 
 
Similarly, in the academic discourse of international relations, a great deal of theoretical discussion is 
suggestive of ideas state freedom. In realism's security dilemma, for example, the autonomy of 
states from higher authority means states are self-reliant with respect to their security, leading to 
predictions about how they will behave. Much liberal debate about humanitarian intervention is 
animated by disagreement as to the appropriate limits to the freedom of action states enjoy within 
their own borders and the contours of legitimate inter-state interference. Constructivist writings on 
the relationship between agency and structure rest on an understanding of the state as a purposive 
actor with the capacity to make choices and set its own direction, but which is embedded within a 
structure of social constraints. 
 
Thinking about states as, in some sense, free entities seems to be a deep assumption in modern 
international relations. Robert Jackson goes so far as to claim: 
 
[The] cardinal value [embedded in the community of states] is of course independence which is the 
foundation on which the entire scheme rests. Virtually all the principles and practices of a sovereign 
states-system derive either directly or indirectly from this desideratum. The logic of such a system is 
the international expression of liberalism: sovereign states are the equivalent of free individuals.
5
 
 
Conceptions of state freedom play important roles in the theoretical arguments of various 
approaches to studying international politics. In one of the most influential books in the discipline of 
International Relations (IR), Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz understands the 
                                                          
5
 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp. 9–10. 
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international realm as a “world of free states” whose principal aim is to maintain their autonomy. 
From this starting point Waltz posits that “states are insecure in proportion to the extent of their 
freedom”, a supposition that leads to a conception of the international system as a ‘self-help’ world 
and generates important predictions about state behaviour.6 
 
A number of IR scholars also identify the freedom of states as a notable idea in the modern history 
of international relations. In his discussion of the balance of power as an institution of international 
order, Martin Wight notes a link between balance of power and the freedom of states across various 
historical periods. When discussing the system of city states of Renaissance Italy, Wight claims that 
“Historically the demand for freedom” came before the explicit institution of the balance of power. 
This demand “combined external freedom, or independence, with internal freedom, the antithesis 
of despotism”.7 In the 18th and 19th centuries, Wight asserts, “a distribution of power was the 
condition of international freedom” and “the guarantee of ‘the liberties of Europe’”.8 He also claims 
that “desire for the liberty of the parts precedes the desire for the order of the whole” of the states 
system. The balance of power developed as an institution to reconcile “international order” with 
state “independence”. The alternatives would have been “disorder” and “insecurity” or “a universal 
empire, with general loss of freedom”.9 Wight also generalised this relationship between the balance 
of power and the freedom of polities, asserting that “the postulate that there is an international 
society generally entails” the belief that “the tranquillity of international society and the freedom of 
its members require an even distribution of power”.10 
 
Despite these examples, however, almost no existing IR scholarship considers state freedom in an 
explicit and sustained way. When academics do use the terms freedom or liberty in relation to 
states, it is very rarely accompanied by conceptual reflection; we are introduced to a concept that 
appears to be important, but offered only a glimpse of its historical and theoretical role.  
 
This thesis addresses the lack of scrutiny of state freedom and argues that it is an important concept 
which illuminates hitherto unexplored aspects of international politics. I argue that state freedom is 
worthy of scholarly attention for two reasons. First, and most importantly, ideas about the freedom 
of states have constituted a significant element of the ideational structure of international relations 
                                                          
6
 K. N Waltz, ‘Theory of International Politics’, 1979, pp. 111–112. 
7
 Wight, ‘Balance of Power and International Order’, p. 87. 
8
 Wight, ‘Balance of Power and International Order’, p. 100. 
9
 Wight, ‘Balance of Power and International Order’, p. 101. 
10
 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory 
of international politics, ed. by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 103. 
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in the modern period. They have informed the thinking of states-people about how inter-state 
relations ought to be conducted and have, in this way, played an important role in conditioning state 
behaviour. The second reason is that implicit conceptions of state freedom lie at the heart of much 
academic thinking about international relations. Although IR scholars rarely explicate or scrutinise 
conceptions of state freedom, they are nonetheless identifiable in the deep analytical and normative 
presumptions of much theory of international relations. The concept of state freedom, then, has 
both empirical and theoretical implications. Exploring these implications is the purpose of this thesis, 
which seeks to answer the following research question: How have understandings of state freedom 
evolved, and how have they conditioned international relations over the past three centuries?  
 
 
The evanescence of state freedom 
 
In the early modern period—the period in which the modern state was becoming recognisable as a 
theoretical and empirical entity—the explicit language of the freedom of states was notable. 
However, as the state’s position as the exclusive locus of political authority was consolidated, the 
prominence of the terminology of state freedom diminished as ideas about state freedom were 
absorbed into related discourses. 
 
As alluded to in the quotes that began this introduction, the Thirty Years War—which is often taken 
to usher in the modern period of international relations—was fought, in part, in the name of the 
freedom of the nascent states of Europe. Sweden, one of the principal belligerents, claimed the 
“veritable main and fundamental cause” of the conflict to be “the restoration of Germany and of the 
princes and estates of the Empire to their ancient liberty and condition”.11 France likewise justified 
their involvement in the conflict on the grounds of their desire to “preserve the liberty” of the 
German states, encouraging them to “convert the servitude in which they had hitherto found 
themselves into a permanent freedom”.12 
 
As the 17th century progressed and the actor threatening hegemony shifted from the Holy Roman 
Empire to France, the discourse of the liberty of states developed and was “constitutive” of a 
balance of power discourse that “appropriated liberty as the supreme moral and political value and 
                                                          
11
 Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of 
International Stability (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 44. 
12
 Osiander, p. 37. 
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applied it to European international relations”.13 As both Richard Devetak and Andreas Osiander 
have shown, aggressive French absolutism provoked a discourse defending the “liberty of Europe”, 
which was understood as a collective goal constituting the liberty of each individual state.14 This 
liberty consisted in not being subject to (that is to say, free from) the arbitrary rule of a Europe-wide 
French monarchy.15 In the 18th century, the association between state liberty and resistance to 
hegemony endured, with the language of the “liberty of Europe” accompanying both the War of 
Spanish Succession and the Peace of Utrecht which settled it in 1713.16 Although in the early 18th 
century the term 'state' was not yet used to denote a territorial sovereign state in the way we 
understand it today,17 the Peace of Utrecht nonetheless exemplified the continuing evolution of the 
European system into one of “self-determining” autonomous actors of equal status, “none of which 
were entitled to dictate to the others”.18 
 
The peace settlement that ended the War of Spanish Succession was an enduring one, ushering in a 
period of relative European stability that was not profoundly shaken until Napoleon's expansionist 
wars at the turn of the 19th century. As the relatively peaceful 18th century progressed, and as the 
status of the states of Europe as independent, sovereign entities was entrenched, the explicit 
discourse of the freedom of states receded. For at least the past 200 years, the terminology of state 
freedom, or state liberty,19 has been rare in both the practical and academic discourse of 
international relations. We readily describe the state as ‘free to’ perform certain actions, or embody 
certain institutional forms, when discussing rightful state behaviour in specific contexts. However, 
the term ‘free’ is not commonly applied to states as a predicate to describe their condition, or state 
of being. Discussion of what that predicate might mean when used to describe states has been even 
rarer. 
 
Nonetheless, the central claim of this thesis is that ideas about state freedom have remained 
significant in international relations and that their neglect by IR theorists ought to be rectified. A key 
claim of this thesis is that despite a relative absence of discussion of the term state freedom, ideas of 
state freedom—beliefs about what constitutes freedom for states—have, nonetheless, persisted and 
been subject to intense and repeated debate. The linguistic terms that characterise this debate have 
                                                          
13
 Richard Devetak, ‘“The Fear of Universal Monarchy”: Balance of Power as an Ordering Practice of Liberty’, in 
Liberal world orders, ed. by Timothy Dunne and Trine Flockhart (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 126. 
14
 Osiander, p. 121. 
15
 Devetak. 
16
 Osiander, p. 120. 
17
 Osiander, p. 107. 
18
 Osiander, p. 120. 
19
 For the purposes of this thesis I make no distinction between the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’. 
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often, however, been cognates of freedom which, although distinct from freedom in their meaning 
and conceptual history, are in some sense analogous to, or overlap with, freedom. The distinction 
between the presence of an idea and the use of a particular signifier to denote it will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Two, as will the understanding of freedom that is employed in this thesis. At this 
juncture I will only note how commonplace it is to implicitly distinguish between ideas and terms in 
everyday discourse. For example, if I were to make an argument about people living in a condition 
lacking the financial means to provide for their minimal physical and emotional needs, my argument 
could be easily identified as one about poverty. This would be so even if I did not explicitly nominate 
the term. In Chapters Three to Five I demonstrate at length that there have been important 
moments of contestation over the meaning of state freedom that have played out with relatively 
little use of the signifier ‘freedom’. 
 
The decline in prominence of the terminology of state freedom from the late 18th century onwards is 
reflected in IR scholarship. Studies of the early modern period have identified the importance of the 
development of the states as in some sense free. Osiander, for example, identifies the principle of 
“autonomy” as the “leitmotiv” of the Peace of Westphalia,20 while Philpott describes the 
development of sovereignty as a story of the “liberation of states” from transnational and 
hierarchical forms of authority.21 Beyond historical studies of the early modern period, however, 
explicit reference to state freedom is piecemeal, unreflective and underdeveloped. As alluded to 
above, a conception of states as, in some sense, free entities undergirds a variety of theoretical 
approaches to the study of international relations. Nonetheless, that conceptual foundation has not 
been given sustained, self-conscious consideration. The absence of the terminology of freedom and 
liberty from the practical discourse of international politics means that scholars have not directed 
their attention to developing a conceptual approach to state freedom or to investigating the 
possibility that ideas about state freedom may have played an important role in the practice of 
international relations beyond the early modern period. 
 
 
Illuminating Ideas of State Freedom 
 
In making an argument about how ideas of state freedom have been implicated in the conduct of 
modern international relations, this thesis is organised into five chapters. In Chapter One I survey the 
                                                          
20
 Osiander, p. 54. 
21
 D. Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton 
University Press, 2001), p. 153. 
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existing academic literature, defending my claim that although the idea of state freedom has not 
been the subject of sustained and explicit study, it is nonetheless implied by many of the major 
theoretical approaches to the study of IR. I argue realist, liberal, constructivist and English School 
approaches share a conception of the state as an autonomous actor with the capacity to be self-
directing. The autonomy of the state is, however, conditioned or constrained by virtue of the fact 
that it exists embedded within a system of autonomous states. I show that the nature of the 
constraints that states face, and their implications for state autonomy, are important issues 
addressed by all four paradigms.  
 
Having reviewed the existing literature, in the subsequent chapters I turn my attention to 
investigating the role of ideas of state freedom in practice, which constitutes the main focus of the 
thesis. In Chapter Two I address the principal methodological and theoretical issues raised by this 
study. In Chapters Three to Five I employ those insights in an analysis of historical moments of 
debate about state freedom.  
 
Chapter Two makes two principal arguments. The first addresses the methodological issue of 
studying ideas of freedom in the absence of the terminology of state freedom. I argue that ideas are 
distinct from the words that are used to signify them and that to fully illuminate the role that 
concepts play in the social world it is necessary to avoid being restricted to specific terminology. I 
acknowledge, however, that the absence of the terminology of freedom poses a significant 
methodological challenge. My purpose in this thesis is to investigate how practitioners of 
international relations have understood state freedom and to reconstruct the evolution of and 
argument over such ideas. The difficulty, therefore, is to ‘see’ ideas about state freedom absent the 
guiding light of the term freedom. Compounding this challenge is that I do not hold an a priori idea 
about what state freedom is. A key claim of this thesis is that ideas about the meaning of freedom 
for states may vary and evolve. To reduce state freedom to a single concept and then search for it in 
international discourse would thus contradict the aims and assumptions of the thesis. My approach, 
therefore, is to elucidate not what state freedom is, but rather what discussions about freedom in 
general have been about. I argue that some of the most prominent and enduring theories of the 
freedom of human individuals and groups have been about the necessary conditions for agents to be 
self-mastering. These three elements—agents, necessary conditions and self-mastery—do not 
represent an essence of freedom. Debate about freedom nonetheless tends to involve disagreement 
about one or more of these elements. Together, I argue, they can be seen as constituting a 
grammar, or form, of debate about freedom. Identifying this grammar in the practical discourse of 
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international relations can, I claim, help distinguish ideas about state freedom from other species of 
ideas without foreclosing the meaning of state freedom. 
 
The second argument I make in Chapter Two is the principal theoretical argument of the thesis. Here 
I address the core question of how ideas of state freedom play a role in the conduct of international 
politics. I draw on constructivist insights about the role of ideas in world politics and argue that ideas 
of state freedom have constituted part of the ideational structure of international system. I suggest 
that the belief that states ought to be free has been a deep normative assumption in modern 
international relations and that this belief generates collective expectations about appropriate 
behaviour; because ideas about what constitutes freedom for states have external dimensions, the 
ways in which states control, influence and direct each other have implications for the realisation of 
state freedom. In this way, ideas of state freedom structure relations of control between states. 
 
The way that this structuring effect of ideas of state freedom is manifest in international relations is 
through the politics of legitimacy. The human agents that conduct international relations have 
repeatedly debated and contested what makes states free and, consequently, what configurations 
of relations of control are legitimate or illegitimate. Chapters Three to Five are an examination of 
that politics of legitimacy as it has played out in a number of historical moments. My historical 
analysis is structured by the concepts non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-determination. 
These three principles are all analogous to freedom in some respect but, unlike state freedom, the 
terminology of non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-determination have been highly 
prominent in international debate. I use these concepts, therefore, in order to guide me to moments 
of debate about state freedom. It is within debates about these three cognate terms that I identify 
and reconstruct ideas about what constitutes freedom for states and demonstrate their structuring 
effect on legitimate relations of control between states.  
 
Chapters Three to Five do not present full histories of, respectively, non-intervention, sovereign 
equality and self-determination. Rather each chapter focuses on discrete historical junctures at 
which those concepts have been the subject of international debate. The purpose of my historical 
analysis is to reveal significant ideas of state freedom and in accordance with that aim the historical 
moments on which I focus were selected on the basis that they; a) yielded extensive debate and 
discussion regarding the concept in question, and b) that they were significant in the history of 
international relations. Selecting moments where the cognate concepts were contested and debated 
directs me to examples of states defending their positions, reasoning and arguing about the concept 
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in question. This makes them rich sources of the discursive statements through which ideas of state 
freedom are expressed. Moreover, the times at which states discuss at length the meanings and 
implications of principles of international conduct are often moments of significant import in the 
evolution of international relations. The periods and events focused on in this thesis are times at 
which representatives of states have consciously scrutinised prevailing modes of conducting 
international politics; the rules that govern relations between states and the practices that 
constitute them have been assessed and contested, and attempts have been made to reform and 
transcend them in the service of the normative aspirations of states. Rather than bilateral relations, I 
analyse cases where numerous states have discussed non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-
determination in conferences, congresses and other multilateral forums. This directs me to debates 
that have significance for the international system as a whole, rather than idiosyncratic cases. I do 
not claim that this method reveals all ideas of state freedom present in the international system at 
any given time. However, by analysing principles that are both related to freedom and significant in 
international relations, and by focusing on important moments of contestation surrounding those 
principles, I am able to identify what I claim to be important ideas of state freedom. Some of the 
historical moments I examine are notable international conferences, at which representatives of 
many states came together to discuss matters of international order and lay down rules for future 
conduct. In some cases, I examine a longer historical period but focus on significant meetings and 
congresses of states that took place within that period. The primary material from which I 
reconstruct debates and build up a picture of ideas of state freedom are the things that state 
representatives said at or, sometimes, about these meetings. The sources I rely on are, therefore, 
the records of speeches made and debates that took place at such meetings and conferences, 
written official and diplomatic material associated with them and, occasionally, the subsequent 
written accounts and memoires of those that took part in them. These primary materials are often 
supplemented by secondary sources to give context to the debates on which I focus. 
 
Through the lens of debates about non-intervention, Chapter Three examines relations of 
domination between states, exploring how ideas of state freedom are implicated in relations of 
control that transgress boundaries of sovereign authority in the international system. I examine two 
historical moments of prominent debate about non-intervention. The first is debates about 
intervention in the Concert of Europe in the period 1818-22. I identify two ideas of state freedom; 
the Dynastic Idea and the Self-Help Idea. In the Dynastic Idea, held by the states of the Holy Alliance, 
the agency of the state was identified with historically-legitimated sovereigns, and the self-mastery 
of states was understood to consist of sovereign control over popular power. This idea of state 
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freedom legitimated a general right of dynastic sovereigns to intervene, in concert, to quell popular 
uprisings across Europe. This idea of state freedom, and the intervention it legitimised, was 
challenged by Great Britain, which displayed the Self-Help Idea of state freedom. In the Self-Help 
Idea, the state was understood as a unique moral order possessing its own individual will. Self-
mastery for states was the freedom to translate their will into action, unhindered by the military 
domination of, or political obligation to, other states. This idea of state freedom legitimated 
intervention by a single state to counter a direct threat to its security and essential interests, but 
challenged the idea of a general alliance that had the right to intervene whenever a sovereign 
monarch was faced with domestic unrest. 
 
In Chapter Three I also examine changing ideas about intervention that were prominent in the 
western hemisphere in the second half of the 19th and early 20th century. In these debates I identify 
two further ideas of state freedom. In the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom, held by the US and 
some of its Latin American allies, the self-mastery of states consisted of self-control in the sense of 
self-limitation and acting responsibly. The Paternalistic Idea legitimated intervention on the grounds 
of maintaining order and furthering the development of ‘civilisation’. The Paternalistic Idea was 
contested by the majority of Latin American states, who put forward a Categorical Idea of state 
freedom. In the Categorical Idea, a state was self-mastering if it was free to determine its own way 
of life, absolutely free of external interference. This idea of state freedom delegitimated the practice 
of intervention and demanded an unconditional right to non-intervention.  
 
In Chapter Four I analyse debates about sovereign equality in order to examine the role played by 
ideas of state freedom in structuring relations of authority in international relations. I begin by laying 
out some intellectual groundwork, reviewing the classic articulation of the doctrine of the equality of 
states as expounded by Emmerich de Vattel in his The Law of Nations. I show how Vattel’s 
conception of states as equal was linked with an understanding of the state as a moral person, 
bound by obligation to natural law but naturally free to obey the dictates of its own conscience. I 
then go on to examine two historical cases in which discussion of the equality of states was highly 
prominent: first, the second Hague Peace Conference of 1907; and second, negotiations over the 
creation of the UN that took place between the allied powers in San Francisco in 1945.  
 
I argue that the negotiations in The Hague over the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice 
were in part a debate between the Paternalistic and Categorical Ideas of state freedom. I show that 
the Paternalistic Idea informed proposals by the great powers to weight judicial representation 
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according to a ranking of states. The Categorical Idea of state freedom held by small states meant 
that this proposal was resisted on the grounds that inequalities in the rights of states opened the 
door to relations of domination between states. I argue that the incompatibility of the Paternalistic 
and Categorical idea in terms of the relations of authority that they legitimated contributed to the 
failure of states at the Hague Peace Conference to reach agreement on the constitution of the 
Permanent Court.  
 
I then show that at the San Francisco conference in 1945 the agreement reached regarding the 
creation of the UN was facilitated by a shared understanding of state freedom which echoed, but 
also transformed, both the Categorical and Paternalistic Ideas. In this idea of the freedom of states—
the Civil Idea—self-mastery was understood in a similar way to the Categorical Idea; self-mastery 
meant being able to set one’s own direction free from the domination of other states. The Civil Idea, 
however, holds that for this self-mastery to be meaningfully realised states must be subject to the 
authority of international law backed up by the coercive capacity of materially strong states. This 
idea of state freedom legitimated the institutionalisation of limited hierarchy between states in the 
UN, provided that the special rights of big powers were checked by the participation of all states. 
 
In Chapter Five, I examine the dynamic relationship between self-determination and state freedom, 
and show how those ideas were implicated in relations of dependence in the international system. I 
examine two moments of debate: first, the ‘Wilsonian moment’22 of post-World War I 
reconstruction and, second, debates about self-determination conducted in the UN in the 1950s. In 
the first section I argue that US President Woodrow Wilson’s understanding of self-determination 
was informed by the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom. First encountered in Chapter Three, in 
Chapter Five I explore further the Paternalistic Idea, highlighting the disconnect in that idea between 
the ideal of self-mastery and the means through which it is realised. The ideal of self-mastery in the 
Paternalistic Idea was one of responsible, democratic states governing themselves as they saw fit. 
Not all peoples were equally prepared for self-government, however, and the aim of promoting this 
self-mastery legitimated great power influence ranging from occasional intervention through to the 
continuous colonial administration of overseas territories.  
 
In the UN in the 1950s, the idea that freedom could be advanced through political dependency was 
contested by states exhibiting an Independence Idea of state freedom. In this idea, states were 
understood as complexes of racial, cultural and geographical characteristics. These states could be 
                                                          
22
 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment : Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism: (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 12 
 
free only if they were politically independent and free to determine their own way of life. 
Dependent peoples living in colonial and Trusteeship territories were thus understood as states-in-
waiting and their freedom depended on their independence being granted without conditions of 
fitness for self-government. The Independence Idea of state freedom contributed, therefore, to a 
momentous delegitimation of colonial relations of dependence.  
 
Taken as a whole, Chapters Three to Five constitute a narrative of the evolution of some of the more 
prominent ideas about state freedom to have formed part of the international normative structure 
in the past 300 years. They show that throughout that period there has been a significant normative 
preference for state freedom among the practitioners of international relations. They demonstrate 
that modern states have made repeated claims for, and in support of, freedom, but that there has 
been profound disagreement about what constitutes that freedom and what are the necessary 
conditions for its realisation. Competing ideas of state freedom have, at various times, butted up 
against one another causing tension within the system, informing different and incompatible 
positions on how international relations of control in international politics ought to be configured. 
Sometimes ideas about state freedom have resisted inter-state interference; at other times, they 
have justified it. The uneasy coexistence of different ideas about what makes states free and how to 
realise that freedom has repeatedly been a dynamic force prompting and shaping international 
change and evolution. 
 
I conclude by reflecting on the implications that illuminating the process of the evolution of ideas of 
state freedom has for how we understand the state and the international system. I suggest that 
prevailing ideas about what makes states free constitute states as particular agents, placing them in 
particular positions and roles with respect to other states and shaping their privileges and 
prerogatives. I situate that discussion in the context of the dominant conception of the state as a 
sovereign entity arguing that the conceptual lens of state freedom reveals structural relationships of 
power and authority that go beyond those implied by the principle of sovereignty. 
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Chapter One  
State Freedom in International Relations Theory: Autonomy and 
Constraint 
 
Introduction 
 
Discussion of the concept state freedom—the concept at the heart of this thesis—has been largely 
muted in the academic discipline of International Relations (IR); existing literature offers no 
sustained and explicit exploration of how the freedom of the state relates to the practice of 
international relations. The lack of a sustained scholarly analysis of state freedom does not, 
however, mean that it is entirely absent from IR theory. In this chapter I review its treatment in 
literature from four of the most prominent paradigms in the study of international relations—
realism, liberalism, constructivism and the English School. I do so in order to support two central 
points; first, that conceptions of state freedom are theoretically implied by each of these important 
paradigms in international relations theory; and second, that the theoretical understandings of the 
freedom of the state implied in the existing literature have not been made explicit in a sustained 
way. By demonstrating that state freedom is important to and underdeveloped in the main ways we 
think about international politics I hope to both introduce the idea of state freedom and provide 
justification for analysing it at length. 
 
I do not approach this review with a fixed understanding of 'state freedom' specifically, or 'freedom' 
more generally.23 Rather, I consider alternative ways of approaching these concepts opened up or 
foreclosed by different theoretical starting points and reflect on their implications for building a 
theoretical approach to studying state freedom. In order to structure my discussion, however, I do 
broadly conceive of freedom of the state to refer to what the state (understood as an agent) is 
constrained or enabled to do or be. I also keep in mind that in most political philosophical 
understandings of freedom, the constraining and enabling conditions pertinent to a discussion of 
freedom are thought to be social rather than 'natural'. 
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Realism and state freedom 
 
Structural Realism 
 
As William Wohlforth has noted, one can claim without too much hyperbole that “the academic 
study of international relations is a debate about realism”.24 The influence of this paradigm on the 
discipline has been deep and enduring, and, although a broad church, Kenneth Waltz is perhaps the 
one figure whose intellectual impact looms largest over IR. It is with his structural (or neo-) realist 
theory of international politics that I begin my literature review. I begin with Waltz’s theory not only 
because of the impact it has had on the field but also because structural realism represents a 
difficult case for my claim that concepts of state freedom are implicit in the prominent ways of 
thinking about international relations. As an avowedly structural theory of international politics, 
Waltz’s realism excludes unit-level theories, suggesting an approach in which, as John M Hobson has 
put it: “the state is exclusively derived from the systemic reproduction requirements of the 
anarchical state system”.25   
 
If Hobson is correct, and the Waltzian state is understood purely in terms of systemic constraints, 
one could question my assertion that an implicit conception of state freedom is pervasive in IR 
theory and the case for a sustained analysis of that freedom would be weakened. In this section I 
make the opposing argument: that even in Waltz’ Theory of International Politics there is such a 
conception, albeit a relatively thin one. 
 
There is no doubt that Waltz’s focus is the structure of the international system, rather than the 
nature of the units inhabiting it. In Theory of International Politics, Waltz goes to great lengths to 
repudiate ‘reductionist’ theories of international relations which provide general explanations of IR 
based on characteristics of states or their interactions.26 The correct approach to formulating a 
general theory of international politics, he argues, must be to “leave aside, or abstract from, the 
characteristics of units, their behaviour, and their interactions”.27 What we are left with when we do 
so, according to Waltz, are purely system-level variables which define the structure of a political 
system: the ordering principle by which units are arranged, the formal functional differentiation of 
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those units, and their distribution of capabilities. Because states are like-units in terms of their 
function for Waltz, however, the second of these variables (the only one that relates to the 
properties of states) “is not needed in defining international-political structure” and drops out of the 
picture.28 Hence, Waltz’s structural realist theory of international politics does not require—and 
some would say precludes29—a theory of the state.30 Rather, the state appears to be, as Hobson 
argues, “exclusively derived from the systemic reproduction requirements of the anarchical state 
system”;31 pressure from this anarchical system, rather than characteristics of states themselves, 
constitutes the central explanation of the character of international politics. 
 
Despite its emphasis on the anarchic ordering principle of the international system, Waltzian realism 
does, however, suggest a number of elements relating to state freedom. Although he gives 
theoretical priority to system structure, privileging it as an explanatory variable, Waltz is explicit in 
denying structure agency in international politics. Structure may have causal priority in Waltz’s 
theory, but its influence is exerted only indirectly, through the major agents in international politics: 
states.32 Though Waltz’s theory emphasises international structure, his understanding of that 
structure necessitates a conception of states as autonomous agents; it is through the “co-action of 
self-regarding units” that international-political systems are formed for Waltz—they are 
“individualist in origin, spontaneously created, and unintended”.33  
 
In Waltzian structural realism states are conceived of as wholly free of social constraints, and it is 
this unconstrained state freedom that is generative of the systemic pressures central to structural 
realism in two ways. First, preserving autonomy—in the sense of not being subject to the authority 
of another agent—is the primary interest of states, and the pursuit of this goal shapes state 
behaviour.34 Second, it is because states attempt to preserve autonomy in a “world of free states” 
that the systemic pressures identified by Waltz are generated.35 A world of free states is a self-help 
world with no external agent ensuring an individual state’s survival, and it is therefore a risky world. 
Should states wish to preserve their autonomy (which Waltz asserts they do), the dangers and risks 
of self-help constrain states, limiting their freedom of action and making their behaviour predictable. 
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The insecurity inherent to anarchy means that, in order to survive, states must follow the survival 
strategies available. Hence Waltz expects states to a) replicate the behaviour of other successful 
states, and b) balance against stronger states in the system.  
 
The anarchic system is not a determining force, however, and states, for Waltz, remain free to ignore 
its influence. Nonetheless, structural realism predicts that states which do so will lay themselves 
open to dangers and will suffer.36 Ultimately, such states will be selected out of the system, thus 
reproducing the same international political structure. For Waltz, then, the freedom of the state 
involves a trade-off with security. States “are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. 
If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted.”37 In reasoning in this way, Waltz abstracts up 
from a tradition of thought on individual freedom that has been prominent in the work of social 
contract theorists and echoes the ideas of earlier realists such as John H Herz.38 Strongly critical of 
‘idealist nationalist’ thought, Herz rejected the position of idealists who held nationalities to possess 
the same fundamental rights as man, and who theorised that “once…freedom had been achieved in 
a system of self-determining nation-states, there would no longer be any reason or justification for 
international friction and war”.39 The effect of an absence of interference and oppression of states 
was not peace, according to Herz, but rather the security dilemma and “a vicious circle of security 
and power accumulation”.40 A similar logic is also applied by later Realist authors who have relaxed 
Waltz’s highly formal understanding of anarchy. Realist scholar David Lake sees hierarchies 
throughout the international system based on a social contract between ‘ruler’ and ‘ruled’.41 In this 
contract states, having ceded elements of their sovereignty, accept restraints on their behaviour in 
return for order and security. This mode of thinking parallels the Hobbesian domestic freedom 
problematic in which liberty, understood as the absence of interference, must be ceded to political 
authority in order to enjoy both security and (a transformed) liberty.  
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We have seen, then, that contrary to what one might expect, even parsimonious, structural realism, 
contains an implicit conception of state freedom. This conception, moreover, is important to Waltz’s 
core theoretical arguments; both the autonomy of states and their autonomy-preserving behaviour 
are key drivers of the structural constraints that generate the theoretical expectations of neorealism. 
However, a number of qualities of Waltzian realism also severely circumscribe the reflections on 
state freedom that can be opened up by that paradigm. Waltz’s theory adds weight to the 
suggestion that state freedom may be an important concept that could add to our understanding of 
international politics, however, by focusing on general theory, and rejecting explanations of 
international politics that include unit-level characteristics, structural realism forecloses any 
sustained reflection on state freedom. In his attempt to achieve structural consistency, Waltz is led 
to the contradictory position of recognising the importance of state agency in international relations, 
but expunging it from his theory.   
 
Waltz’s writings suggest that in his understanding of international politics, the mutual interaction of 
system and units is important in shaping international behaviour. On the one hand, individual state 
agency is crucial to generating the character of the international system. This is so because system 
structure is defined in terms of the arrangement of its units, implying it is these units (autonomous 
states) which constitute it. On the other hand, however, it is only through the influence of the 
system itself—that is to say, the imperatives of self-help—that states act to produce it, implying the 
priority of international structure. It is this tension at the heart of neorealism that has led to two 
opposing readings of Waltz: a systemic reading which sees states as product, not productive,42 and 
an agent-centric reading in which states pre-exist the system.43 That both of these readings are in 
some sense ‘correct’ results from the fact that Waltz acknowledges the significance of the co-
constitution of states and structure but refuses to theorise it; by exclusively focusing on the third 
image of international relations he is unable to coherently combine his insights with a theory of the 
influence of the second image (the state). The autonomous state is axiomatic for Waltz meaning, as 
Alexander Wendt has noted, system structure can only be conceived of as constraining, rather than 
generating, states as agents.44 An investigation into the social conditions which constitute states as 
free or not free to do and be a range of actions and conditions of character is, therefore, precluded 
by structural realism. Moreover, emphasis put on the distribution of capabilities in structural 
realism’s theoretical schema leads realists to privilege material, rather than ideational factors in 
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shedding light on world politics. Ideas and norms tend not to be given much weight by realists,45 a 
priori prejudicing against an investigation into the possibility that ideas about state freedom may 
have been significant in structuring international relations. 
 
Classical Realism 
 
Waltz’s refusal to admit a theory of the state into his theory of international politics is not 
representative of all realist writings, and it was precisely this characteristic of classical realism that 
Theory of International Politics positioned itself against. In Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among 
Nations46—criticised by Waltz for its reductionism—the state plays a much more prominent role.  
 
The differences between Morgenthau and Waltz should not be overemphasised; precursors of many 
of the latter’s main arguments can be found in Politics Among Nations. As in Waltz, the international 
system is seen by Morgenthau as anarchic and dangerous, leading to systemic imperatives that 
mould state behaviour. States are seen as autonomous and individualistic, and the anarchic 
structure of the international system leads to balance of power politics; balance of power “insures 
the freedom of one nation from domination by the other”.47 In acting to maintain their autonomy 
when faced with systemic pressures, Morgenthau’s states both balance and emulate, like Waltz’s. 
Unlike Waltz, however, Morgenthau brings domestic variables firmly into the picture: crucial in 
shaping state behaviour are a) what a state’s interest is with respect to the balance of power (does it 
have imperialistic or status quo interests),48 and b) how states perceive the interests of other 
states.49 
 
The addition of perceptions of decision-makers as a determinant of international political behaviour 
is indicative of a second face of Morgenthau’s classical realism, an aspect that is at odds with 
Waltzian structuralism. Whereas in Waltzian realism the state is assumed to be free both from 
domestic constraints and international restraints,50 its freedom in Morgenthau’s realism is variable 
according to both second and third image environments. Unlike Waltz, for whom the international 
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system is reproduced unintentionally by egoistic state behaviour, Morgenthau sees the possibility of 
the international environment being consciously constructed by its main actors. According to 
Morgenthau, the precariousness of power politics engenders bulwarks against its dangers, in the 
form of “the normative orders of morality, mores and law”,51 and unlike Waltz he does not prejudice 
against this normative backdrop having significance for international, as well as domestic, politics. 
He describes the ‘Aristocratic International’ of the 17th and 18th centuries as forming an “ethical 
system” that imposed its own restraints on international relations, distinguishable from power 
politics and international structure.52 The balance of power politics of the 17th to 19th centuries was 
accompanied by a system of aristocratic norms and standards rooted in a sense of common 
civilisation. While for Waltz, such factors would be dismissed as reductionist or mere process, for 
Morgenthau they constitute a full-blown, and variable, “structure of international society”.53 
 
Such a conception marks a radical difference between Morgenthau and structural realists, such as 
Waltz and Robert Gilpin. While Gilpin is less parsimonious than Waltz, admitting domestic factors 
into his schema as intervening variables, both he and Waltz start from a continuity problematic 
which seeks to explain the enduring—rather than changing—nature of international relations.54 The 
notion that an ethical system could have a profound influence on international political structure 
would be anathema to them both. Morgenthau’s recognition of the possibility of a significant 
international normative environment implies a very different conception of the freedom of the state 
to that of Waltz. While the restraints imposed by an ethical system on state power would seem to 
limit state freedom in the Waltzian sense (that is, in the sense of freedom from obligation, or 
restraint on the exercise of power) they also suggest a more profound freedom of states to shape 
their international environment. This type of freedom—to purposively shape the international realm 
in significant ways—is unambiguously denied states by structural realism, in which the only 
possibility for structural change Waltz sees is if the majority of states lose their interest in survival. 
The freedom problematic of Waltz (abstracted up from Hobbes) is thus inverted in Morgenthau. 
Rather than being trapped in a situation where their freedom begets insecurity, states use their 
freedom to shape the international normative environment as a buffer against the insecurity of 
balance of power politics. 
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The agency of states at the international level is not permanent, however, but contingent. According 
to Morgenthau, it is only in the presence of certain domestic facilitating conditions that states are 
afforded agency vis-à-vis the international system. The Aristocratic International was able to 
construct such an ethical edifice by virtue of its being a monarchical system. The cultural result of 
this system was a degree of homogeneity resulting from regular contact, family ties, common 
language (French), and common customs.55 The structural result (in diplomatic, rather than 
international political, terms) was stability, with the individuals responsible for foreign affairs often 
remaining in their posts for long periods. Both of these elements made possible the development of 
a common morality that “imposed its restraints upon the day-by-day operations of foreign policy”. 
The enforcement mechanism for these restraints was not coercive authority (which the tradition of 
moral scepticism shared by Hobbes and Waltz would deem necessary for curtailing the freedom of 
agents), but rather non-authoritative social sanction: “A violation of *Louis XV’s+ moral obligations, 
as they were recognized by his fellow monarchs for themselves, would set in motion not only his 
conscience but also the spontaneous reactions of the supranational aristocratic society, which would 
make him pay for the violation of its mores with a loss of prestige that is, a loss of power”.56 This is a 
qualitatively different kind of socialisation to that described by Waltz—which is dictated solely by 
power and survival rather than conscience—and opens up the possibility of theoretical insights 
spanning the second and third images of IR. 
 
Morgenthau argued that by his time, however, the ethical system of the Aristocratic International 
had undergone a process of “dissolution”, restraining foreign affairs “no longer”. He identified the 
reason for the collapse of this normative environment as “the democratic selection and 
responsibility of government officials”.57 As the domestic political structure evolved—through the 
expansion of individual political rights—control over state affairs became increasingly dispersed 
throughout society, leading to a higher turnover of officials and the diffusion of a nationalist, rather 
than internationalist, morality. The loss of state freedom of action with respect to its domestic 
constituency, therefore, reduced its agency with respect to the construction of the international 
environment: “the fluctuation of policymakers in international affairs and their responsibility to an 
amorphous collective entity has far-reaching consequences for the effectiveness, even for the very 
existence, of an international moral order”. This transformation, for Morgenthau, made an 
international system of moral restraints into “a fiction”.58 
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We can see from the above analysis that the conception of state freedom implicit in Politics among 
Nations is different, and slightly thicker, from that found in the theory of Kenneth Waltz. The latter 
implicitly conceives of state freedom as freedom from coercive authority, and sees that freedom 
restrained only by the imperatives of survival in an anarchic system. In Morgenthau’s work, on the 
other hand, one can infer an understanding whereby, though being subject to (moral) constraints, 
state freedom is augmented through the ability of that unit to significantly alter its external 
environment. One can also read in Morgenthau a sensitivity to the impact that domestic structures 
have on external state freedom, though the potential link between individual freedom (in the form 
of democratic self-government) and state freedom is not a concern of his and thus not pursued. 
 
To a degree, however, Morgenthau’s work is incoherent and contradictory. He does not find a way 
to combine the two aspects of his theory, and these aspects—a systemic aspect that requires the 
state to adapt to its external environment, and an agent-centric aspect in which states have the 
freedom to shape the international system through ethical orders—remain in tension. Morgenthau’s 
commitment to more readily recognisable realist convictions (such as asserting the inevitability of 
balance of power politics59 and the autonomy of the political from the moral realm60) seem to 
undercut the possibility of a thorough reflection on the dynamic relationship between, on the one 
hand, state freedom and, on the other, an international normative milieu. 
 
 
Liberalism and state freedom 
 
As I have shown in the section above, Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism implicitly conceives of 
states as free in the sense that they are subject to neither higher authority nor societal constraints. If 
states wish to preserve that freedom, however, they are highly constrained by the structural 
condition of anarchy, a condition which reproduces itself by selecting out states that do not act in 
accordance with systemic pressures. The classical realism of Morgenthau, on the other hand, 
gestures toward the possibility that states can also be constrained by societal norms and pressures. 
While in one sense societal norms are constraining on states, Morgenthau’s observance of a social 
international world beyond the individualism and autonomy of states hints at an idea that it is 
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through these social and moral constraints that states can shape their structural environment and be 
‘free’ in a deeper sense.  
 
The optimism that states can develop their international relations in progressive ways—which 
Morgenthau ultimately pulls-back from—is a key element of liberal thinking about international 
relations. Although liberals accept the realist postulate that a world of sovereign states is an anarchic 
system, as Michael Doyle asserts “their anarchy is different” from the anarchy seen by realists.61 
Rather than inevitable and recurring patterns of conflict and competition, liberals are cautiously 
optimistic about states’ capacity to engage in cooperative behaviour and shape their social 
environment. Crucial to this agential power of states with respect to the international structure is 
the creation of rules and institutions which on the one hand constrain states’ freedom of action, but 
on the other hand create conditions of possibility otherwise unavailable to states. In this section I 
argue that when applied internationally, liberal political theory exhibits an important tension 
between a conviction that states are or ought to be free and the belief that this freedom must, and 
can be, be transformed in order for liberal values to be realised. Attempts to cast liberal 
international relations theory as a purely analytic endeavour, consistent with a neo-positivist 
conception of science, have obscured the importance of a conception of state freedom to liberal 
approaches to international relations. Nonetheless, I argue, implicit notions of state freedom inform 
liberal IR theories through their philosophical heritage and are manifested in their analytic approach.  
 
International Liberal Theory 
 
Liberalism is a famously broad and often inconsistent theoretical tradition which has addressed an 
abundance of philosophical, political and economic questions. Despite the impressive range of 
liberal theory, however, the realisation of human freedom is conspicuous as perhaps the central 
liberal concern. The freedom of the individual is often claimed to be one of, if not the, core ethical 
commitment that distinguishes liberalism from other theoretical traditions,62 and the realisation of 
that freedom is a political imperative that liberal theorists have repeatedly attempted to satisfy. 
Animating such thought is a problematic that recognises freedom as both essential to human social 
life but also perilous to it. Despite the charge of utopianism that is often levelled at liberalism, at the 
most basic level most liberals do not, pace Richard Cobden, assume a natural harmony of interests 
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between people, but rather the “social unsociability” of human beings.63 This Kantian concept 
suggests that humans are both inclined to enter social relations but nonetheless engage in socially 
destructive behaviour. The ambiguous character of human nature—both good and evil, rational and 
irrational—means that if humans are not subject to restraints, their conflictive and selfish traits will 
make the realisation of human freedom impossible. By the same token, however, this ambiguity 
makes progress possible, with the rational element of human nature facilitating the development of 
human relations beyond the destructive. 
 
In liberal theory, crucial to the realisation of both cooperation and human freedom is the 
development of the state. An important liberal concern has been the recognition that state power 
has the potential to thwart human flourishing and that it must, therefore, be checked and limited by 
particular forms of domestic constitution. Nonetheless, it is society’s submission to a higher political 
authority that makes possible the transcendence of the harmful effects of anarchy between 
individuals. The tragic effects of natural, unconstrained freedom can only be overcome by its 
transformation into civil freedom constituted and guaranteed by the state.64 This crucial but 
ambiguous role played by the institution of the state in domestic liberal theory has significant 
implications when liberal thinking is directed towards international relations.  
 
It has been averred that liberal internationalism has been “little more than the projection of 
domestic liberalism on a world scale”,65 and it is certainly true that some of the main concerns and 
contributions of liberalism are mirrored beyond state borders. One of the principal ways in which 
liberal thought is rearticulated on the level of relations between political communities is the upward 
transposition of the problems associated with human relations in the absence of authority. As 
Immanuel Kant explained, the solution to humans’ flawed sociability at one level, recreated the 
same problem at the level of inter-state relations: 
 
The same unsociableness which forced men to [form a Commonwealth], becomes again the cause of 
each Commonwealth assuming the attitude of uncontrolled freedom in its external relations, that is, 
as one State in relation to other States; and consequently, any one State must expect from any other 
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the same sort of evils as oppressed individual men and compelled them to enter into a Civil Union 
regulated by law.
66
 
 
Freedom, then, once again poses problems for liberals. The liberal understanding of the natural 
condition of inter-state relations is similar to the realist; freedom begets insecurity.  This is a position 
that has been shared by both classical liberals and analytical liberals that accept the neo-realist 
anarchy problematic.67 
 
Rather than holding freedom and insecurity in a zero-sum relationship, however, liberals are more 
optimistic as to the possibility of transforming the nature of the international system in a way that 
provides both security and a transformed, rather than truncated, state freedom. What constitutes 
such a transformation and how it can and should be effected are not, however, settled questions in 
liberal theory.  
 
The Kantian solution to the problem of the conflict and violence procured by freedom appears to be 
the same as the domestic solution. Just as with individuals, states should give up their natural 
freedom to follow their “own desires” in order to obtain a more profound freedom made possible by 
obeying law: 
 
There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other states can emerge from a lawless 
condition of pure warfare. Just like individual men, they must renounce their savage and lawless 
freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws and thus form an international state (civitas 
gentium) which would necessarily continue to grow until it embraced all the peoples of the earth.
68
 
 
However, although the subjection of states to public laws may be the ideal solution for Kant, the 
nature of the state precludes the possibility of coercing states into this position. The state is not a 
mere container for individual freedom. Rather, by virtue of making civil freedom possible for its 
citizens, a state constitutes a moral order69 and, as such, is a “moral person” in itself.70 As a moral 
person governed by law rather than nature, a state—no matter how imperfect—represents an 
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improvement on the lawless amorality of the state of nature and thus ought not be coerced or 
compromised. Although there is a latent cosmopolitanism in Kantian thinking,71 it is only through the 
uncertain midwife of sovereign consent that such international moral progress can be realised. 
Although the liberal problematic of domestic anarchy is transposed up to inter-state relations, the 
liberal solution to domestic anarchy cannot be similarly transposed. The moral and legal regime 
embodied by states is particular rather than universal, and therefore imperfect, but is an 
achievement that ought not to be disregarded. States are thus valuable institutions that ought, in 
one way or another to enjoy freedom internationally.  
 
By virtue of constituting orders of right within their borders, states possess rights in the international 
realm beyond those borders, and principal among such rights is the right to non-intervention. As 
Kant put it, a state is not a “piece of property” but rather a “society of men whom no one else has 
any right to command or to dispose except the state itself”.72 Alternatively, as Michael Doyle more 
recently articulated: 
 
The basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from 
foreign intervention. Since morally autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that 
democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence. Mutual respect for 
these rights then becomes the touchstone of liberal international theory.
73
 
 
The idea that states are imbued with a moral value and therefore are (or ought to be) both self-
determining and free from outside interference74 has been justified on various grounds. Sometimes 
the position is defended on pragmatic grounds by the claim that sovereignty and non-intervention 
provide some level of order in international relations, without which violence and conflict would be 
intolerable. For others, states are more explicitly held to “provide collectively for the purposes of 
individuals”.75 RJ Vincent attributes such a position to the influential 19th century liberal JS Mill and, 
among contemporary thinkers, Michael Walzer. According to Vincent, the positions of Mill and 
Walzer begin “with the idea that states, like individuals, are to be treated as free persons, the 
pursuit of whose purpose requires the non-interference of others”.76 According to this idea—which 
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Charles Beitz calls the “idea of state autonomy”77—the “function of the state” is “to protect” the 
“common life” of its citizens “against the outside world”.78 Although many states fail to fulfil this 
function, the belief that states ought to be ‘treated as if they were free persons’ is often robust 
enough to resist empirical realities at odds with the logic that supports it.  
 
One of the ways in which the idea of state autonomy is defended even in the face of oppressive 
state actions is the claim that freedom must be grasped not given. Mill famously argued that the 
“attempt to establish freedom by foreign bayonets is a solecism in terms”;79 if a people “have not 
sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from merely domestic oppressors”, their freedom will 
be neither “real” nor “permanent” if it is granted by intervening powers.80 The freedom of states 
from intervention is a sturdy rule with true state freedom only achieved through indigenously-won 
self-government.  
 
These liberal arguments for the inviolability of states against outside interference illuminate the 
problems associated with coercing states into a renunciation of their ‘savage and lawless freedom’. 
Although liberals are often staunch defenders of pluralism81 they also hold certain values—such as 
individual freedom, justice or human rights—as being universal. Any commitment to promote such 
universal values internationally is in tension with a commitment to pluralism, which even if it is not 
blind to the behaviour of other states must at least be tolerant of it.  
 
This tension in liberal thought between pluralism and universalism is in part a product of liberalism’s 
ambiguous approach to state freedom. On the one hand, a ‘free state’ is one that is not dependent 
on another. In this sense, state freedom demands mutual respect for sovereignty and a strong norm 
of non-intervention, On the other hand, the connection that liberalism makes between a state and 
its people means that a state can only be truly free if its people are free; that is to say, if the state 
embodies liberal universal values, central among which is individual freedom which implies some 
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notion of self-government.82 This creates a moral hierarchy of states and opens up the possibility 
that state freedom could actually be promoted, rather than compromised by outside intervention.  
 
Analytic Liberalism 
 
In recent decades, mainstream liberal IR theorists have made a conscious attempt to separate 
liberalism from the normative tradition out of which it has grown.83 In perhaps the most influential 
liberal contribution to IR theory Robert Keohane, in After Hegemony, accepts not only realism’s 
anarchy problematic, but also the Lakatosian understanding of science that Kenneth Waltz 
advocates in Theory of International Politics. The consequence of the embracing of a neopositivist 
approach to scholarship means that in contrast to international liberal theory, liberal International 
Relations theory resists taking normative positions and making normative prescriptions. In 
Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism, then, traditional liberal questions about what states ought to 
be free to do and what kind of state is a true expression of freedom are put to one side. Analytical 
liberals propose liberalism to be “an approach to the analysis of social reality rather than as a 
doctrine of liberty”.84 
 
Keohnane’s neoliberalism does, however, retain at least two characteristics of traditional liberal 
international thought; first, that states are autonomous and, second, that while fostering 
cooperation between states may be difficult, it is not impossible. This cautious optimism about the 
possibility of civilising the dangerous autonomy of states is a key liberal belief; even sceptical 
liberalism which sees pluralism as the limit of possibility for international morality rests on at least a 
norm of mutual toleration and respect for autonomy. Keohane accepts that “liberalism believes in at 
least the possibility of cumulative progress”85 and an important aspect of his work is an exploration 
of the ways in which autonomous states can resist the structural constraints they face, bucking the 
logic of anarchy to engage in cooperative behaviour—most significantly in the form of international 
regimes and institutions—actively adjusting their own “policies to meet the demands of others”.86 
 
                                                          
82
 As Michael Doyle states, the liberal state “subject to neither the external authority of other states nor to the 
internal authority of special prerogative held, for example, by monarchs or military castes over foreign policy.” 
Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, 208. 
83
 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory’, European Journal of International 
Law 12, no. 3 (2001): 573–94. 
84
 Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Liberalism Reconsidered’, in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, ed. 
John Dunn, Murphy Institute Studies in Political Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 174. 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984), 12. 
 28 
 
Keohane sees states as “separate and typically self-interested units of action”,87 which act according 
to a bounded rationality.88 These rational, egoistic actors are not completely unconstrained and 
Keohane is interested in an “analysis of the constraints and opportunities that face states as a result 
of the international system in which they are embedded”.89 Reminiscent of Waltz’s autonomy-
preserving states, for Keohane “governments put a high value on the maintenance of their own 
autonomy” and it is therefore “usually impossible to establish international institutions that exercise 
authority over states”.90 Neoliberal institutionalist theory attempts to show, however, that given the 
right conditions, states are able to self-impose constraints on their action and engage in cooperative 
behaviour—“mutually adjust*ing+” their policies even when their interests are discordant.91 Although 
the principal contribution of After Hegemony to IR theory is to demonstrate that states can 
cooperate without submission to higher authority, Keohane nonetheless recognises the facilitating 
role hegemonic powers can play in creating international regimes.92 While he claims there is “little 
reason to believe that hegemony is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the emergence of 
cooperative relationships”,93 he is somewhat equivocal in the way he assesses that claim and his 
theory ultimately rests on “the willingness as well as the ability” of a “single state” to “lead” in order 
to get off the ground.94 For the maintenance of cooperative regimes, however, Keohane is confident 
in states’ capacity to recognise that it can “make sense to accept obligations that restrain one’s own 
freedom of action in unknown future situations if others also accept responsibilities”. Ultimately, the 
“pursuit of flexibility can be self-defeating: like Ulysses, it may be better, on occasion, to have 
oneself tied to the mast”.95 
 
Although Keohane recognises the impossibility of entirely separating scholarship from the normative 
values that inform it,96 his work is sharply differentiated from the international liberal theory 
considered above. Nonetheless, in his construction of a theory whereby states are able to transform 
the nature of the constraints and restraints they face while maintaining their autonomy, Keohane’s 
work can be seen to be informed by familiar concern with overcoming the excesses of state freedom 
without extinguishing it. Like Keohane’s liberal institutionalism, the ‘structural liberalism’ outlined by 
Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry characterises liberal world order as states successfully engaging 
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in institutions and practices that reconcile state autonomy with the dangers associated with it; 
modifying the structural condition of anarchy that autonomy itself generates. Unlike structural 
realists, Deudney and Ikenberry do not see a stark choice between autonomy (anarchy) and 
subjection (hierarchy). Rather, they observe in international relations ‘liberal’ ordering practices that 
recognise but refuse to reproduce the danger of anarchy as an international ordering principle. 
Practices such as “co-binding” are attempts to constrain states and reduce their freedom of action. 
Empire and hegemony (and the inherent subjection they entail) do not, however, exhaust the ways 
of practicing this social restraint on state behaviour; “symmetrical co-binding” is a liberal practice 
that “overcomes the effects of anarchy without producing hierarchy”.97 Deudney has since 
developed his interpretation of international institutions and ordering practices that lie between 
anarchy and hierarchy, describing them as “negarchy”—a negation of both hierarchy and anarchy—
and identifying with them with what he terms “republican” international theory.98 These practices of 
‘negarchy’ are equivalent to the concern of domestic liberalism (or, often, republicanism) to avoid 
the twin threats to freedom of the insecurity of wild natural freedom and the despotism of central 
authority. 
 
Most recently, the range of liberal international relations theory distancing itself from its 
philosophical forbearers and focusing on explanatory theory has been joined by the ‘new liberalism’ 
of Andrew Moravcsik. Moravcsik is keen to ground liberal international relations theory on a social 
scientific basis—which he sees as an essentially explanatory endeavour99—and his central 
explanatory variable is the configuration of state interests in the international system.100 For 
Moravcsik, however, the state is a mere “transmission belt” for the interests of private individuals 
and groups. 101 Although states act purposively in international relations, they do so in the limited 
capacity of furthering the interests (that is to say, preferences) of domestic actors.  
 
However, despite Moravcsik’s attempt to separate liberal international relations theory from its 
normative antecedents, and his disaggregation of the state into sub-strata of interests, new liberal 
scholarship nonetheless displays the hallmarks of the debate about state freedom in international 
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liberal theory identified above. Moravcsik’s outline of a ‘social scientific’ liberal IR theory attempts to 
synthesise the explanatory insights of the liberal tradition but separate them from their ideological 
associations. A key strain of this revived liberal theory is what Moravcsik calls “Republican 
Liberalism”.102 This variant of liberal theory finds explanations for state behaviour in the ways in 
which “domestic institutions and practices” translate sub-state preferences into policies. The 
significance of this is that although Moravcsik writes the state out of liberal theory as an 
independent actor, the institutional form of the state has significant causal consequence. The 
resulting theoretical prediction of republican liberalism is the familiar link between democracy and 
pacific behaviour.103 When new liberalism is used as a guide for policy, then, not all states (or 
‘transmission belts’) are equal, and liberal states are distinguished from illiberal states.104 Ikenberry 
and Anne-Marie Slaughter’s application of new liberal theory to contemporary world affairs 
constitutes a call for “Forging a World of Liberty Under Law”, as their prescription for US national 
security policy is entitled.105 This ‘forging’ of freedom takes the form of creating a world of “mature 
liberal democracies”, through military intervention if necessary.106 This new liberal project, then, is a 
particularly assertive intervention into the liberal debate between pluralism and universalism—a 
debate which, as we have seen, is in part a debate about state freedom. 
 
 
Constructivism and state freedom 
 
Whereas realists and liberals share a great deal of common ground in what they see as the natural 
condition of relations between states, perhaps the core claim of constructivists is to dispute the very 
notion of ‘naturalness’ in the social world. While liberals see a degree of mutability in the 
international realm and a limited flexibility in the definition of state interests, a basic constructivist 
insight is that the very identities which inform the interests of social actors and their relationships 
are shaped by socially constructed meanings and understandings. While many (though not all)107 
constructivists would accept the proposition that the international system is anarchic, they would 
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reject the attendant realist claim that this formal condition determines the nature of states’ 
relationships. Anarchy, in Alexander Wendt’s famous phrase, “is what states make of it”.108 
 
To say that anarchy is what states make of it is not the same as the liberal optimism that states can 
modify the dangerous effects of anarchy; it is to say that if insecurity is associated with anarchy it is a 
socially created institution rather than a necessary corollary of a lack of central authority.109 That 
does not mean, however, that states are free to transform the social world into whatever form they 
like; the process of the creation of meaning that an absence of central authority has for states is an 
example of one of constructivists’ core ontological claims; that agents and structures are mutually 
constitutive.110 This claim leads constructivists to hold a sophisticated position on the way that the 
state is constrained and enabled as an actor in world politics; on the freedom of its action, the 
freedom of its will, and the ways in which it is affected by shared beliefs about what states ought 
and ought not be able to do and to be. 
 
According to Wendt, the ‘problem’ of how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and 
structures stems from two ‘truisms’ about social life: “1) human beings and their organizations are 
purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) 
society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful 
actors”.111 These truisms pose a problem for Wendt in how one ought to conceptualise the 
necessary relationship between social actors and social structures. Rather than making one of either 
agents or structures ontologically primitive—a criticism Wendt makes of other theoretical 
approaches to IR—constructivism posits the relationship between the two to be mutually 
constituted, or co-determined;112 that is to say, it is simultaneously true that “social structures are 
only instantiated by the practices of agents”, and that the “causal powers and interests of those 
agents, in their own turn, are constituted and therefore explained by structures”.113  
 
The structures that constructivists refer to are not purely material structures. While neorealism 
parsimoniously considers the distribution of material capacities as the structure that counts in 
international relations, and neoliberalism considers norms to be a constraining influence on rational 
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state behaviour, constructivists suggest ideational phenomena such as norms and principles have a 
deeper significance for the character of world politics. Social or shared beliefs matter for the way in 
which states interpret and understand the phenomenal world. Structure is therefore understood by 
constructivists as the “institutions and shared meanings that make up the context of international 
action”.114 
 
For constructivists, this social structure has important effects on states. The first effect is that states 
do not have an unconstrained freedom of action internationally. Social structures—including shared 
beliefs about right and wrong behaviour—constrain states, limiting what they can legitimately do. In 
this sense, by taking into consideration “social normative structures”, “many constructivists seek to 
establish…that states are far more constrained than materialist theory recognises”.115 Constructivists 
do not, therefore, see the state as free or autonomous in the same way as Waltz does. 
 
The second, and more profound, effect is that these social structures constitute states as agents. 
Normative structures do not only constrain states in a simple way of affecting the calculations of a 
pre-existing rational actor. Rather, intersubjectively held beliefs—that is to say, ideational social 
structures—shape the identities of actors, and these identities in turn shape what states see as 
important and valuable. The identities and interests that inform state policy are not something 
internally116 generated by states; they are inseparable from the social environment within which 
they are embedded.  
 
Despite the profound role social structure plays in the constructivist understanding of the world, 
states are not reducible to structural effects. While shared understandings about the world 
constitute the state, it is only through the practices of states that shared understandings are created 
and recreated. As Wendt states, “it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate 
the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests”.117 
Elsewhere he affirms that “structure exists, has effects, and evolves only because of agents and their 
practices”.118 Although on a meta-theoretical level, constructivists have been less attentive to agency 
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than structure,119 empirically constructivists have shown how agents, including states, have been 
able to act purposively to transform their structural environment.120 On a theoretical level, Wendt 
claims that “structural change is difficult”, having a tendency to reproduce itself as a “self-fulfilling 
prophecy”.121 Nonetheless, contestation between the agents that constitute social structures 
through practicing them provides avenues for evolution and transformation. The socialisation 
process that shapes states’ identities is not totalising, and agents can hold “private” as well as 
intersubjective beliefs.122 Further, compared to human individuals in society, states are “much more 
autonomous from the social system in which they are embedded”.123 
 
Not all constructivists would agree with the way that Wendt conceptualises the state as an agent; he 
sees states as “people too”, by which he does not mean that we should make an analogy between 
states as people, but that they are people.124 However, his understanding of states as “purposive 
actors” would be shared by many constructivists, as would the claim that although states are 
structures themselves in the sense of institutional ensembles, they are treated “as-if” they are 
agents.125 Indeed, agency is often understood in the simple sense of an “entity” acting in a social 
context.126 By treating the state as an agent, and by conceiving of agency and structure as mutually 
constitutive, constructivism implicitly holds the state to be a free agent that has some degree of 
autonomy in determining both its will and its action but is nonetheless embedded in a complex 
system social structures that limit and condition that autonomy. Examining how those two core 
elements of social life interact and mutually evolve has been a key analytic focus for constructivist 
scholars.  
 
Although constructivists have not explicitly examined the ways in which social structures have 
constituted agents as free or not free, a significant body of scholarship exists that considers the 
dynamics between states and social structures that come close to ideas about state freedom. I am 
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referring here to literature on sovereignty, a concept by which the identity of the modern state and 
states system is overwhelmingly defined. Though this concept is understood in a variety of ways, in 
much constructivist as well as rationalist literature, sovereignty is taken to be foundational in 
shaping the international system. Sovereignty is also associated with autonomy, independence, and 
non-interference and in this way is evocative of freedom. 
 
 For rationalists, sovereignty necessitates anarchy, a structural condition which strongly proscribes 
state behaviour. For constructivists, sovereignty is understood as a social institution (and hence 
variable), but is nonetheless viewed as particularly significant in constituting the social identity of 
states (which, identities being relational as we have seen, shapes international relations).127 As 
Cynthia Weber has noted, IR scholars often “begin by positing sovereignty as a “first” or 
“constitutive” principle that is the defining characteristic of the modern state system”.128 Christian 
Reus-Smit also recognises this tendency, noting that constructivists assert a “tight constitutive 
relationship” between the organising principle of sovereignty (considered to be the primary 
institution of the international system), state identity and basic practices.129 Simply put, “*s+tate and 
sovereignty are mutually constitutive concepts”;130 the state is an international agent, and 
sovereignty is a social structure. Given the mutually constitutive relationship between structures and 
agents, it follows that any investigation into sovereignty is also an investigation into the state; how it 
is constituted as an international actor and the ways in which it is constrained and enabled by its 
social context. It is for this reason that, for constructivists, “*o+ne of the most important analytical 
challenges for scholars of international relations is to identify different meanings of state, 
sovereignty and territory, and to understand their origins, comprehend their changes of meaning, 
analyze their interrelationships, and characterize their transformations”.131 
 
This kind of constructivist exploration of sovereignty is exemplified by Daniel Philpott’s book 
Revolutions in Sovereignty, which examines how the Westphalian system of sovereign states that “so 
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essentially defines world politics today” came into being.132 Taking a macro-historical perspective, 
Philpott’s analysis suggests that freedom was profoundly implicated in the development of 
sovereignty, describing its history as an “unfolding logic of liberation”.133 Philpott’s analytical focus is 
on developments in international authority, which he sees as varying along three axes; what is a 
legitimate polity, who may become a legitimate polity, and what are the basic prerogatives of those 
polities. 
 
The two most important developments of international authority identified by Philpott are the 
‘revolutions in sovereignty’ he identifies as generating the contemporary sovereign state system; the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and decolonisation in the 1960s. These two very different revolutions 
were, he argues, driven by ideational developments prompting claims to sovereignty made “in a 
similar moral fashion, on behalf of a similar value—freedom”.134 Importantly, Philpott’s referent for 
freedom is not the individual, but rather states; the story of liberation Philpott tells is “the liberation 
of states, the freedom of states” from larger authorities.135 Philpott exhibits, therefore, a number of 
important elements of an investigation of the freedom of the state; the state as a referent of 
freedom, a sensitivity to the importance of ideas and social institutions, and a theoretical sensitivity 
to legitimate state prerogatives. Philpott’s conceptual focus, however, is sovereignty, and it is 
through the prism of this principle that he sees the history of modern international relations; a 
history which he characterises as first the waxing and then (the beginnings of) the waning of 
sovereignty as the definitive international principle. Philpott sees the history of international 
authority as one of the establishment and diminishment of ‘the sovereign state’—an entity which, 
although central to Philpott’s study, is not scrutinised theoretically or empirically—rather than a 
dynamic transformation of the state as an important locus of authority.  
 
Although Philpott understands sovereignty as a social institution and hence variable, he attributes to 
it a fairly fixed meaning (“supreme authority within a territory”) and, given that he doesn’t locate 
that institution within a broader normative environment of overlapping institutions which bear on 
the identity of the state, he is unable to see certain aspects of important transformations. For 
example, when discussing the second ‘revolution in sovereignty’, 20th century decolonisation, 
Philpott describes an “expansion” and “replication” of the sovereign state, but not a transformation 
of what that meant in terms of legitimate authority. In Philpott’s terms, decolonisation was a 
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revolution in one aspect of international authority—‘who may become a legitimate polity’—but a 
“reinforcement”, not revision, of the other two aspects (what is a legitimate polity and what are its 
basic prerogatives).136 This characterisation, the result of seeing historical events through the narrow 
focus on sovereignty, elides the significant change in prerogatives of existing states that the 
delegitimation of formal empire represented. In part, this empirical lacuna can be attributed to fact 
that Philpott, and IR in general, lacks a thorough conceptualisation of state freedom. Philpott 
recognises the historical significance of freedom in the development of the sovereign state, but 
conceptually he implicitly conflates the two: state freedom is equivalent to formal sovereignty. As 
such, he is able to see the emergence of state freedom, but not its transformation. 
 
Other authors that have analysed sovereignty from a constructivist perspective have recognised the 
need to consider sovereignty as only one principle (albeit a particularly important one) among 
several existing within a complex normative environment. Several authors in the edited volume 
State Sovereignty as Social Construct recognise that “sovereignty is not the only principle 
constituting state actors”,137 and that multiple (social) institutions co-exist in the international 
system, creating role and identity conflicts for states.138 In their concluding chapter to the volume, 
Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber assert that “one of the most striking conclusions” of the book 
is the observation that sovereignty “is only one among several competing organizing principles for 
state relations in the international system”, and that “sovereignty is only one of many identities that 
a state actor can take on”.139 Constructivism’s social ontology opens up, therefore, opportunities to 
investigate the ways in which social structures constitute states as agents in sophisticated ways. As 
yet, however, state freedom has only been hinted at in the empirical and historical applications of 
that approach. 
 
 
The English School and state freedom  
 
Proponents of the English School approach to international relations have been less explicit than 
constructivists in setting out their ontology of the social world and of their meta-theoretical and 
methodological principles. However, English School authors have nonetheless demonstrated a clear 
common sensibility in the kinds of questions they ask and the ways in which they go about 
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answering them. Inspired by a small group of prominent scholars—such as Martin Wight, Hedley 
Bull, RJ Vincent and Adam Watson—English School scholars’ principal object of study has been 
international society, a conceptual mid-point between realist conflict and utopian harmony. English 
School scholars traditionally follow, to a degree, realist premises and accept that a system of 
autonomous states without central authority leads to problems of instability and disorder. However, 
like constructivists, they also see states as forming a society, with rules, norms and institutions that 
regulate state behaviour. States in international society share “common interests and common 
values”, even if only to a minimal degree, and so “form a society in the sense that the conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules on their relations with one another, and share in 
the working of common institutions”.140 
 
Whether or not a group of states in any one place and time do actually form such a society, and if so 
what are the shared purposes and “values” it embodies, is an empirical and historical question—a 
question to which scholars from the English School have enthusiastically applied themselves. Despite 
the historical contingency of analyses of international society, however, one subject that has been 
enduringly prominent in English School analyses has been the relationship between order and 
independence. The starting point for much of the most important English School work was the 
“coexistence of independent political communities, if not in a state of nature then certainly in the 
absence of a common government”. Vincent described that anarchy as being for Bull “the central 
fact of international life” and the “central theoretical task was to decide how it was that order could 
obtain in this anarchy”.141 Like realists, English School scholars connect state independence with 
international instability, and so reconciling state autonomy with order is a central normative task for 
both theorists and practitioners of IR. 
 
In the Westphalian society of states, state autonomy is identified by English School scholars as a 
basic shared value. If the distribution of authority into distinct sovereign states defines the 
Westphalian state system, it follows that for such a system to constitute a society there must at least 
be a mutual respect for the autonomy of its members. As John Vincent explained: 
 
If international society is accurately described as being split up into islands of order, the distribution 
of which is determined by the principle of state sovereignty, then it is the function of the rule of 
nonintervention to draw attention to that distribution and require respect for it. It is a first principle, 
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an elementary rule of orderly international relations because its observation would demonstrate the 
recognition by states of the existence of others and the legitimacy of their separateness in a society 
bound together only by mutual acknowledgement of the autonomy of its parts. It is fundamental to 
order in a society without government because it stands guard over the established enclaves of order. 
So long as international society is primarily composed of sovereign states, observance of a general 
rule of nonintervention can be regarded as a minimum condition for their orderly coexistence.
142
 
 
A minimal condition for order143 between sovereign states, then, is a shared respect for autonomy. 
Although English School scholars assert the tight and stable link between the autonomy of states and 
the institution of non-intervention— for Nicholas Wheeler non-intervention is a “cardinal” rule of 
international society,144 while Robert Jackson describes it as a “grundnorm”145—the historical 
sensitivity of the English School means that they have been attentive to evolving modes of securing 
state independence. As I have shown in the introduction to this thesis, Martin Wight identified 
balance of power as a doctrine of inter-state relations as being animated by the shared purpose of 
maintaining the freedom of states. Wight asserted that “the postulate that there is an international 
society “generally entails” the belief that “the tranquillity of international society and the freedom of 
its members require an even distribution of power”.146 He saw the balance of power as a solution to 
the problem of the insecurity generated by the freedom and independence of states. The balance of 
power developed as an institution, therefore, to reconcile “international order” with state 
“independence”. In 18th and 19th century Europe, it was understood that “a distribution of power 
was the condition of international freedom” and “the guarantee of ‘the liberties of Europe’”. The 
conscious management of the balance was an attempt to avoid twin threats to state autonomy; on 
the one hand “disorder” and “insecurity” and, one the other, “a universal empire, with general loss 
of freedom”.147  
 
Examining the 20th century, Robert Jackson also notes the parallels between freedom and the 
purposive protection of state autonomy. In his study of sovereignty through the prism of 'quasi-
states', Jackson draws out some of the parallels between freedom and sovereignty through his 
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dualistic conception of “positive sovereignty” and “negative sovereignty”. Like negative liberty, 
negative sovereignty is defined as “freedom from outside interference”;148 a formal-legal condition 
conferred on states by international society. Positive sovereignty, on the other hand, “presupposes 
capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters”; like positive liberty it is a subjective 
condition, and one which demands a government is able to conduct international relations and “has 
the wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens”.149 Following the period of rapid 
decolonisation post-World War II, the nature of the freedom of states in the international system 
dramatically altered; whereas pre-1945 all states possessed ‘positive sovereignty’, the materially 
weak post-colonial states that emerged from the wreckage of European empires possess only 
‘negative sovereignty’, guaranteed by the powerful states in the system. 
 
While Jackson and Wight’s insights about sovereignty and balance of power are both suggestive of 
the freedom of states being an important concept in the Westphalian states system, neither of them 
devotes sustained analytical attention to the concept. Although Wight notes that the preservation of 
freedom was an important common purpose states in 18th and 19th century Europe, the meaning of 
that term in that context is not scrutinised, implicitly taken to mean an absence of hegemony. 
Jackson meanwhile uses freedom as an heuristic device and implicitly assumes an equivalence 
between state freedom and state sovereignty. 
 
The closest an English School scholar has come to analysing state freedom at length is Adam Watson. 
His book The Evolution of International Society is the most ambitious attempt to theorise the 
relationship between state independence and order across international societies of states. In The 
Evolution of International Society, Watson makes a general argument that across states systems that 
there is “an inevitable tension between the desire for order and the desire for independence”. 
Political communities are willing to accept constraints on their “freedom of action” in order to gain 
the benefits of “peace and prosperity”.150 According to Watson, all systems of political communities 
are organised according to principles falling somewhere between the “theoretical absolutes” of 
“absolute independence and absolute empire”.151 The institutions that an international society 
develops will be, according to Watson, an inevitable compromise between having “the ultimate 
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ability to take external decisions as well as domestic ones” (but being insecure),152 and security (and 
a greater degree of “centralized authority”).153  
 
Watson sees a spectrum of patterns of international relations between his two extremes of absolute 
independence and absolute empire, along which an international system will exhibit varying degrees 
of integration between political entities. Moving along the spectrum from independence, 
international systems can be characterised by hegemony, suzerainty and dominion before arriving at 
empire.154 The further a system is located along this spectrum, the greater the “constraints and 
commitments” that states are subject to.155 The autonomy and independence of states in the 
schema is described variously as consisting of an absence of these constraints and commitments,156 
“freedom in external decision”, 157 “freedom of action”,158 and that states are “free to act as they see 
fit”.159 Watson notes that historically, in the European states system, there has been a prominent 
pull toward the independence end of his scale and freedom of internal and external action for 
states.160 However, “the question of order between the member states of the European society 
became more acute in proportion as the demand for independence was realized, and the power of 
the states increased”.161 As a result, there has also been an important “gravitational pull towards 
hegemony, and the ubiquity of some hegemonial authority in societies of independent or quasi-
independent states”.162 
 
The theoretical conclusion Watson draws from his macro-historical investigation suggests that the 
maintenance of some notion of state freedom has been a recurring and important common value 
within systems of states. However, Watson’s understanding of independence and autonomy seems 
to consist of freedom of action for states, something he contrasts with both constraints and order. 
The lack of conceptual scrutiny places on ‘freedom of action’, or the meaning of freedom more 
widely, mean that Watson does not see the possibility that states’ freedom of action and 
independence could be transformed rather than inhibited by constraints and commitments. While 
he notes the pull toward hegemony in systems of independent states and that this hegemony can 
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have benefits for all states, the relationship that the resulting order has with freedom of action is 
zero-sum; increasing order means decreasing autonomy and freedom of action. It is impossible for 
Watson to conceive, therefore, that states’ freedom and autonomy might in important ways be 
constituted, not compromised, by commitments and integration. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
State freedom and state liberty are terms that are close to completely absent from the academic 
discipline of International Relations. Although scholars casually refer to states as being free to or not 
free to engage in specific behaviours, sustained, explicit reflection on what it means for states to be 
free or unfree has yet to be undertaken. In this chapter I have examined four of the most prominent 
paradigms, or approaches, to the study of international relations—realism, liberalism, constructivism 
and the English School—and analysed important theories and theorists from each. I have attempted 
to show that although none of those schools of the study of world politics have yielded self-
conscious and avowed studies of state freedom, implicit conceptions of state freedom appear to 
play important roles in the basic theoretical tenets of each approach. 
 
Autonomous states that are subject to no external authority and no social constraints are central to 
the way that structural realists see the international system. They are the only actor that counts in 
international relations, and their presumed desire for autonomy generates neorealism’s central 
predictions about state behaviour. A key problematic for liberal international theorists is how to 
preserve the freedom that states ought to possess as facilitators of human freedom while at the 
same time constraining states to avoid the dangers of war and conflict. For constructivists, the ways 
in which states are constrained and enabled by social structures are important not only for what 
they permit states to do but also because they constitute states as particular types of agents. English 
School scholars see an important tension between, on the one hand, states’ freedom to make their 
own decisions and act upon them and, on the other hand, order and stability in international 
relations. 
 
The authors surveyed in this chapter vary widely with respect to the ontological positions they hold 
with respect to world politics, the kinds of questions they are interested in asking, and the methods 
that they employ to do so. Nonetheless there are two commonalities that run through much of the 
literature considered here. The first is that the state is understood to be, or to have the potential to 
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be, a purposive agent. States are understood as important actors in world politics that have 
interests, make choices and act decisively. States either are or, at least, have the potential to be self-
directing; to will and to follow that will. The second common theme in the literature surveyed is that 
the self-directing capacity of states either is or ought to be constrained. The nature of the 
constraints that states face, and the implications of those constraints for state autonomy, differ 
widely between the paradigms. However, the question of the extent to and ways in which the self-
directing potential of the state is realised is a central issue for all of these important approaches. 
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Chapter Two 
State freedom and relations of control 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I reviewed a number of the major theoretical approaches in International 
Relations, showing that while none of the major paradigms have yet yielded extended, explicit 
consideration of state freedom, realism, liberalism, constructivism and the English School each, in 
different ways, imply a conception of states as free. In this chapter, I outline my approach to 
addressing the absence of reflection on state freedom in the discipline of International Relations. As 
noted in the introduction to this thesis, animating this research is a desire to investigate what role, if 
any, ideas about state freedom have played in the practice of international relations. I aim to 
illuminate the ways in which thinking about states in terms of freedom—what is the meaning of 
freedom when that value is applied to states and how might it be realised—has been implicated in 
how relations between states have been conducted. Chapters 3-5 are historical analyses of such 
ideas and together constitute an exploration of how ideas of state freedom have been manifest in 
practice. In this chapter, I lay the theoretical groundwork for the historical reconstructions that 
follow.  
 
The argument proceeds in three parts. First, I make an argument that distinguishes between ideas 
and terms. I show that during the 17th and 18th century, the freedom of states was an explicit subject 
of political discourse and that arguments about the “liberty of states” and what constituted a “free-
state” were notable. However, as the state’s position as the predominant site of political authority 
was consolidated, and as republicanism and Natural Law both faded in prominence, the use of the 
terminology of state freedom diminished. The absence of the terms freedom and liberty does not, 
however, equate to an absence of ideas of freedom. I argue that ideas of state freedom did not 
disappear from international discourse, but rather came to be expressed in different, but related, 
terms.  
 
Although the absence of the terminology of state freedom does not necessarily denote an absence 
of ideas of state freedom, it does present a challenge for studying them; how can we identify ideas 
of state freedom in the absence of the guiding light of the term? In the second section I address this 
methodological challenge. In doing so, I turn to the history of ideas of freedom in general, rather 
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than ideas of state freedom specifically. I briefly examine some of the more influential theories of 
freedom in order to identify common elements that characterise discussions about freedom. I do 
not attempt to find a common or true essence of freedom, but rather to establish what is being 
disputed or argued about in different theories of freedom. I contend that state freedom ought to be 
understood as being more than just the freedom of action of states; state freedom is equivalent to 
neither state capacity nor the room to manoeuvre left to states once their obligations have been 
taken into account. Rather, I argue that theories of freedom can be characterised as being about the 
necessary conditions for agents to be self-mastering. I suggest that the three elements of i) agents, 
ii) necessary conditions and iii) self-mastery together constitute a ‘grammar’ of freedom that can be 
employed to identify debates about the freedom of states as well as human freedom. 
 
Having identified what ideas of freedom are about, in the third section I move on to addressing the 
main question of this thesis; how have such ideas been implicated in the conduct of modern 
international relations? In this section I outline a theoretical argument for how ideas of state 
freedom can be understood to have been significant in conditioning international relations. The 
principal element of this argument is a claim that ideas of state freedom have, in modern 
international relations, structured relations of control between states, by which I mean patterns of 
influence and control between states. They do so via two basic intersubjective beliefs that have been 
persistently prominent in modern international relations. The first is a general normative preference 
for states to be free. Although there is no necessary relationship between holding an idea of what 
makes states free and a belief that such freedom ought to be realised, at least since the mid-18th 
century there has been a basic intersubjective belief that states ought, in some sense, to be free. The 
second is the belief that the freedom of states can only be realised in the context of certain social 
conditions; the freedom of states will be realised, conditioned or compromised by virtue of their 
relations with other actors. In the context of these two intersubjective beliefs, ideas about what 
make states free legitimate some configurations of relations of control between states and 
delegitimate others. By thus being implicated in the politics of legitimacy of the international system, 
ideas of state freedom have played an important, and under-studied, role in the practice of 
international relations. 
 
 
Concepts and terms 
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The principal argument of Chapter One was that although the explicit terminology of state freedom 
is absent from IR theory, we can nonetheless infer conceptions of the states as, in one way or 
another, free in the major theoretical approaches to the study of international relations. The rest of 
this thesis attempts a similar task but its subject of inquiry moves from the conceptual schemas of IR 
theorists to the prevailing ideas structuring international practice. As with theorists of international 
relations, the practitioners of world politics do not readily employ the terminology of state liberty or 
state freedom when they analyse, interpret and debate international relations. That is not to say 
that the terms freedom and liberty have been absent from the practical discourse of international 
relations; individual and collective freedom both make up a notable part of the rhetorical armoury of 
states-people. However, while notions of the collective freedom of nations and peoples will be 
familiar to observers of world politics the notion of the freedom of states is likely to appear more 
alien. 
 
Intellectual historians may be more familiar with the notion that states themselves, not only their 
populations, are or can be thought of as free. The idea that political communities could be free or 
unfree was an important normative preoccupation for the republican writers of the Italian 
renaissance, and the idea of the ‘free-state’ was an important concept in the development of the 
idea of the state itself.163 These ideas, inspired by Roman republicanism were revived by neo-
republicans in 17th century England and the conception of the ‘free-state’ enjoyed prominence. 
These thinkers, politicians and pamphleteers were strident in arguing that political liberty could only 
be realised in a free-state, which is to say a community in which the body politic was able to exercise 
its powers according to its “own wills” to meets its “own desired ends”.164 The ‘will’ in question for 
the republican thinkers was identified directly with the will of the citizens. The commonwealth 
(which was usually their preferred term for a political community), however, was associated directly 
with the people that constituted it; the will of a ‘free-state’ was not, therefore, reducible to the will 
of the ruler, but nor was it the will of the state conceived as an abstract entity or agent in itself.  
 
According to the neo-roman writers, “a body politic, like a natural body, will be rendered unfree if it 
is forcibly or coercively deprived of its ability to act at will in pursuit of its chosen ends”, 165 or even if 
it is “merely subject or liable to having its actions determined by the will of anyone other than the 
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representatives of the body politic as a whole”.166 Because of the association of the will of a polity 
with the will of its citizens, in republican thought there were two ways a commonwealth could be 
deprived of its freedom. One was “when a body politic finds itself subject to the will of another state 
as a result of colonisation or conquest”,167 the other when the “internal constitution of a state” 
permitted “the exercise of any discretionary or prerogative powers on the part of those governing 
it”.168 For a state to be free, then, the link between the will of the people translating into political 
action had to be assured; any subjection of the body politic to a will other than its own rendered it 
servile, regardless of whether the source of that exogenous will was foreign or indigenous. 
 
The equivalence that the neo-roman writers posited between the will of the commonwealth and the 
will of its citizens—an equivalence which legitimated and delegitimated certain forms of constitution 
with reference to the value of freedom—was “highly subversive” and strongly criticised.169 
Prominent among such critics was Thomas Hobbes who, in his famous Leviathan, denied the link 
between freedom and the internal characteristics of a state. Hobbes did not deny the liberty of 
states, but he distinguished that freedom from the will of its citizens. The state was not identifiable 
directly with its population, but rather was itself a “person by fiction”,170 irreducible to either its 
population or its rulers. In this watershed political theory, although the state is a fictional person 
that can only pronounce and act through its representatives, the fact that the actions of a 
representative are “attributed” to the state mean the fictional person of the state can still be, as 
Quentin Skinner notes, a “figure of unsurpassable force and might” and a “powerful agent” .171  
 
As a result of this representative theory of the state, while Hobbes echoed the republican notion of 
the liberty of political communities, it was properly the freedom of the state as a fictional person 
itself rather than the freedom of its members to which he referred. The “Libertie of the Common-
wealth” was, for Hobbes, “the same with that, which every man should have, if there were no Civil 
Laws, nor Common-wealth at all”.172 Because states are constrained by neither physical chains nor 
the artificial chains of law, “in States, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every 
Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, 
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what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit”.173 Of 
course, by possessing absolute liberty and hence living in a state of nature, Hobbes also saw states 
as existing in a “condition of perpetuall war” and sovereign representatives of states had “the 
Libertie to resist, or invade other people”.174 Like individuals in the state of nature—who possessed 
the kind of liberty “by which all other men may be masters of their lives”175—states, then, were free 
absolutely but precariously. 
 
Hobbes’ theory of the state as a fictional person, possessing natural liberty, was received into 
continental philosophy and re-articulated in terms of a ‘moral person’ possessing a single 
‘understanding and will’ that was embodied in (but not reducible to) the representatives of the 
state.176 This Hobbesian schema received “by far” its “most influential” presentation in Emmerich de 
Vattel’s 1758 treatise Le Droit des Gens (The Law of Nations). The conception of the state as a moral 
person was fundamental to Vattel’s thinking; it was this moral personhood that made the state a 
subject of natural law, and it was the application of this law to states to which The Law of Nations 
was dedicated. The starting point of this application was to proclaim, though analogy to human 
individuals in a state of nature, that the state was naturally free. The distinct, and profoundly 
influential, contribution that Vattel makes to the history of international thought is to explore how 
this natural freedom of states can be made compatible with their interdependence and societal 
obligations.177 As Theodore Christov has noted, “Vattel’s most pronounced concern is reconciling the 
tension between the freedom of states and their duties to the natural society of nations”.178 
 
Stéphane Beaulac has argued that in exploring this tension, Vattel “transformed the reality of the 
word ‘sovereignty’” in order to “carry out the externalization of the idea of exclusive and supreme 
power over territory and people”.179 This extension of sovereignty’s meaning “constitutes”, 
according to Beaulac, “the most important episode in the history of the changing social effects of 
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‘sovereignty’ on the international plane”.180 I do not disagree with Beaulac’s main thesis that the 
sovereign state for Vattel is an entity that is both “incorporated and independent”,181 or that The Law 
of Nations was influential in the development of that meaning. However, although it is rarely given 
much importance by IR scholars, the terms in which Vattel discussed the external implications of the 
moral personhood of the state not sovereignty, but rather ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’ and ‘independence’.182 
Most of the time, when using the term sovereignty, Vattel was not referring to the international 
independence of states, but rather employing the term in the same way as Hobbes; to denote a 
supreme public authority that embodies the fictional person of the state.183 
 
That Beaulac uses the term sovereignty to describe what Vattel calls freedom is indicative of the 
fading prominence of the terminology of state freedom since the mid-18th century. Andrew Hurrell 
and Richard Devetak have both placed Vattel at a crossroads, historically and theoretically, between 
pre- and early-modern ideas of the unity of Christendom and more recognisably modern practices 
and ideas about autonomous nation-states.184 Vattel’s conception of the freedom of states 
exemplifies his position as a thinker of epochal transition, rooted as it is in 17th century universalising 
ideas about natural law, but employed to derive ideas about state independence, balance of power 
and moral pluralism. For natural law thinkers, the notion that states were free was an obvious 
conclusion; individuals were naturally free, states were individuals in a state of nature and states 
were, therefore, free. As Natural Law ideas were replaced in international juridical thinking by 
positive law—a shift often attributed to Vattel—the terminology of free states also fell out of favour. 
As we will see in Chapter Four, 19th century international lawyers were extremely indebted to 
Vattel’s conception of states, but whereas he described states as naturally free, later writers 
assigned to states a natural or essential right to sovereignty. Similarly, the Hobbesian rejection of the 
link between political liberty and living in a free state prevailed over republican ideas, severing state 
freedom from its other main intellectual grounding. 
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As I will show in the chapters that follow, the issues and questions raised by Vattel in relation to the 
freedom of states, and the tension between “pluralism and unity”,185 have not been resolved in the 
practice of modern international relations; they have been enduring, subject to repeated 
contestation and negotiation. That contestation has not been characterised, however, by the 
prominent use of the terminology of the freedom and liberty of states.  
 
The presence of notions of the freedom of states during the period in which the modern states 
system was consolidated is indicative of the possibility that ideas of state freedom have some 
importance for the practice of international relations. The diminishing prominence of that language, 
however, raises a legitimate question of whether that concept has had any international importance 
since the mid-18th century. The remainder of this thesis constitutes an argument that it has, but that 
the presence of conceptions of state freedom have not been marked by the use of the term state 
freedom. The next section outlines how I understand and identify ideas of state freedom, but before 
doing so it is necessary to defend the possibility that concepts can be distinguished from 
terminology. I will address two avenues for criticism of attempts to separate ideas from terminology. 
The first is the philosophical position that identifies meaning with language. Such linguistic 
approaches to philosophy, although broad and varied, can be characterised as rejecting 
transcendental and metaphysical accounts of meaning, instead arguing that language is the medium 
through which meaning is both constructed and understood. Unsurprisingly, the words used by 
social actors are given great importance in such approaches, and the attribution of a concept or idea 
to an actor or actors without the corresponding use of the language would violate the basic tenets of 
linguistic philosophy. The importance of such philosophy for the study of international relations 
becomes apparent when the association between language and meaning is extended into arguments 
that language can play a productive or performative role in the creation of social reality, for example 
through the creation of social roles and identities or through speech acts. If such approaches are 
correct, then the social world is constituted by the language through which social actors 
communicate.  Whether the language of state freedom is present or absent is, therefore, far from a 
trivial issue. 
 
As will become clear in the remainder of this chapter, underlying the theoretical approach to this 
thesis is an ontological position that owes much to philosophical approaches that hold language as 
implicated in the construction of social reality. To note the importance of language, however, does 
not necessarily entail adhering to equivalence between ideas and terminology. Although we may 
                                                          
185
 Hurrell, ‘Vattel: Pluralism and Its Limits’, 247. 
 50 
 
sometimes assume a necessary relationship between concepts and terms, even brief reflection 
shows that to be mistaken.  
 
It is a familiar scholarly practice to problematise the relationship between a term and the concept it 
represents. Intellectual historians, for example, have been clear in identifying the danger in 
assuming that a particular term, such as ‘sovereignty’, has a single meaning. Employing the 
Wittgensteinian observation that ‘sovereignty’ cannot have any meaning that transcends its use, to 
assume that it had the same meaning in the 17th century as today would risk anachronism. Indeed, 
historical investigation into the changing meanings of key concepts in international relations has 
proved a fruitful scholarly endeavour over recent decades. 
 
Once the relationship between term and concept is compromised by the observation that a single 
term can have multiple and evolving meanings it opens up the possibility that a concept can be held, 
and communicated, without the use of a specific term. This is something that is clear from the way 
we use and think about language in everyday settings. We would not deny, for example, that a 
person could have an understanding of, recognise and even discuss the Freudian idea of 
‘abnegation’ without ever having encountered the term. Even if one were to deny the possibility of 
forming concepts without language, such a position would not imply the need to articulate that 
concept using any specific term in order to possess an understanding of it. Again, as an example, we 
can linguistically construct the idea that people may, as a psychological defence-mechanism, refuse 
to accept overwhelming evidence of something, all without using the term abnegation.  
 
Although it has been commonplace to accept that a single term can have different meanings in 
different contexts, scholars have seemed less willing to accept that a concept can be in use in the 
absence of a (pre-determined) corresponding term. This is perhaps precisely because of the 
suspicion that language has to be situated, and used, to have meaning. If concepts are denied any 
transcendental, essential meaning, then the use of terminology may appear to be the only way for 
concepts to be identified. To again use sovereignty as an example, if it is acknowledged that the 
meaning of sovereignty is evolving not fixed, to establish its meaning in particular spatial and 
temporal contexts demands an examination of the use of sovereignty. In order to escape reliance on 
the use of the term sovereignty, one would have to assign to the concept of sovereignty a fixed 
meaning; only armed with an a priori understanding of sovereignty could one identify the use of that 
concept without the use of the term. It seems then, at first blush, that we can either hold ideas to be 
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changing and analyse the use of the term, or hold meaning fixed and allow that it can be expressed 
in a variety of terms, but not hold that both meaning and terminology can be changeable. 
 
In this thesis I take the position that we can both reject that concepts have essential definitions and 
also that they need to be expressed in relation to specific terms; concepts are reducible neither to 
terms nor essential definitions.  The idea that we must a priori privilege either specific terminology 
or a specific definition of a concept is unsatisfactory because privileging terminology risks obscuring 
the employment of a concept in other terms, while privileging an essential understanding means 
ignoring the possibility that meanings can change. I attempt to avoid both of those problems by 
distinguishing the topic of state freedom from both the term state freedom and particular ideas, or 
conceptions of state freedom. While ideas of state freedom (understandings of what constitutes 
freedom for states) can evolve, and can be expressed through a variety of terms, I argue that a 
broader understanding of what ideas of state freedom are about (not what they are) can 
nonetheless usefully bring different ideas expressed in different terms under the rubric of state 
freedom. 
 
If we accept the ontological position that ideas (or concepts) and terms can be separated, the 
second principal avenue for criticising the separation of concepts from terms is the epistemological 
question of whether we can correctly attribute an idea to somebody if they do not use specific 
terminology. This seems to be the concern of Quentin Skinner, who distinguishes concepts from 
terms but cautions against revising the terms in which historical beliefs are expressed. Skinner 
asserts that “if we wish to grasp how someone sees the world – what distinctions he draws, what 
classifications he accepts – what we need to know is not what words he uses but rather what 
concepts he possesses”.186 But Skinner also argues that: “historians have no option but to begin by 
assuming that what people actually talk about provides us with the most reliable guide to their 
beliefs”.187 “To begin by insisting that they must really be talking about something else”, he argues 
“is to run the highest risk of supplying them with beliefs instead of identifying what they 
believed”.188 
 
The danger that Skinner raises of attributing to people beliefs to which they did not adhere is, in a 
thesis like this one, very real and ought to be taken seriously. However, it strikes me as an obstacle 
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that ought to be confronted methodologically rather than avoided by forsaking particular lines of 
academic inquiry. I both address and attempt to overcome that problem in the next section, where I 
outline a grammar of debates about freedom that can accommodate both changing terminology and 
changing conceptions of freedom.    
 
 
The grammar of freedom 
 
In this section I address the methodological challenge of how to identify and reconstruct ideas of 
state freedom in the absence of the terminology of state freedom. This difficulty is exacerbated by 
the fact that although I know the species of ideas I wish to identify—what constitutes state freedom, 
or what it means to be a free state—the content of those ideas is necessarily unknown. My aim is to 
uncover ideas of state freedom rather than approach historical investigation armed with an a priori 
idea of state freedom and attempt to find arguments with which it is consistent. Freedom could be 
termed an essentially contested concept and the value in studying it in relation to states is to make 
the contestation that surrounds it, and its significance, visible rather than attempt to settle it.  
 
As Christian Reus-Smit has argued, when examining the historical role of ideas “*w+hat matters is the 
form arguments take, not the terminology employed”.189 In keeping with this sentiment, my 
approach is to elucidate not what state freedom is, but rather what discussions about freedom in 
general have been about. In this section I examine arguments about freedom generally (rather than 
specifically state freedom) and identify what I argue are important common elements in different 
theories of freedom. I argue that some of the most prominent and enduring theories of the freedom 
of human individuals and groups have been about the necessary conditions for agents to be self-
mastering. These three elements—agents, necessary conditions and self-mastery—do not represent 
an essence of freedom, but debate about freedom nonetheless tends to involve disagreement about 
one or more of these elements. Together, I argue, they can be seen as constituting a grammar of 
debate about freedom. Identifying this grammar, or form, in the practical discourse of international 
relations can, I claim, help distinguish ideas about state freedom from other species of ideas without 
foreclosing the meaning of state freedom. In other words, the grammar of freedom can be used to 
identify the topic of state freedom without prejudicing a particular conception of state freedom. 
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In the last century, perhaps the most significant debate between theorists about the grammar of 
freedom has revolved around the distinction between positive and negative concepts of liberty. This 
dichotomy was made famous by Isaiah Berlin in his 1958 essay Two Concepts of Liberty in which he 
distinguished two “senses” of freedom, or liberty. The first of these, negative liberty, was concerned 
with the question “What is the area within which the subject—a person or group of persons—is or 
should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons”. The 
second theory, positive liberty was concerned with the question “What, or who is the source of 
control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that”.190 
 
In Berlin's exposition of negative liberty, which he associates with the Liberal tradition of political 
thought, this concept of freedom has three structural elements. The first is a subject which is 
capable of both desire and choice.191 The second element is potential constraints, and the third is an 
external power or authority, which is the source of those potential constraints. It is the relative 
presence or absence of constraints—put in place by the external power—on the choice of the 
subject that determines the extent to which that subject is said to be free or unfree: “If I am 
prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree”.192 Freedom 
in this sense does not consist in the actual action (or inaction) of the subject following the choice, 
but rather the absence of interference in making the choice; it is an “opportunity concept” rather 
than an “exercise concept”.193 It is the sentiment that freedom consists in the absence of constraints 
that makes this idea of liberty a negative one. 
 
Positive freedom, for Berlin, rather than asking “How much am I governed?”, asks “By whom am I 
governed?”,194 with the response of the free man being “I am my own master”.195 Berlin recognises 
that, logically, the condition of being one's own master does not seem far removed from the 
absence of interference in choosing.196 Historically, however, this positive understanding of freedom 
has, according to Berlin, rested on a split conception of the self; a lower self of “impulse” and 
“uncontrolled desires” and a higher, or real, self of “reason”.197 In positive understandings of 
freedom, Berlin argues, this higher self “became identified with institutions, Churches, nations, 
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races, States, classes, cultures, parties, and with vaguer entities, such as the general will, the 
common good”.198 In short, it was through the organisation of human beings into certain forms of 
social life that this higher self was realised. In this way, on Berlin's assessment, “what had begun as a 
doctrine of freedom turned into a doctrine of authority”.199 Berlin was deeply suspicious of positive 
freedom because of the possibility it holds for a disconnection between a person's professed desires 
and their authentic desires; opening up this gap was, for Berlin, to open the gates to a 
totalitarianism that destroys freedom (that is to say, freedom of choice).  
 
This positive tradition of thought does, however, have a long list of adherents in the history of 
political thought, from Aristotle200 through to Charles Taylor.201 The fundamental tenet of such 
approaches to freedom are a denial that the only relevant threats to a person's freedom are external 
constraints, highlighting the dangers of internal fetters, and that true freedom consists of realising 
an idealised conception of the self.202 Most often (although not necessarily), the realisation of the 
authentic desires, or the true self, that constitute positive freedom involve some active participation 
in collective self-rule. Hence, the grammar of positive freedom can be generalised to consist of a 
base subject, a higher subject and a social structure. Freedom consists of the realisation of the 
higher subject which is achieved through the exercise of self-rule in a social structure. 
 
In the years since Berlin's essay, the work of intellectual historians has identified a second strain of 
negative freedom with a long tradition in the history of political thought but which does not consist 
of non-interference but rather “non-domination”.203 In this approach to liberty—associated primarily 
with neo-roman political thought and the classic writings on Roman jurisprudence—the direct 
connection between interference and ‘unfreedom’ is severed, opening up the possibility for 
situations in which a subject is unfree without being interfered with, or interfered with without 
being unfree.204 According to Phillip Pettit (who along with Quentin Skinner has led the revival of the 
idea of freedom as non-domination) this is so because while all interference conditions freedom, it is 
only interference of an arbitrary nature that reduces it; a person is free to the extent that no-one 
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has the capacity to interfere with them “without being forced to track their acknowledged good.205 
Republican writers have often been understood as holding a positive conception of freedom in the 
civic humanist tradition whereby freedom consists of living a virtuous life of civil duty. As Skinner 
and others have shown, however, for writers such as Machiavelli, civic life did not constitute 
freedom in the sense of self-realisation. Rather, it was through public service that a population was 
able to prevent political power being exercised in an arbitrary manner which would interfere in the 
personal life of citizens.206 Freedom in this view consists of neither the act of public service nor the 
condition of non-interference but rather the status of not being subject to arbitrary power. The 
grammar of republican freedom therefore consists of a subject, power external to that subject and a 
non-arbitrary power relation between the two.  
 
Although positive and negative approaches to freedom share the element of a subject with the 
capacity for desires and choice, their relative understandings of what constitutes that subject's 
freedom are often interpreted as opposites. For some, the notions that a person can be forced to be 
free (as positive freedom can allow) or freedom as a form of service (as in republican freedom) are 
fallacies; freedom consists in the very opposite, being able to act (or not act) according to one's 
wishes. Some critics contend, therefore, that such theories are not theories of freedom at all and are 
actually theories of constraint.207 Likewise, critics of freedom as non-interference have asserted that 
the freedom to follow one's choices ought, in certain circumstances, be understood as a form of 
slavery rather than liberty.208 
 
Both of these seemingly irreconcilable approaches boast distinguished lineages in the history of 
thought about political freedom, and both seem to capture elements of what freedom is commonly 
thought to mean. Neither approach, therefore, should be cast aside lightly. Given their seemingly 
inverted understandings of freedom, however, is there any possibility of reconciling the two into a 
single grammar of freedom? Gerald C MacCallum made a highly influential attempt along those lines 
in his 1967 article Negative and positive freedom. In it, MacCallum made the bold claim that theories 
of freedom both positive and negative follow the same, triadic, structure: 
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Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from some 
constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not 
becoming something. Such freedom is thus always of something (an agent or agents), from something, 
to do, not do, become, or not become something; it is a triadic relation. Taking the format “x is (is not) 
free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z,” x ranges over agents, y ranges over such 
“preventing conditions” as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and barriers, and z ranges over 
actions or conditions of character or circumstance.
209
 
 
Different theories of freedom can be best identified, according to MacCallum, not as different 
“kinds” of liberty, but in terms of their disagreement “in what they understand to be the ranges of 
the term variables”.210 If one of the three elements of this “triadic relation” of freedom is not 
present in discussions of freedom, it “should be only because the reference is thought to be 
understood from the context of the discussion”.211 
 
MacCallum's formalistic account of freedom rests on what seems to be a fairly thin reading of 
positive freedom; he associates positive freedom with “freedom to”, and asserts that this dyadic 
relation, along with “freedom from” do not represent “genuinely different” concepts of liberty, but 
rather “serve only to emphasise one of the other two features of every case of the freedom of 
agents”.212 This conflation of positive freedom with 'freedom to' seems to misrepresent the 
grammar of many of the most influential positive theories of freedom; in theories of self-realisation 
or human flourishing, the freedom in question is not to do something, but rather freedom in or 
through doing.213  
 
This misrepresentation of positive theories of freedom notwithstanding, and even if we don't accept 
that MacCallum is completely successful in eliding the differences between positive and negative 
freedom into a single structure, his triadic relation may still be useful for the purpose of identifying 
ideas about freedom; although it has been resisted by advocates of both positive and negative 
liberty, the triadic relation does seem to capture much of what is at stake in a great deal of 
discussion about freedom. Liberal theorists of negative freedom often hold that the locus of 
freedom is in the absence of constraint and that any subsequent positive desire (to act, to be, etc.) is 
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properly outside the theory of freedom; this was Berlin's response to MacCallum.214 However, 
divorced from any positive desire, freedom understood as an absence of constraints seems to lose 
its meaning, or certainly its significance, as a political concept; if freedom were an entirely negative 
ideal, unconnected to positive ends, it would seem strange to hold it as a valuable political ideal. 
Undergirding understandings of freedom as non-interference there is necessarily at least the 
positive aim of choosing. Holding freedom as non-interference as a value makes no sense unless if 
facilitates higher order values.  
 
Freedom as non-interference can, therefore, fit MacCallum's triadic structure in the sense of an 
agent being free from constraints in order to be free to choose; the positive element need not be a 
physical action, but rather the process of choosing itself. Indeed, even if theorists of negative liberty 
prefer to push the act of choosing outside the formal definition of freedom, it is fundamentally 
linked to their normative preference for liberty. As Berlin wrote: 
 
[Those] who have ever valued liberty for its own sake believed that to be free to choose, and not to be 
chosen for, is an inalienable ingredient in what makes human beings human; and that this underlies 
both the positive demand to have a voice in the laws and practices of the society in which one lives, and 
to be accorded an area, artificially carved out, if need be, in which one is one's own master, a 'negative' 
area in which a man is not obliged to account for his activities to any man so far as this is compatible 
with the existence of organised society.
215
 
 
Republican ideas about freedom can also fit MacCallum's triadic relation in this way by taking into 
account a normative preference for personal liberty that motivates the desire to escape arbitrary 
power.216 
 
Positive theories of freedom, for their part, can be consistent with MacCallum's triadic relation if we 
consider them in the context of the necessary conditions for freedom to be realised. Internally, 
positive freedom can fit the grammar of an agent being free from the desires of the lower self to 
realise its higher self. Externally, the agent needs to be free from any relevant social constraints that 
would impede the content of positive freedom—self-realisation or whatever is proclaimed to 
constitute human flourishing. 
 
                                                          
214
 Ibid., 241. 
215
 Berlin, Liberty, 52. 
216
 For evidence of this normative desire for personal liberty, see Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume 2, 
Renaissance Virtues, 162. 
 58 
 
Both positive and negative freedom, then, can be seen to fit the triadic structure. To do so, however, 
it is necessary to look beyond the actual concepts of freedom such theories hold and apply the 
triadic relation, rather than merely identifying the elements of freedom from and freedom to which 
MacCallum claims ought already to be there. MacCallum's theory of freedom is, nonetheless, useful 
in that it reminds us that underlying even negative theories of freedom are certain normative goals. 
For any social or political discussion of freedom, the identification of these normative aims seem to 
be crucial; without them, it is not clear what is the meaning of being free from interference—that is, 
freedom—for the agent in question. In asserting the importance of the barriers that might prevent 
freedom, MacCallum also directs us towards the necessary conditions for freedom, without 
consideration of which philosophical theories of freedom seem possible, but not political theories.  
 
To fit both positive and negative senses of freedom into the triadic relation requires a good deal of 
stretching, however, and it may do less damage to positive and negative concepts of freedom to 
consider them both in relation to the normative goals of freedom and its conditions for realisation. 
These two elements seem to form part of a grammar of freedom that spans both senses of freedom 
without eliding what is distinct about the different theories’ positions on what constitutes freedom.  
 
This is a significant step forward in the search for a grammar of freedom that can be applied to the 
international system; it tells us that discussions about freedom will involve the necessary conditions 
for an agent to realise a particular normative end. This structure certainly seems able to capture a 
wide breadth of different theories of freedom. Theories of freedom that emphasise non-interference 
are concerned with the necessary conditions (an absence of interference) for an agent to realise the 
normative end of un-coerced choice. Republican theories of freedom are concerned with the 
necessary conditions (active civic participation, etc.) for the realisation of the normative goal of not 
being subject to the arbitrary will of others. Positive theories of freedom likewise consider necessary 
conditions (public spiritedness, for example), for an agent to reach the normative goal of realising 
their own nature. While seeming to accommodate both positive and negative strains of ideas about 
freedom and thus not being overly narrow, this potential grammar of freedom does seem to suffer 
from the opposite problem of being overly broad; the element of 'normative goals' could be applied 
to any number of valued ends, not all of which could be easily identified with freedom. For example, 
it may be normatively valued, by an individual or a society, to go to university. That does not mean, 
however, that university attendance has any relation to the freedom or unfreedom of the agent in 
question. On the other hand, it may, of course, be held to be the case that going to university 
increases one's freedom—because, for example, a degree will increase the range of career options 
 59 
 
an individual will be able to choose from, or because of a belief that freedom consists of intellectual 
capacity. Likewise, attending university may be thought to diminish freedom—because, for example, 
university study promotes certain modes of thought, diminishing a person's freedom to truly think 
for themselves.  
 
The normative goals that are associated with debates about freedom seem, therefore, to be of a 
particular type. In some of the most significant theories of freedom in political theory, and in 
everyday usage, the normative goals associated with debates about freedom relate to the concept 
of self-mastery. Mastery in its ordinary usage means “control or superiority over someone or 
something”.217 Self-mastery, then, is control or superiority over the self. The concept of self-mastery 
is familiar to many theoretical approaches to freedom and is often thought of as akin to autonomy. 
The autonomous individual, which lies at the normative heart of much liberal theory, is one that has 
self-mastery, or control over themselves, in the sense that they are able to choose and make 
decisions without the interference of others. Self-mastery also implies the rejection of the mastery 
of others and hence invokes the status-oriented theory of freedom of thinkers in the republican 
tradition of not being subject to the arbitrary will of others. Self-mastery also encompasses theories 
of freedom that focus on internal constraints on freedom; to be self-mastering is to control the 
lower-order desires that would, if succumbed to, frustrate higher-order aims and wishes. Hence self-
mastery chimes with theories that equate freedom with self-realisation or self-perfection;218 in 
mastering, or accomplishing, their self, an individual succeeds “in realising an ideal of themselves” 
or, in some versions of positive freedom, realising the “essence” of “human nature”.219 
 
Self-mastery encompasses, then, the normative goals associated with a significant breadth of the 
canon of theories of freedom; freedom of choice, freedom from servitude, freedom from desire and 
self-realisation. When put into relation with the other elements of theories of freedom identified 
above, we are left with a grammar of freedom that suggests arguments about freedom are 
concerned with the necessary conditions for an agent to be self-mastering. This grammar of freedom 
remains broad; it leaves room for argument about what constitutes an agent or ‘self’, what 
constitutes self-mastery and what external environment is necessary for that realisation to be 
achieved. However, it is not so broad as to encompass any aim or value that an individual or 
individuals may hold and hence distinguishes freedom from other classes of normative goals.  
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If arguments about freedom are about the necessary conditions for an agent to be self-mastering, 
arguments about state freedom are a specific class of such arguments in which the agent in question 
is the state. Two objections may be made to the application of this structure to discussions of the 
state. The first is that changing the object of freedom may change the understanding of freedom 
employed. I see no reason, however, why changing the agent in question should alter what is at 
stake in arguments about its freedom. Certainly when discussing different agents the theory or 
conception of freedom may change; that is to say, there is no reason to believe that what constitutes 
freedom for a human individual will be the same as what constitutes freedom for a state. However, 
the very purpose of the grammar of freedom outlined above is to allow for a variety of 
understandings of what constitutes freedom. Although by considering the freedom of states I am 
examining the freedom of an agent that is not often thought of in terms of freedom, there is nothing 
novel about considering freedom in relation to a variety of agents, both individual and collective. 
Changing the referent object of freedom may involve a change in the conception of freedom, but if it 
were to involve a change in the topic then we would no longer be talking about the freedom of 
agents but some other quality. 
 
The second objection may be that the state is not an agent and therefore an inappropriate referent 
object for freedom in the first place. The ontological status of the state, and whether it ought to be 
considered as an agent, is not a settled issue among scholars of international relations, although 
many scholars would assert that it is. In this thesis, I do not make an ontological claim about what 
the state is—whether or not it is an agent—but rather seek to investigate how the state has been 
thought of by practitioners of international relations. State agency itself is not a necessary condition 
for ideas of state freedom to have played a role in international relations. What is necessary is that 
the state has been believed to be an agent. Just as we would not discount the historical importance 
of ideas about the divine right of kings even if we did not believe royal authority to be bestowed by 
god, neither should we dismiss ideas about state freedom if we do not think the state is an agent. If 
states have been discussed as if they are agents, then there is reason to believe that they may have 
been thought of as free or unfree. 
 
 
Ideas of state freedom and relations of control 
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In the previous section I argued that what are at stake in debates about freedom are understandings 
of the necessary conditions for the realisation of the self-mastery of an agent or agents. Ideas of 
freedom involve beliefs about the nature of the agent in question, what constitutes self-mastery for 
that agent, and what circumstances promote or hinder that self-mastery. When people are arguing 
about freedom, they are arguing about one of more of these three elements. Together they 
constitute a grammar, or form, that arguments about freedom take. When the agent whose self-
mastery is being argued over is a state (or states) we can refer to such arguments as being about 
ideas of state freedom.  
 
That discussion provided the necessary background for this section, which addresses directly the 
main question of the thesis. Having dealt with the issue of what I understand ideas of state freedom 
to be, I now discuss how such ideas have played a role in shaping world politics. Chapters Three to 
Five present historical demonstrations of that role, but here I draw on constructivist theoretical 
resources in order to lay out an argument that theoretically connects ideas of state freedom with 
the practice of world politics. The way that ideas about freedom have been implicated in the 
conduct of international relations, I argue, is through the politics of legitimacy. I argue that ideas 
about what constitutes freedom for states, and normative beliefs about whether and in what ways 
that freedom should be realised, legitimate and delegitimate certain relations of control between 
states. In this way, I contend, ideas of state freedom are implicated in constituting the social power 
of states, constraining and enabling them in important ways. 
 
As I have argued, the normative concern at the heart of ideas about state freedom is the concept of 
self-mastery; the notion that an agent is self-governing, or in control of its own direction. There is 
nothing necessarily ‘social’ about such a concept; self-mastery could be seen to be affected by 
factors purely internal to the agent itself. An historically prominent understanding of freedom along 
these lines is the idea that people are free if their lower-order desires, or ‘passions’, are controlled 
by a higher, rational ‘self’. Nonetheless, the way that I approach ideas of state freedom in this thesis 
has important social dimensions, and it is an understanding of these social dimensions of state 
freedom that illuminate the ways in which ideas about state freedom have been implicated in the 
conduct of international relations.  
 
The first way that ideas about state freedom can be seen to be social is through the external aspects 
of state freedom. As with human freedom, state freedom could be understood as a purely internal 
quality; one that is facilitated or stymied purely on the basis of conditions or characteristics 
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understood to be inherent to the agent of the state itself. Historically, as we shall see, important 
arguments have been made about state freedom which have focused on internal aspects of states, 
such as their governmental form or material capability. However, the debates that are presented in 
Chapters Three to Five demonstrate the historical prominence of the notion that state freedom is 
affected by factors that go beyond the internal characteristics of the state.  
 
One way in which external dimensions become relevant to arguments about state freedom is when 
they constitute part of the conception of self-mastery. As we saw above with respect to human 
freedom, for republican theorists freedom is not constituted by internal cognitive processes but 
rather by societal arrangements; the republican conception of freedom is inseparable from the 
environment within which human beings are embedded. Likewise, some ideas of what constitutes 
the freedom of states have been about the ways in which states interrelate. The second way that 
dimensions external to the state have been implicated in ideas of state freedom is through beliefs 
about the necessary conditions for its realisation. Even when ideas about state freedom have 
understood the self-mastery of states to be an internally constituted quality, the environmental 
conditions external to the state have been understood as significant for its realisation. Whether one 
views states as existing in a system or a society, the reality of states’ existence is one of co-existence 
and interaction; no state is completely isolated and unaffected by the actions of other states. Unless 
one holds a conception of self-mastery that is completely unaffected by any external circumstances, 
ideas about state freedom and its realisation have an unavoidably social dimension. 
 
These external dimensions of the grammar of freedom—the external dimensions of self-mastery, or 
the necessary conditions for its realisation—connect the conduct of international relations with 
ideas about freedom; they make the organisation and practice of international relations relevant for 
ideas about state freedom. In themselves, however, these external dimensions of state freedom do 
not do the inverse and make ideas about state freedom relevant for the conduct of international 
relations. In order to understand how ideas of state freedom are implicated in international practice 
it is necessary to reflect on their social nature in a second sense. The second way that ideas about 
state freedom are social is the way that they constitute part of the ideational structure of 
international relations. This notion—that ideas of state freedom constitute part of an international 
ideational structure—builds on broadly constructivist insights into the nature of international 
relations. Constructivism in IR rests on the fundamental insight that the social world—of which the 
international system is a part—cannot be understood without an appreciation of the ways in which 
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actors interpret the world around them.220 Human agents do not interact with an unmediated world 
of brute material facts, but rather operate within complex social structures that are constituted by 
“collective understandings” about the world.221 From this basic ontological position, constructivists 
have built up a body of theoretical and empirical work that investigates the role of ideas in 
constructing, or constituting the social world. 
 
Such an approach does not understand ideas to be individually held beliefs operating at a purely 
cognitive level within the minds of individuals. Rather, ideas form part of the social world and are 
understood as “collective knowledge, institutionalized in practice”.222 Collective ideas are not merely 
individual beliefs that happen to be held by more than one actor. Rather, such ideas are understood 
as being inter-subjective in that they are socially held and “shared by all who are competent to 
engage in or recognize the appropriate performance of a social practice or range of practices”.223 
Their social nature means that collective ideas confront “actors as…objective social fact*s+ that 
cannot be wished away”.224 Because ideas do not exist only in the heads of individual agents but 
intersubjectively, they can be seen to constitute a structure within which agents operate. Moreover, 
because it is only through these intersubjective ideas that agents experience social reality, shared 
understandings of the nature of the world have a profound effect on those agents; they constrain 
and enable agents by socially proscribing and sanctioning certain behaviours, but also constitute 
agents by defining “what is cognitively possible and impossible”225 and by shaping their identities 
and interests.226 
 
These constructivist insights provide a powerful theoretical groundwork for understanding how 
ideas of state freedom may have played a role in shaping the conduct of international relations. If 
we accept the constructivist argument regarding the role ideational, or normative, international 
structures can play in shaping international politics, it remains to be shown that ideas of state 
freedom constitute a significant part of it. Chapters Three to Five take up that task, and constitute a 
historically grounded demonstration that ideas about state freedom are not only identifiable in the 
practical discourse of international relations, but that they have constituted part of the normative 
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structure of international relations, generating shared expectations about behavior and constituting 
state agency in important ways.  
 
As noted above, ideas about state freedom have external dimensions that connect them to the ways 
in which international relations are conducted. At the core of ideas about state freedom is a 
conception of the self-mastery of the state; they are ideas about what it means for a state to be self-
controlling or directing, and how that condition of self-mastery can be realised. Implicated in the 
realisation of states’ self-mastery over their own existence has been their external environment, 
which is to say their relations with other states. The ways in which states interact, influence and 
affect each other have been understood to play a crucial role in determining whether or not states 
are free. Depending on what has been thought to constitute self-mastery for states, different 
international practices have been understood to be consistent or inconsistent with state freedom. 
 
On its own, this connection between the realisation of state freedom and international practice is 
not enough to suggest that ideas of state freedom have played a role in the practice of international 
relations. However, the historical chapters that follow show that, since at least the mid-18th, century 
a general normative preference in favour of the realisation of state freedom can be identified in 
international discourse. That is not to say that freedom has always been believed to mean the same 
thing for all states, or that it should apply equally to all states, but there has nonetheless been a 
deep assumption that freedom is an important element of statehood; being free is part of what 
makes states states and it ought, therefore, to be realised in practice.  
 
It is this intersubjective belief that states should be free that implicates ideas of state freedom in the 
international ideational structure. If ideas of state freedom are ideas about what constitutes the self-
mastery of the state, and if there is a shared expectation for that self-mastery to be realised, then 
ideas of state freedom create collective expectations about appropriate behaviour. Collective 
expectations that state behaviour should be consistent with the freedom of states are what make 
ideas of state freedom form part of the ideational structure of international relations. Because ideas 
of state freedom are concerned with the self-mastery of states—that is to say, the ability of states to 
control and direct their own existence—the category of inter-state relations that are relevant to 
ideas of state freedom are relationships of control and rule. The kinds of relationships and 
interactions that can be characterized as pertaining to inter-state control, rule or direction constitute 
the external dimensions of state freedom, and in this thesis I call them relations of control. Ideas of 
state freedom structure such relations by legitimating some relations of control and delegitimating 
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others on the basis of whether or not they are understood to be consistent with the freedom of 
states.  
 
By structuring relations of control between states, ideas of state freedom constitute part of the 
ideational structure of international relations and can be understood as social facts rather than 
individual beliefs. As will be shown in the chapters on non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-
determination, by structuring relations of control, ideas of state freedom enable certain relations of 
control and influence between states while precluding others and in this way they constitute the 
agency of states. However, such relations are only produced and reproduced through the 
acceptance and practice of states, meaning that even if the relations of control constituted by ideas 
of state freedom are experienced as social facts, they are not immutable and can be subject to 
contestation by the very agents that produce them and are themselves produced by them. 
 
The empirical focus of this thesis is on historical moments of contestation between different ideas of 
state freedom. Through the prism of debates about non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-
determination I identify and illuminate different ideas about state freedom that have had currency 
in modern international relations. At such moments of debate we can see disagreement among the 
human agents of world politics about what constitutes the self-mastery of the state and what 
conditions are necessary for its realisation. Because such ideas structure relations of control 
between states, it is these relations that are at stake for the organisation of world politics when 
ideas of state freedom are contested. It is in the contestation and disagreement about ideas of state 
freedom that we can see the complex and interlocking nature of ideational structures in world 
politics, as well as the role of actors in their production, reproduction and evolution.  
 
The way that these debates play out—and the way that relations of control are reconfigured—is 
through the politics of legitimacy. Over the past decade, IR scholars have paid increasing attention to 
the role of legitimacy in world politics,227 demonstrating its importance for the development of 
international norms. This thesis builds on such literature, showing that debates about state freedom 
are instantiations of what Ian Clark has called “practices of legitimacy”.228 If prevailing ideas about 
state freedom make certain relationships of control between states legitimate, or socially accepted, 
then debates about state freedom occupy the “political terrain” that exists between, on the one 
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hand, accepted “principles of legitimacy” and, on the other, “actors’ strategies of legitimation”. This 
political terrain is “the meeting ground of norms, distributions of power, and the search for 
consensus”, 229 and the arena where norms are “interpreted, developed, reconciled, transcribed, and 
consensually mediated”.230 As we will see, when states-people are arguing about ideas of state 
freedom, they are challenging or reinforcing the legitimacy of the relations of control that those 
ideas constitute. In doing so, they are making claims about the kinds of behaviours that states can 
legitimately engage in with respect to one another and hence about their power as social agents.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to introduce the theoretical argument that will frame the historical 
chapters that follow. I began by arguing that ideas are not reducible to the terms in which they are 
expressed. I showed that in the early modern period the terminology of state freedom was notable 
before it fell into obscurity as the prominence of its intellectual groundings of republicanism and 
natural law waned. I argued that the absence of the term state freedom does not necessarily denote 
the absence of the concept of state freedom and outlined an approach for identifying the former 
without the latter. This approach involves identifying debates about state freedom by looking for 
arguments that are about the necessary conditions for agents to be self-mastering. I then drew on 
constructivist approaches to IR to make an argument about how ideas of state freedom can be 
understood to have played a role in international relations. I argued that ideas of state freedom 
structure legitimate relations of control between states and thus constitute an important element of 
the ideational structure of international relations.  
 
Ideas of state freedom by no means constitute the totality of the shared ideas that make up this 
normative structure. As will become clear in the historical chapters that follow, ideas of state 
freedom exist in relationship to, and are articulated through, a variety of connected concepts. 
Prominent among these concepts is sovereignty, the principle which more than any other is taken by 
international relations scholars to constitute states and order their relations. In international politics, 
shared ideas such as sovereignty (but also authority, independence, rights, responsibilities and 
others) pertain to the kinds of relations states have with each other; the levels and forms of control 
that they are understood to legitimately hold with respect to themselves and their fellow states. As 
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such, these and other principles are consequential in structuring relations of control between states. 
To the extent that such principles, and the international institutions and practices associated with 
them, are understood to have relevance for the realisation or stymying of the self-mastery of states, 
they also form part of the vocabulary through which ideas of state freedom are expressed. Such 
principles cannot be equated with state freedom, however. Concepts such as sovereignty have their 
own distinct histories of changing meanings and dimensions of significance for international 
relations. Their exact relationship to state freedom is dynamic, contingent and particular to a given 
historical or empirical context. As the chapters that follow will show, at times principles such as 
sovereignty have, through the importance attached to them by the human actors of world politics, 
been significant in shaping the contestation between ideas of state freedom. At other times, ideas of 
state freedom can be seen to inform changes in shared understandings of the meaning and 
significance of such principles. 
 
Chapters Three to Five are organised around three prominent concepts that have important, and 
varying, connections with state freedom; non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-
determination. In them, I will reconstruct in detail a number of important debates about state 
freedom that have taken place since the mid-18th century and will illuminate the politics of 
legitimacy through which such ideas have conditioned international relations. 
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Chapter Three 
Non-Intervention 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter Two I outlined a theoretical approach to understanding ideas of state freedom. I argued 
that what is at stake in debates about state freedom are ideas about the necessary conditions for 
states to be self-mastering. These elements together constitute a ‘grammar’ of freedom; when these 
elements are present, we can say that state freedom is being discussed. This gives us a way to 
identify ideas of state freedom even in circumstances when the terminology of state freedom is not 
used. I further argued that because ideas about state freedom pertain to the self-mastery and self-
direction of states, they also structure relations of control between states. These relations can be 
formal, institutionalised relations of authority, or more informal relations of influence and 
compulsory power.  Ideas of state freedom play a role in structuring such relations by legitimising 
relations of control which are consistent with a particular understanding of state freedom and 
delegitimising those that are not. In this way ideas of state freedom play an important, if neglected, 
role in the constitution of states’ social power.  
 
This chapter is the first of three that employ those theoretical arguments to historically analyse ideas 
of state freedom through the cognate concepts of non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-
determination. Here, I focus on debates about non-intervention, and primarily address relations of 
domination between states, which I understand as relations of control that transgress normal 
boundaries of political authority. Non-intervention is a concept that is granted a privileged position 
by theorists of international relations and is understood as being fundamental to modern 
international order; a concept that is intimately related to relations of control between states. The 
way in which intervention is commonly understood in International Relations literature is as a 
violation of the basic ordering principle of modern international relations, state sovereignty. 
Sovereignty means that states have the right to supreme authority within their own mutually 
exclusive territories; they have the right to rule and to determine their own social and political order. 
Ensuring this sovereign right is the principle of non-intervention which dictates that states ought not 
to be interfered with by others in the system. In this way, non-intervention invokes liberal ideas 
which understand freedom as the absence of interference in the choices that people make.  
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Non-intervention is understood as a “cardinal” rule of international society,231 a “grundnorm”,232 an 
“elementary rule of orderly international relations” and a “minimum condition for *states’] orderly 
co-existence”.233 However, although intervention may be conceived of as an “act of 
transgression”,234 that does not mean that it ought to be seen as an indication of disorder. As this 
chapter will show, intervention has played a significant role in international relations as a 
mechanism for the construction and maintenance of international order. In international relations, 
attitudes toward, and practices of, intervention are products of higher-order beliefs and values that 
prescribe the contours of legitimate and illegitimate intervention. In this chapter I will show that one 
of the sources of changing understandings of (non-)intervention is changing ideas of state freedom. I 
do so by examining contestation about legitimate intervention to illuminate the ideas of state 
freedom that are implicated in that contestation. I examine two historical moments of prominent 
debate about non-intervention. The first is the years 1818-22, during which time the great powers in 
the Concert of Europe were engaged in a dialogue about the legitimate contours of the practice of 
intervention. In the second section I examine changing ideas about intervention that were 
prominent in the western hemisphere in the second half of the 19th and early 20th century.  
 
During the Concert period I identify two ideas of state freedom; the Dynastic Idea and the Self-Help 
Idea. In the Self-Help Idea—which was identifiable in the British arguments about intervention—
states were understood as unique political and moral orders, each with their own individual will. A 
state was self-mastering if it possessed the freedom to translate its will into action, unhindered by 
the domination of a single hegemonic state or general political obligations it owed to other states. 
The necessary conditions for the realisation of this idea of self-mastery were a balance of power 
between the great powers in order to prevent hegemony and a self-help, rather than collective, 
security system. The Dynastic Idea of state freedom, which was held by the Holy Alliance, had as a 
central tenet, a direct identification of the state with the dynastically legitimated sovereign. As a 
result of this conception of legitimate statehood, the self-mastery of states was understood as the 
control of the sovereign monarch over their population. The necessary condition for the realisation 
of this self-mastery was a collective guarantee of the preservation of the dynastic order, and the 
collective intervention of the great powers to quell popular revolt across Europe. I argue that these 
two ideas of state freedom led to different understandings of the purposes of the Concert of Europe 
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and legitimated different practices of intervention which ultimately led to Britain withdrawing from 
collective management of European affairs. 
 
In my analysis of western hemisphere debates about intervention, I identify two further ideas of 
state freedom. In the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom, the self-mastery of states was understood 
as consisting of self-control in the sense of self-limitation and acting responsibly. A responsible state 
was one which embodied certain modern values and met the standards of ‘civilisation’. This idea of 
state freedom legitimated intervention in the affairs of other states in order to preserve stability and 
further the progress of civilisation. Also identifiable in debates in the Americas was the Categorical 
Idea of state freedom. Self-mastery in this idea of freedom consisted of formal state independence 
plus the absence of foreign interference. The necessary condition for the realisation of this self-
mastery was, therefore, an absolute and unconditional right of non-intervention. In this section I 
detail the role the Categorical Idea of state freedom played in Latin American arguments that 
contributed to the US renouncing its right to intervene in their affairs as it transformed its social role 
from one of a hemispheric ‘policeman’ to that of a ‘good neighbour’. 
 
 
State freedom in the Concert of Europe: self-help and collective security 
 
The French Revolution in 1789 marked the beginning of a period of intense flux in the European 
international system. The ideas about popular sovereignty and democracy that undergirded the 
revolution profoundly challenged the traditional European bases of political authority, and 
monarchical regimes across the continent keenly felt the threat of their spread. The aggressive 
French military campaigns that followed the revolution, meanwhile, constituted an acute material 
threat to the prevailing European order. The dominant principle in the European system prior to the 
Revolution was that of the balance of power, which was understood as providing a basic liberty of 
states and of the system as a whole; as long as no state became so powerful as to be able to subject 
the other states in the system to its rule, the independence of states, and the liberty of Europe, was 
secured. 
 
Napoleon’s attempt to “establish mastery in Europe”235 provoked a concerted military and 
diplomatic response by the other major European powers that would, in the first half of the 19th 
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century, both stem from and challenge the 18th century understanding of the liberty of states. The 
balance of power remained the fundamental principle of the settlement agreed on at the Congress 
of Vienna in 1815, which had redrawn the territorial boundaries of Europe in the wake of French 
expansion and then defeat. In this way, the post-Napoleonic European order preserved and loosely 
institutionalised the idea of state freedom as an absence of foreign hegemony that had been 
prominent in the 18th century. However, in bringing the European Great Powers into closer 
cooperation and increased interdependence, the ‘Concert of Europe’ system that developed out of 
the Congress of Vienna also resulted in that idea of state freedom being contested in significant 
ways. 
 
In this section I examine the debates between the Great Powers about the contours of legitimate 
intervention that took place in the years following the Congress of Vienna. In these debates, it is 
possible to identify two incompatible ideas of state freedom being contested—incompatible in the 
sense that they legitimate and delegitimate different configurations of relations of control between 
states. One the one hand, the British foreign secretary Lord Castlereagh defended a Self-Help Idea of 
state freedom. In this understanding of state freedom, the state was understood as an authoritative, 
territorially-bounded entity that was identifiable with neither its population nor its rulers at any 
given time. At the core of the Self-Help Idea of state-freedom was the belief that self-mastery was 
the freedom of the political institutions of the state to determine their own policies, neither subject 
to the supremacy of other states nor bound to them through general obligation. The necessary 
conditions for the realisation of this understanding of self-mastery had two significant implications 
for legitimate relations of control between states. First, it meant that states had a general obligation 
not to intervene in the affairs of others; if states were subject to foreign dictation, either temporary 
or permanent, their existence as independent states was compromised. Second, the Self-Help Idea 
of self-mastery nonetheless meant that states had a right to intervene in other states if they judged 
their safety or vital interests compromised. The supreme principle of international affairs was the 
right of states to determine for themselves the action that was necessary to preserve their 
independence, even if that meant interfering in the sovereignty and independence of other states.  
 
Alongside the Self-Help Idea of state freedom, the ‘Holy Alliance’ of autocratic states—Austria, 
Prussia and Russia—exhibited a Dynastic Idea of state freedom. In one sense, this idea of state 
freedom was backward-looking in that it associated state agency not with an abstract territorial 
entity, but rather the dynastically legitimated monarch. As a result of this identification of the state 
with the person of the monarch, for the Holy Alliance, the self-mastery of the state consisted of the 
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control the sovereign person had over their population. The necessary conditions for this self-
mastery to be realised was a calm and tranquil Europe that was free from revolutionary fervour and 
the threat of popular revolt. This Dynastic Idea of state freedom thus justified a general right on the 
part of the dynastic monarchies to intervene in other states to quash popular revolt.  
 
The role that these two ideas of state freedom—Self-Help and Dynastic—played in the constitution 
of the social power of states can be seen in the debates over how to reorganise European 
international relations following the French hegemonic threat. In debates about the nature and 
scope of the cooperation between the Great Powers in the years following the defeat of Napoleon, 
and particularly in disagreements about the contours of legitimate interstate intervention, Great 
Britain and the Holy Alliance were engaged in a struggle over how relations of control between 
states ought to be configured. While the core principle of the international order established at 
Vienna was the rejection of hegemony by any single power, the Concert of Europe added an 
“embellishment onto the operation of the balance system” of the 18th century, requiring that the 
balance of power “should be sanctioned and legitimised by the European Concert of Great 
Powers”.236 It was the exact nature of this ‘embellishment’ of Great Power management and the 
kinds of international relations it instituted that was contested. 
 
For Britain, the cooperation between the great powers was motivated by the need to resist France 
and preserve the freedom of European states in the face of Napoleon’s hegemonic aspirations. 
Further joint action was to be limited to the same purpose; to ensure the preservation of the 
territorial settlement agreed upon at Vienna and to thwart any further designs on supremacy in 
Europe by a single state. The proposals of the Holy Alliance, meanwhile, suggested a system of 
mutually obligating collective security that would secure the existing dynastic order against the 
threat of popular revolt. Carsten Holbraad, summarising the great powers’ different understandings 
of the Concert of Europe, notes that for Britain, it was as an: 
 
[Alliance] of great powers established by treaties and formal declarations, not a union of sovereigns 
founded in common sentiments and interests; about the external freedom of the members of the 
states system, not the internal condition of the parts of the society of Europe; about the threat of 
aggression not the danger of revolutions.
237
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The British position grew out of a long tradition of associating the liberty of states with the absence 
of hegemonic power and, specifically, resistance to French expansion.238 Drawing on the work of 
historians Brendan Simms and Steven Pincus, Richard Devetak has shown that the political goal of 
liberty was a significant element of 17th and 18th British political thought. This liberty was two faced, 
with an internal aspect relating to individual civil liberties against arbitrary power, and an external 
aspect concerned with the liberty of nations threatened by the power of Louis XIV's France. 
According to Simms, it was the imperative to protect the “liberties of Europe”—that is, the 
independence of states, secured by the balance of power—by checking French power through war 
that led to the invitation to William of Orange to take the British crown. When William did wage war 
on Catholic France, the aim was not to impose Protestantism, but rather to restore European order 
and protect the liberties of states by preventing France from “realising its goal of universal monarchy 
in Europe”.239 
 
Devetak argues that the balance of power was embraced “as an instrument in maintaining liberty 
and fighting tyranny”, and that it was “grasped as an indispensable ordering practice in maintaining 
Europe as a system of free states”. This appreciation of the balance of power as a freedom-
preserving institution continued into the 18th century, with hegemony rejected in favour of “*t+he 
idea of the freedom of all states, of the equal right of all to exist, accepting competition yet 
subscribing to a measure of order in that competition”.240  
 
When, around the turn of the 19th century, the idea of a European order based on independent free 
states was confronted with French revolutionary ideology and Napoleon's hegemonic ambitions, it 
provoked a determined response from other European states and prompted repeated coalitions 
against the threat of French tyranny. Following the military defeat of France by the Sixth Coalition, 
the four powers of the Quadruple Alliance—Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia—turned their 
attentions to the re-establishment of continental order. It was with this aim in mind that the 
Congress of Vienna was convened to determine the redrawing of territorial boundaries following 
Napoleon's annexations and the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire. As well as establishing the post-
Napoleonic map of Europe, the Congress of Vienna also established a system of managing European 
affairs—the Concert of Europe—that consisted of sporadic meetings of the Great Powers to decide 
upon shared action in response to European issues. 
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This period of 'Concert' was a significant development in the governance of international affairs, 
understood by the participants as being “without precedent”.241 The novelty of the concert system 
has been identified as its cooperative and associative nature,242 and the notion that all the principal 
European powers should “bind themselves mutually to protect and support each other”243 in 
safeguarding one another's rights and possessions unquestionably marks a notable innovation in 
collaborative spirit. From the outset, however, the desire for joint action among the major powers 
masked significant schisms in understandings of the purposes and competency of this general 
alliance. Informing these differing positions were the Dynastic and Self-Help Ideas of state freedom. 
These conflicting ideas manifested themselves in different doctrines of intervention, and it is by 
reconstructing debates between the European powers on that subject that I draw them out. These 
differences in interventionary doctrine were first in evidence at the meeting of the Concert in Aix-la-
Chapelle in 1818, and then fully precipitated in discussions in response to revolutions in 1820 in 
Spain and Naples. Diplomatic dialogue surrounding those three events is the focus of my analysis. 
 
Aix-la-Chapelle 
 
The attempt of the Great Powers to collaboratively manage European affairs was initially instituted 
in the first Treaty of Paris, which restored peace with France and called for all parties of the war 
(including defeated France) to meet in a General Congress in Vienna to settle the many territorial 
issues thrown up by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.244 Following the 100 Days War that 
took place after Napoleon absconded from exile in Elba, the Second Treaty of Paris, signed on 
November 20, 1815, provided for the continuation of the practice of convocations of major powers 
for the purpose of promoting European peace. It was to this end that a meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle 
was convened in the autumn of 1818, largely to address questions of the occupation of France by 
the allies (which had been in place since the final defeat of Napoleon by the Seventh Coalition) and 
the indemnity placed upon the French as part of the second Paris peace treaty.245 During this 
congress the differing positions within the coalition on the subject of intervention were first 
articulated and it became apparent that the Great Powers had differing interpretations of the 
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treaties of peace that concluded war with France and the final acts of the Congress of Vienna. Great 
Britain, on the one hand, understood the agreements in a limited sense, with the purpose of the 
alliance understood to guard against the potential for renewed French aggression. To Britain, 
Napoleon's aggressive drive for hegemony was what drew the Coalition together and that limited 
purpose gave it its reason for being. The Congress of Vienna, meanwhile, was interpreted as 
instituting a defensive alliance that guaranteed the territorial settlement agreed upon at the 
congress. 
 
The Russian Tsar Alexander, by contrast, had a broad interpretation of the concert system as 
guaranteeing not only the territorial settlement reached at Vienna, but also the existing, dynastic, 
political order of Europe.246 Extrapolating from the instability emanating from France after the 1789 
revolution, Alexander made a general link between internal revolution and international aggression, 
and proposed that it was the responsibility of the Quadruple Alliance to protect Europe from the 
danger of domestic upheaval. According to a lengthy memorandum circulated by Russia on 8 
October 1818, Alexander's interpretation of the treaties of Paris and the Congress of Vienna was 
that they constituted an “alliance générale” which had as its purpose “*l+a garantie solidaire de l'état 
de possession territoriale statué par ces actes” and “*l+a garantie solidaire de la souveraineté 
légitime ab antiquo ou reconnue par des traités en vigeur”.247 This ‘joint guarantee’ meant that the 
great powers had a duty to both restore and preserve the French monarchy, and to prevent the 
overthrow of other European monarchies by popular revolt. 
 
As Henry Kissinger notes, Alexander's understanding amounted to a “doctrine of general 
interference in the domestic concerns of all states superimposed on a system of collective 
security”,248 and the suggestion that the alliance would act as a guarantee of sovereignty according 
to historical legitimacy was a radically broader interpretation of the treaties than that of Great 
Britain. In response to Alexander's communication, the British plenipotentiaries at Aix-la-Chapelle 
circulated their own memorandum outlining Britain's interpretation of the peace treaties of 1814 
and 1815. In it, Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh outlined in detail the British position on the 
nature of the alliance, the limits on the collective management of European affairs, and the British 
doctrine on intervention. 
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The British memorandum was clear that the “avowed principle and object” of the treaties was 
limited to the “restoration and conservation of Europe against the power of France”.249 Although the 
treaties constituted a “general pact” on the regulation of the issues precipitated by the wars that 
followed the French Revolution, they did not “impose” any “positive obligation” on the part of the 
powers to enforce their “observance” and did not even “form an alliance in the strict sense of the 
word”.250 In response to Alexander’s assertion that it was the duty of the powers to restore and 
maintain the French monarchy, Castlereagh argued that it was not “competent” for the Allies to 
consider a change in the French political order, regardless of how it was brought about, as 
something they were “entitled to take notice of” beyond the question of “how far that change goes 
immediately to endanger their own repose and safety”.251 In other words, France had the right to 
political independence, to determine its own political constitution. France, and its rights as a state, 
was distinct from its former monarchy, and France’s internal arrangements were within the purview 
of other states only if they were directly threatened by them. 
 
The allied powers had clearly interfered in France though the stationing of troops within French 
territory. However, that intervention was temporary, limited in scope and addressed to the specific 
threat that France had posed to the political independence European states. The Memorandum 
argued that the Treaty of Alliance between the four powers: 
 
[Proceeds] upon the principle that after the army of occupation should be withdrawn the Allies could 
only justify an interference in the affairs of a foreign State upon the ground of considering their own 
safety compromised, and that, independently of such a consideration, they could not justly claim any 
right of interference, or in prudence charge themselves with the task of redressing violations of the 
internal Constitution of France.
252
 
 
Although the British government had a clear preference for the restoration of the Bourbons to the 
French thrown,253 they refused to interfere with the French domestic order beyond the removal of 
the Bonarparte family; an interference that was justified on the basis that it had repeatedly been 
guilty of attempts to establish hegemony over Europe. Not only was there no obligation on France to 
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“preserve inviolate” its internal order, but it would have been “impossible” for the allies to make 
such a demand. The reason for this ‘impossibility’ was that “no state of things could be more 
humiliating than that of a State which should be bound to its neighbours to preserve unchanged its 
internal system, and that any fundamental change in it, without their consent first had been 
obtained, should in itself be cause of war”.254 Even a more limited demand that any change in the 
French constitution should be legally made, rather than enforced by revolutionary elements, would 
be no less impossible “for how can foreign States safely be left to judge of what is legal in another 
State?”255  
 
States, then, have neither the right nor the ability to pass judgement on the international 
constitution of their neighbours. There was no intersubjective principle of legitimate statehood that 
justified great power intervention. For Britain, the state was not identified with any particular ruler, 
government, or principle, but was rather an exclusive and bounded political order. The notion that 
nothing could be more humiliating for a state than have the nature of that political order 
determined by an external actor demonstrates how crucial an element of statehood was the self-
determination of political systems. In itself, however, this political independence of states to 
determine their own political system does not constitute self-mastery of states. Although the self-
determination of a state’s political constitution was a crucial criterion to be able to say that states 
were in any sense self-mastering, Britain’s response to Russia’s position also demonstrated a second 
essential element of statehood over which states must retain control. This second issue was not 
concerned with the ‘humiliation’ of France or any other state that might suffer from great power 
intervention, but rather the obligation that a general alliance guaranteeing ‘legitimate sovereignty’ 
across Europe would put Britain itself under.  
 
In response to Alexander’s proposed system of ‘collective security’, Castlereagh wrote that although 
a “universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world” had “always been one of speculation 
and hope” it had “never yet been reduced to practice” and never could, he opined. Although the 
Quadruple Alliance may have gone further than any other previous steps in that direction, it 
nonetheless was “formed upon principles altogether limited”. The Alliance advanced cooperation 
between states without “transgressing any of the principles of the law of nations or failing in the 
delicacy which they owe to the rights of other States”. Prominent among those legal principles was 
the political independence of states, a notion that Britain saw as incompatible with Alexander’s 
proposals. As Castlereagh noted: 
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The idea of an “Alliance Solidaire,” by which each State shall be bound to support the state of 
succession, government and possession within all other States from violence and attack, upon 
condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee, must be understood as morally implying the 
previous establishment of such a system of general government as may secure and enforce upon all 
kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice.
256
 
 
An ‘Alliance Solidaire’, then, by ‘enforcing’ a political system upon states amounts to a fundamental 
deviation from a system of independent states. Until states devise a “mode of constructing such a 
system”—a utopian fantasy for Castlereagh—the “consequences” of a general guarantee of existing 
sovereigns were “inadmissible”. The reason for this inadmissibility was that for independent states 
“nothing would be more immoral or more prejudicial to the character of government generally than 
the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power 
without any consideration of the extent to which it was absused”. Although the great powers could 
“continue consulting together” and “interposing from time to time their good offices”, the basic 
principle of the European system must remain self-help: 
 
Till…a system of administrating Europe by a general alliance of its States can be reduced to some 
practical form, all notions of general and unqualified guarantee must be abandoned, and States must 
be left to rely for their security upon the justice and wisdom of their respective systems, aided by such 
support as other states may feel prepared to afford them”.
257 
 
The interpretation of the British was clear; absent the fanciful transcendence of a system of 
politically independent states, states were responsible for their own security. The notion that the 
armed forces and foreign policy action of a state could be outside of their free control was a moral 
outrage.  
 
Although the British position in the Concert period is often characterised as advocating non-
intervention in contrast to Austria, Russia and Prussia’s interventionary approach, the fundamental 
understanding of states as being in control of their own security and vital interests meant that the 
right to non-intervention was significantly qualified: 
 
The only safe principle is that of the law of nations: that no State has a right to endanger its 
neighbours by its internal proceedings, and that if it does, provided they exercise a sound discretion, 
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their right of interference is clear.
258 
 
The priority that Britain granted to self-help over non-intervention is crucial for understanding the 
idea of state freedom prevalent in Great Britain in the first half of the 19th century. For a state to be 
properly in control of itself and its destiny, it was more important for it to be autonomous in its 
response to threats than for it to be assured in its freedom from the interference of other states. 
This crucial interventionary right advocated by Britain is a significant exception to non-intervention 
which is at odds with contemporary understandings. However, the denial of a general right to 
intervene to preserve existing arrangements of political authority was also a significant divergence 
from the Russian vision of the management of the European political system.  
 
Questions relating to France's rehabilitation of a member of European society were easily settled at 
Aix-la-Chapelle; France’s remaining debt was dropped, the occupation ended and France was 
assured of the “place that belongs to her in the European system”.259 The four powers plus France—
now rehabilitated—reaffirmed the “principle of intimate Union” with respect to their common 
relations and interests for the “Maintenance of general Peace”.260 However, Napoleon’s attempt to 
gain mastery over Europe had shaken the 18th century international consensus on how interstate 
relations ought to be conducted and what relations of control between states were legitimate. At 
Aix-la-Chapelle the seeds of disagreement over those issues were established with respect to 
doctrines of intervention. For Russia the legitimacy of 18th century dynastic order and the 
illegitimacy of states experiencing popular revolt gave powerful, established states the freedom to 
intervene to influence such events. For Britain, the freedom of states to establish their own internal 
character meant intervention by other powers was illegitimate unless faced with a direct threat of 
aggressive behaviour. In subsequent years of the Concert system, the conflicting ideas about state 
freedom that had begun to be exhibited at Aix-la-Chapelle, and the politics of legitimacy about the 
relations of control those ideas implied, would be played out with respect to particular cases of 
potential intervention. The next sections examine two such cases; that of the military revolt in Spain, 
1820, and the 1821 popular uprising in Naples. 
 
Spain 
 
The differences between the Russian and British interpretations of European relations outlined 
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above did not destroy the Quadruple Alliance at Aix-la-Chapelle. Nor were the differences resolved 
during the Congress, however. Rather, they were merely side-lined by the diplomacy of Prince 
Metternich, Foreign Minister of the Austrian Empire. While accepting the principle put forward by 
the Tsar, Metternich, knowing that such a proposal could not be accepted by Great Britain, convinced 
Alexander that his Alliance Solidaire was rendered superfluous by the pre-existing Holy Alliance. 
Alexander withdrew the proposal while Castlereagh believed he had made the British position clear 
and interpreted the withdrawal of the Russian proposal as tacit acceptance of it.261 Although 
contained at Aix-la-Chapelle, the possibility remained that political events would again bring the 
underlying schism in the alliance into view. Given the political instability in continental Europe at the 
time, it did not take long for that possibility to become a reality. The tensions in the alliance managed 
to survive Austrian intervention in response to revolution in Germany in 1819,262 but in 1820 the 
revolts in Spain and in Naples caused differences in doctrines of intervention to resurface. 
 
In January 1820, a group of soldiers began a mutiny in Cádiz, Spain, demanding that King Ferdinand 
VII reinstitute the liberal Spanish Constitution of 1812. As the revolt spread, Ferdinand was taken 
prisoner and obliged to proclaim the former Constitution. Russia was prompted by these events to 
circulate an invitation to the allies to discuss common action in response to unrest in Spain.263 The 
Russian proposal to intervene prompted a response from Castlereagh—his famous 'State Paper' of 5 
May—which has been taken to define the British position on intervention in the Concert period. In 
this lengthy document, Castlereagh sets out a number of significant arguments about the nature of 
control both within and between states, and their rights and duties. The main thrust of Castlereagh’s 
argument is a repetition of the British position at Aix-la-Chapelle; states have a general right to non-
interference from other states but also a more fundamental right to determine when their own 
independence is threatened by other states. Provided their own aims are not aggrandisement and 
mastery over other states, a state can then rightfully forcibly intervene beyond their borders.  
 
This argument about intervention stems from more fundamental understandings of the nature of 
states. Great Britain’s position is an essentially individualistic one; states are diverse entities that 
have their own wills and sentiments which, provided they do not threaten the independence of their 
fellow states, ought to be free to act in pursuit of that will. The State Paper again demonstrates 
Castlereagh’s basic position that the purpose of the alliance was limited to protecting the 
independence of states from French mastery over Europe, describing it as a “Union for the re-
                                                          
261
 Kissinger, A World Restored, 226–7, 229. 
262
 Ibid., chap. 13. 
263
 Ibid., 248–9. 
 82 
 
conquest and liberation of a great proportion of the Continent of Europe from the military dominion 
of France”.264 In a clear rebuttal of what he saw as an attempt by Alexander to interpret the alliance 
in such a way that legitimated novel relations of control between states, Castlereagh asserted it was 
never the intention to unite “for the government of the world or for the Superintendence of the 
affairs of other States”. The allies should beware, therefore, of “any attempt to push its duties and 
obligations beyond the Sphere which its original conception and understood Principles will 
warrant”.265 
 
There were two reasons informing Castlereagh’s rejection of a joint guarantee of historically-
legitimated sovereignty. The first is the basic presumption of the European system as constituted by 
independent states that are not subject to a higher authority. The second reason is that states ought 
not to be subject to obligations to other states beyond those of a specific, limited nature. Both of 
those reasons are based in a conception of states as possessing their own individual will and a 
normative belief that they ought to be able to pursue their will via their own means.266 These ideas 
are drawn out in Castlereagh’s discussion of the case of Spain.  
 
The State Paper shows a keen appreciation of “general danger” to the European order and the 
“stability of all existing Governments” carried by the contemporary European fervour for the 
“representative principle”. The British government also recognised the worrisome and “lamentable” 
situation of Spanish King being coerced into constitutional change.267 However, although there was 
“no doubt” Spanish events “seriously *extended+ the range of political agitation in Europe”,268 they 
did not meet the threshold of danger to justify intervention on the part of other states: 
 
*It+ must…be admitted that there is no portion of Europe of equal magnitude, in which such a 
Revolution could have happened, less likely to menace other States, with direct and imminent danger, 
which has always been regarded, at least in this Country, as alone constituting the Case which would 
justify external interference.
269 
 
The threshold of ‘direct and imminent danger’ was that which had to be reached in order to justify a 
breach of the right to non-intervention. The 'general danger' of European unrest did not, for the 
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British, translate into a general right of intervention. For the absolutist powers—Austria, Prussia and 
Russia—”political agitation” in itself was deemed threatening enough to warrant intervention. 
However, the difference in opinion over whether or not intervention was justified in Spain was not 
the result of a different interpretation of the level of threat posed by the Spanish revolt. Rather, it 
was a different understanding of what the situation in Spain was a threat to. As we have seen, 
Alexander’s understanding of the Concert was that it was a union to preserve the common value of 
historically-legitimated sovereignty. As this was a shared, international value, an attack on the 
principle in Spain was an attack on the whole order based upon that value. For Britain, Spain would 
be a danger only when it represented a military threat, and would be a common danger, justifying 
joint intervention, when it was a threat to the balance of power in Europe as a whole.  
 
For Britain, “the notion of revising, limiting, or regulating the course” of constitutional changes in 
other states “either by Foreign Council or by Foreign Force, would be as dangerous to avow, as it 
would be impossible to execute”.270 The 'general danger' of European unrest did not, for the British, 
translate into a general right of intervention. Although the “principle of one State interfering by force 
in the internal affairs of another in order to enforce obedience to the governing authority” can be 
legitimate in the face of “actual danger”, to “generalize such a principle and to think of reducing it to 
a System, or to impose it as an obligation, *was+ a scheme utterly impracticable and objectionable.” 
Such a system would suffer from both a “physical impossibility” and a “moral impractibility.”271 
 
This moral impracticality had two aspects. The first is the general assumption that states, provided 
they are not a threat to the independence of other states, should be self-determining with respect to 
their own political constitution. As long as the great powers “security *was+ not directly menaced”, 
they could: 
 
surely permit these Nations to work out by their own means, and by the lights of their own Councils, 
that result which no doubt materially bears upon the general Interests of the World, but which is more 
especially to decide their own particular destinies, without being led to interfere with them.
272
 
 
The absence of interference is, however, not the only, or even the most crucial condition for states to 
be able to ‘decide their own destinies’. The second, and more important, aspect to the moral 
impracticality a general system of intervention would pose is the obligations it would place on Great 
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Britain and the other members of the alliance. Although the power relations between the great 
powers in such a system might be horizontal—rather than a hierarchical, interventionary 
relationship—it would nonetheless strip the great powers of a crucial aspect of their self-mastery. To 
make a general commitment to guarantee dynastic sovereignty would intertwine states in each 
other’s affairs in such a way that was incompatible with their essential prerogatives of statehood.  
 
In defending his position against intervention in Spain, Castlereagh made an argument about the 
essentially diverse and individual nature of states. In contrast to the solidarism of Alexander’s rallying 
call to defence of dynastic sovereignty, Castlereagh pointed to the differences in the nature of British 
and Russian constitutions. While for Russia, if Alexander’s “Mind *was+ settled” on the matter of 
intervention, “His Action *was+ free and His Means *were+ in his own hands”, for Britain 
Parliamentary and public opinion were crucial in determining what a government could and could 
not do.273 An intervention in Spain on the part of the great powers would have “more or less the air 
of dictation and of menace”.274 During the Concert period, Castlereagh had constantly to negotiate a 
domestic suspicion of involvement in European affairs because of its association with intervention 
and tyranny.275 Indeed Castlereagh was himself accused by one pamphleteer of having “laid the 
foundations of universal despotism” by bringing Britain into the Vienna system.276 However, while 
the relative constitutional arrangements in Russia and Britain may have given a Russian emperor 
greater freedom of action than a British foreign secretary, that did not mean that Russia was self-
mastering while Britain was not. The constraints on Castlereagh and the British government by its 
constitutional fetters was not something that perturbed Castlereagh; as we have seen, the right to 
determine one’s own political form was a fundamental state right in British opinion. The way in 
which a state’s will was determined was a question of its internal political form. The fact that the 
British government had to “take *its+ Principle of action, and *its+ scale of acting…from those Maxims, 
which a System of Government strongly popular, and national in it’s character, has irresistibly 
imposed upon *it+” was plainly a matter of fact for Castlereagh and a simple product of Britain’s 
constitution.277 What was deeply troubling for Castlreagh was the possibility that the actions of a 
state could be determined by something other than the will of that state. States being essentially 
different in character, they were also necessarily different in will:  
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The fact is that we do not, and cannot feel alike upon all subjects. Our Position, our Institutions, the 
Habits of thinking, and the prejudice of our People, render us essentially different. We cannot in all 
matters reason or feel alike.
278
 
 
That being the case, to extend the alliance, and states’ mutual obligations, would be to “render” it an 
“Object of Odium and Distrust”.279 The only safe option was to maintain the limited, specific purpose 
of the alliance, to ensure that: “*each+ Government will then retain it’s due faculty of independent 
Action, always recollecting, that they have all a common Refuge in the Alliance, as well as a common 
Duty to perform, whenever such a Danger shall really exist, as that against which the Alliance was 
specially intended to provide”.280 
 
During the crisis in Europe over the Spanish revolution, Metternich's diplomacy was once again 
successful in avoiding in a total breakdown of the alliance over the issue of intervention.281 However, 
Castlereagh's State Paper clearly emphasised the differences between the British and Russian 
positions. The strain put on the Concert System by these differences were soon to become 
unbearable when Europe experienced further domestic upheaval. 
 
Naples 
 
Less than two months after the circulation of Castlereagh's State Paper, the allies again faced the 
question of whether or not to intervene to quell domestic revolt when, on 2 July 1821, revolution 
broke out in Naples. Austrian predominance in Italy was one of the “pillars” of Metternich's 
European policy and the Empire's level of influence in Naples was underlined by a treaty between 
the two that prohibited constitutional change in the latter without consultation with the former.282 It 
was clearly unlikely that Austria would leave the Neapolitan revolution to run its course, and 
intervention to restore the King seemed certain. The issue to be determined by the major powers 
was less that of whether or not intervention was justified and more the form this intervention would 
take; would it be an Austrian action, undertaken alone, to protect its legitimate national interest of 
self-defence, or would it be a multilateral response carried out in order to guarantee the European 
political order? 
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The position of Great Britain on this question was unsurprising. Britain was not against intervention 
in Naples; there was a specific treaty relationship and geographical proximity between the two states 
and it was for Austria to judge if the situation in Naples warranted interference. The Neapolitan 
revolution was not a threat to independence in Europe as a whole, however, and Britain herself was 
“not so...immediately menaced according to the doctrines...which have hitherto been sustained in 
the British Parliament *to+ justify it becoming party to an armed interference”.283 Castlereagh 
advocated, therefore, unilateral Austrian action with no general European involvement: 
 
“We can give a much stronger moral support to a cause which is not strictly our own than to one to 
which we are an active party. The revolution should be treated as a special rather than a general 
question, as an Italian question rather than as an European, and consequently as in the sphere of 
Austria rather than of the Alliance”.
284 
 
Castlereagh was unsuccessful, however, in his attempts to cajole Metternich into acting alone, and a 
congress was called which met in November 1820 in Troppau. Neither Britain nor France sent 
plenipotentiaries, though they did send observers, with Britain making a clear and principled 
objection to even the discussion of the internal affairs of another state. In a dispatch to the British 
observer Lord Stewart ahead of the congress, Castlereagh again set out his concerns regarding a 
mutual commitment to intervention, reemphasising his twin beliefs in the balance of power and that 
states should be in control of their own actions and commitments. Any “universal pledge” would 
make Britain “responsible” for future international actions by the other powers, but Britain “could 
not and ought not to have that species of detailed control” over other states’ decision-making 
“which would justify such a responsibility”. Castlereagh asserted that if Austria wished to take any 
measure in Naples, “she must adopt it upon her own responsibility, and in her own name, and not in 
that of the five Powers”.285 The Allies should independently decide whether to agree with and 
approve Austria’s action on the basis of their satisfaction “that she engages in this undertaking with 
no views of aggrandizement; that she aims at no supremacy in Italy incompatible with existing 
treaties; in short, that she has no interested views; that her plans are limited to objects of self-
defence”.286 The British “desire” was “to leave Austria unembarrassed in her course” while claiming 
for themselves “the same freedom of action”. Such a situation, wrote Castlereagh, “enables us, in our 
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Parliament, to consider, and consequently to respect her measures as the acts of an independent 
State—a doctrine which we could not maintain, if we had rendered ourselves, by a previous concert, 
parties to those acts”. Austrian had to pursue “what she feels to be her own necessary policy” 
without: 
 
*Involving+ other Powers in a…completely common interest and common responsibility. The 
consequence of so doing would be to fetter her own freedom of action. She must preserve to herself 
the power of pursuing with rapidity and effect her immediate views of security; and the other Allied 
States must reserve to themselves the faculty of interposing, if they see cause for doing so.287 
 
Although Castlereagh warned that universal pledges made by the great powers would be “seen 
through and despised”288 the autocratic states nonetheless articulated at the congress a broad 
interventionary position, which denied the legitimacy of any state whose domestic institutions had 
been altered by revolt. The 'Troppau Protocol' asserted that: 
 
States belonging to the European alliance, which have undergone in their internal structure an 
alteration brought about by revolt, whose consequences may be dangerous to other states, cease 
automatically to be members of the alliance. *If such states+ cause neighbouring states to feel an 
immediate danger, and if action by the Great Powers can be effective and beneficial, the Great Powers 
will take steps to bring the disturbed area back into the European system, first of all by friendly 
representation, and secondly by force if force becomes necessary to this end.
289 
 
This protocol, adopted by Austria, Russia and Prussia, established an interventionary system whereby 
the internal constitution on states becomes subject to the judgement of the Great Powers. In this 
system, constitutional change by popular revolt meant automatic ejection from the European order 
and the loss of the right to independence and non-intervention. The supposed source of the 
legitimacy of such a judgement was the shared interests of Europe as a whole, and these shared 
European interests and values—the definition of which was a privilege reserved for great powers—
determined whether or not a state was deemed legitimate. At Troppau, Metternich articulated the 
powers' understanding of a legitimate state as being both monarchical and stable—that is to say, free 
from the risk of revolution.290 It was not only the right of the great powers but their duty to 
guarantee that states met those conditions for the good of Europe. The Protocol thus not only bound 
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all states to a particular form of constitution, but also bound the powers to act to contain threats to 
general, common values. 
 
The idea of state freedom dominant at Troppau, then, was not one of independent states enjoying 
the freedom to determine their own domestic political structures. Nor was it the freedom of states 
to act according to their independently determined interests and sentiments. Rather, legitimate 
statehood was directly identifiable with its dynastically legitimised sovereign. States, so conceived, 
could only be understood as being in control or self-mastering if they were not subject to the threat 
of popular agitation and revolt. Although the self-mastery of states was apparent as a normative goal 
for the plenipotentiaries at Troppau, with the state identified with the legitimate sovereign, and the 
primary normative concern being those sovereigns’ control over their own population, the relations 
of control between states that were claimed as legitimate at Troppau were starkly different from 
those set out by Britain. Like Britain, the absolutist powers invoked the battle against tyranny as their 
unifying and animating purpose, but they had very different understandings of how the threat of 
tyranny was constituted and how the remedy of intervention should be employed. Britain associated 
tyranny with the desire of a state for territorial aggrandisement, an aim that was concretely linked to 
Napoleonic France. The Holy Alliance of Austria, Russia and Prussia, on the other hand—while 
admitting the link between Napoleon and tyranny—principally associated tyranny with revolution; 
Napoleon was the 'son' of the French revolution, and so were his hegemonic aims. The continental 
allies summarised the discussions at Troppau in a circular of December 18, 1820 to mark its 
adjournment, in which they asserted an “obligation” on the part of the great powers of “watching 
over the Tranquility of States”.291 Their joint action had “delivered Europe from the yoke” which 
“Revolution” had placed on Europe through Napoleon. It was natural, therefore, that just as the 
great powers had “delivered the Continent of Europe from the military tyranny of the Representative 
of the Revolution”, the alliance should also “put a curb on a force no less tyrannical and no more 
detestable, that of Revolution and Crime”.292 
 
According to the Holy Alliance, this tyrannical threat of revolution activated a right to intervene, 
threatening as it did the common values of the European system: 
 
The Powers exercise their indisputable right, in employing security measures in the states in which the 
revolutionary overthrow of a government could only be considered a dangerous example, one which 
could result in a hostile attitude toward all legitimate Constitutions and governments. The exercise of 
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the right became even more urgent, when those who had placed themselves in this position sought to 
spread their misfortune to neighbouring states, and to propagate all around them rebellion and 
confusion.
293 
 
States in this vision of European politics do enjoy negative rights of non-intervention, but popular 
revolt compromises the solidarist pact that guarantees such rights (rights which are enjoyed only by 
those within this exclusive community of states): 
 
“In this attitude and behaviour we can see the breakdown of the pact which guarantees to all 
European governments, not just the inviolability of their Territory, but also the enjoyment of peaceful 
relations which exclude encroachments on one another's rights.
294 
 
It is this understanding of Europe as a system of states based on common values (embodied in a 
particular form of domestic organisation) that enabled the allies to claim that the Troppau Protocol, 
despite its interventionary character, did not compromise the independence of states: 
 
“Besides, no other proofs are necessary, than that neither the spirit of conquest, nor the pretext of 
infringing on the Independence of other governments in their Internal Administration, nor the project 
of preventing wise alterations, freely undertaken, and consistent with the true interests of the 
peoples, had had any part in the Resolutions of the Powers. They only wish to maintain Peace, and to 
deliver Europe from the curse of revolution, and to remove or abridge, as much as in them lies, the 
evils which result from the violation of all principles of order and morality”.
295
 
 
Although independence may ordinarily mean “freedom from outside control or support”,296 the 
relevant ‘outside’ in this case is outside the traditional dynastic order rather than outside the borders 
of the state. Hence, in the position of the Holy Alliance, a state can be self-mastering in spite of, and 
indeed because of, outside intervention.  
 
The British response to the Troppau Protocol was to remain neutral with respect to which human 
object—the 'People' or the monarch—could legitimately represent 'the State'. In a circular dated 19 
January, 1821, Castlereagh reiterated the exceptional and limited character of the right to intervene, 
emphasising the incompatibility of a general “rule” of intervention with “general principles of the 
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greatest value and importance”.297 While careful not to accuse the other powers of undertaking 
interference for their own aggrandisement, Castlereagh asserts that “in the hands of less beneficent 
Monarchs” the Troppau proposals would “inevitably sanction...a much more frequent and extensive 
interference in the internal transactions of states”.298 We can infer here a link between a broad right 
of intervention and the danger of tyranny and supremacy; 'frequent and extensive interference' is 
incompatible with the independence of states and, in the British mind, the only alternative to 
independent states is hierarchy. A hierarchical Europe—unachievable and undesirable—could take 
one of only two forms: federative or hegemonic. As Castlereagh put it in his circular, the doctrine of 
intervention implied at Troppau was reconcilable with neither “the general interest, *n+or with the 
efficient authority and dignity, of independent Sovereigns”.299 The British Government, he wrote: 
 
do not regard the Alliance as entitled under existing Treaties, to assume, in their character as Allies, 
any such general powers, nor do they conceive that such extraordinary powers could be assumed, in 
virtue of any fresh Diplomatic Transaction amongst the Allied Courts, without their either attributing 
to themselves a supremacy incompatible with the rights of other States, or, if to be acquired through 
the special accession of such States, without introducing a federative system in Europe, not only 
unwieldy and ineffectual to its object, but leading to many most serious inconveniences. 
 
Just as the Holy Alliance claimed the Troppau Protocol to be anti-tyrannical, the British position has 
not changed from their position at the outset of the Concert system; that the tyranny to be 
avoided—first associated with Napoleon, now being linked with the programme of the Holy 
Alliance—is that of dictating the internal affairs of other states, be it through hegemonic military 
means of a single state, the multilateral action of a concert of states, or the mutual obligation that 
follows from collective organisation of security. Absent direct threat, the self-determination of 
domestic political order is a right of states—understood as a territorial entity rather than a dynastic 
monarch—and is a right which cannot be reconciled with the influence of a higher authority. 
 
Following the adjournment at Troppau, the Congress was resumed in Laibach300 and sat between 
January 21 and May 12, 1821.301 Again Britain sent only an observer rather than a plenipotentiary, 
and the divisions between her position and that of the Holy Alliance were merely reiterated rather 
than reconciled. The powers at Laibach continued to see revolution as a general threat to both 
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European peace and the “constitutive principles of Society”,302 leading to a position that European 
order, and the independence of states, could only be maintained by the Great Powers guaranteeing 
traditional domestic political orders. The circular dispatch from Metternich that concluded the 
Laibach Congress declared it an “eternal truth” that reform of political orders must emanate “from 
the free decision, from the enlightened views of those on whom God had conferred the 
responsibility...lest upheaval usurp a degree of power which would become a general scourge”.303 
The declaration issued at the close of the congress re-asserted that the “object” of the allied powers’ 
policy would “always be the preservation of the Independence and of the Rights of each State”, 
although with the crucial proviso, “such as they are recognised and defined in existing Treaties”.304 
Nonetheless, intervention in Naples had the “sole object of protecting the free exercise of legitimate 
authority”.305 Keen to distinguish their motives from those of territorial aggrandisement, the powers 
again claimed their action in Naples in the name of independence: 
 
Destined simply to fight against and repel rebellion, the Allied Forces, far from upholding any exclusive 
interest, came to the assistance of subdued Peoples, and they considered it as coming in support of 
their liberty, and not as an attack against their independence. From that moment war ceased; from 
the moment the States which the revolt had overtaken, became friendly States towards the Powers 
who had never looked for anything but their tranquillity and their prosperity.
306
 
 
Castlereagh, meanwhile, recognised that the continued proclamation of interventionary doctrines—
doctrines incompatible with principles which in the British system were “immutable”—would “ere 
long work a separation” between the parties that all had wished to avoid.307 So it proved to be, with 
the disagreements over intervention in Spain and Naples providing an outline of the “constellation 
which posterity has identified with the whole post-Vienna period”; Austria, Russia and Prussia acting 
together and superintending over European political and social order, Britain acting as an 
independent and oppositional pole, and France vacillating between the two.308 
 
A significant element of the history of the early period of the Concert of Europe, then, is 
characterised by debate about intervention. Neither Britain nor the Holy Alliance held anything like a 
rigidly non-interventionary position, but their understandings of the purposes and contours of use of 
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intervention as a tool of foreign policy were markedly different. It was disagreement along these 
lines that wrought a schism between Britain and the continental powers.  
 
As I have argued above, the different positions of the two parties on intervention can be linked to the 
different conceptions of state freedom they held. Although all of the great powers exhibited the 
inheritance of 18th century associations between basic political independence and a rejection of the 
supremacy of foreign powers, Britain and the Holy Alliance had widely diverging understandings of 
the meaning of that independence. Britain displayed a Self-Help idea of state freedom.  In this idea, 
the state is understood as an entity possessing its own individual form, characteristics and 
sentiments. For such an entity to be considered as self-mastering and self-controlling, it is necessary 
that its unique characteristics are realised through its self-determination of interests and actions 
without the imposition of foreign influence and control. That freedom of states was not 
unconditionally sacrosanct; a fundamental state right was to judge for itself when it was necessary to 
intervene in defence of its own independence. However, a necessary condition for the realisation of 
the self-mastery of states was the absence of inter-state control, whether that control was 
hierarchically or laterally imposed.  
 
The Holy Alliance, in contrast, identified the state with the dynastically legitimised monarch. The 
‘self’ in the self-mastery of states was, therefore, the sovereign him- or herself. The self-mastery of 
the state consisted, therefore, in the control the sovereign had over her or his population. The 
necessary condition for the realisation of that self-mastery was the stability of the order that 
constituted dynastic sovereign authority. This Dynastic Idea of state freedom supported a 
legitimating claim for a reconfiguration of the relations of control between states. States as territorial 
entities ought not to be self-controlling with respect to their own constitutions; this control should 
rather be in the hands of the international dynastic order, which was the true location of political 
authority. Dynastic powers had both the right and the duty to intervene wherever that order was 
threatened.   
 
 
State freedom in the Americas: paternalism and absolute rights 
 
Non-intervention is frequently associated with the Peace of Westphalia, and the claim is made that 
the basic rule of abstaining from intervention in the affairs of European states grew out of European 
ideas and practices of state sovereignty. To a certain extent that is true; theories of sovereignty did 
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spawn in Europe ideas about the illegitimacy of intervention. However, although present in 19th 
century European legal and political theory non-intervention was subject to numerous exceptions. As 
we have seen, in the practice of European relations, intervention was a well-established rule of 
conduct, even if there was significant contestation regarding the legitimate contours of its use. In the 
Americas, however, the young states that had grown out of former European colonies were keen to 
preserve their new found freedom from foreign subjection. The fear of European intervention in the 
Americas, followed by the practice of US intervention in Latin American affairs led to the advocacy 
and eventual institutionalisation of an absolute rule of non-intervention in western-hemispheric law. 
 
In this section I will describe the development of the non-intervention norm in the Americas from 
the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 until the zenith of hemispheric non-intervention 
in the 1930s, piecing together the ideas about state freedom that American debates about non-
intervention reveal. Although the states of the western hemisphere shared a basic normative belief 
that states were sovereign, independent entities that should be masters of their own destinies, over 
the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries a schism opened up between the Latin American 
states and their powerful neighbour to the north as to the meaning of that mastery and the 
necessary conditions for its realisation. The nature of those diverging ideas of state freedom were 
precipitated and illuminated by repeated attempts on the part of Latin American states to 
reconfigure relations of control between states. These claims were put forward through progressive 
arguments about the illegitimacy of intervention between states, first arguing against intervention 
for pecuniary measures, then for the protection of citizens abroad and culminating in the advocacy 
of an absolute prohibition of intervention. At the same time, however, the US was developing a social 
role as a ‘hemispheric policeman’ and accompanying doctrines of control over the internal 
characteristics of other American states. First, a practice of ‘preventive intervention’ developed, with 
its stated aim being to preserve Latin American independence from European control. This 
developed into a doctrine that linked states’ capacity for, and right to, non-intervention to the display 
of certain internal characteristics, principal among which were civilisation, order and democracy.  
 
The diverging beliefs about the rightfulness of intervention were extensively debated at the sixth and 
seventh International Conferences of American States, held in Havana and Montevideo in 1928 and 
1933 respectively and it was during the conference in Havana that two different ideas of state 
freedom were articulated most clearly. The US and its key allies demonstrated an understanding of 
state freedom that linked the self-mastery of states to responsibility and the fulfilment of duties, 
underlying which were the familiar principles of civilisation, order and democracy. In order for this 
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self-mastery to be realised, self-control in the sense of self-limitation needed to be demonstrated. In 
the absence of such self-control, the intervention and guidance of other states may be necessary, not 
to deny the freedom of states but to develop it. It is for this reason that I term this idea of freedom 
the Paternalistic Idea. Against this idea, the majority of Latin American states exhibited an idea of 
state freedom in which self-mastery consisted of the complete rejection of outside influence in the 
affairs of independent states. The necessary condition for this idea of self-mastery to be realised was 
the codification of absolute state rights in international law. This chapter focuses on the 
unconditional right of non-intervention and in Chapter Four I go on to examine how this idea of state 
freedom is related to ideas about the equality of states. Because of the absolute rejection of 
intervention at the heart of this idea of state freedom, I term it the Categorical Idea of state 
freedom. 
 
Responsibility and control: US hemispheric policing 
 
Although the high point of the codification of non-intervention into the law of the Western 
hemisphere came in the 20th century, non-intervention as an aspiration and a policy doctrine in the 
Americas began with the famous Monroe doctrine, first articulated in 1823. Proclaimed by US 
President James Monroe, the doctrine was both a rejection of European interference with the 
nascent independent states of Latin America and a renouncement of US interference with the 
remaining European colonies in the Americas. The doctrine is highly significant in the history of non-
intervention in the Americas as it both informed US policy well into the next century, and was 
regularly invoked by the Latin American states in their struggle for the codification of an absolute 
principle of non-intervention. The doctrine introduces the idea that by virtue of having thrown off 
the yolk of European colonialism, the American republics constituted “free and independent” states 
and were consequently unsuitable for future European colonisation. Their freedom, however, rested 
on more than merely the absence of formal colonial rule, but also the absence of any lesser 
interference on the part of European powers. As Monroe put it in his December 1923 address to 
Congress: 
 
We owe it...to candour and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those 
powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any 
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or 
dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the 
Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we 
have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition 
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for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European 
power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United 
States.
309
 
 
The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, implicitly claims a right on behalf of the Latin American republics to 
existence as independent states free from the colonial domination of the European powers. It also 
claims on their behalf the right of Latin American states to be free from European interference short 
of imperial control, bundling together formal independence and the freedom of a state to control its 
own destiny free from European oppression. This relationship between independence and a state's 
control over its own destiny would be frequently repeated by the American states over the coming 
century. As well as introducing the idea that as independent entities, American states had the right 
to control their own destiny (and the correlative duty of European powers not to interfere with 
them), the Monroe Doctrine also involved the US assuming the responsibility to uphold the rights of 
Latin American states against European encroachment. In appointing itself guarantor of Latin 
American rights, the US to an extent adopted the role of policeman in in the Americas (although in 
reality it lacked the power to effectively play the role), a role which, as we will see, was actively 
embraced by some of Monroe's successors as US President. 
 
Following the Monroe doctrine, in 1868, the “second American doctrine of non-intervention”310 was 
articulated by the noted Argentinian jurist Carlos Calvo and constitutes a notable attempt to 
reconfigure legitimate relations of control between Latin American states and the materially 
powerful European states from which they had gained their formal independence. While the Monroe 
Doctrine was primarily aimed against territorial occupation of American soil by the European powers, 
the Calvo Doctrine expanded the call for nonintevention into the financial sphere. Calvo rejected the 
practice of European states of exerting military or diplomatic interventions in American states in 
order to “enforce private claims of a pecuniary nature”. Calvo rejected this practice on the grounds of 
inequality—both the inequality of rights between national and foreign individuals, and the inequality 
between states it implied given that the practice was conducted by European nations only in their 
relations with American states and not with each other.311 Calvo's doctrine was taken up by the Latin 
American states at the First International Conference of American States. Held in Washington in 
1890, the Washington conference initiated a series of hemispheric conferences that promoted the 
                                                          
309
 Quoted in Ann Van Wynan Thomas and AJ Thomas, Non Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the 
Americas (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956), 11. 
310
 Ibid., 57. 
311
 Amos S. Hershey, ‘The Calvo and Drago Doctrines’, The American Journal of International Law 1, no. 1 
(1907): 26–45. 
 96 
 
idea of special relationships between the American republics and aimed to further cooperation 
between them. The principal aims of the conference as conceived of by the US were to discuss plans 
for the adoption of arbitration for the settlement of intra-American disputes, and to encourage 
commercial relations between states.312 The legal and political thinking throughout Latin America at 
the time, however, was characterised by growing prominence of the ideas of their equality and 
independence as states. Seen as incompatible with these ideas was intervention violating the 
sovereignty of less materially powerful states.313 With certain Latin American states viewing the 
Washington conference as an ideal opportunity to push for equal respect of sovereignty, a resolution 
was proposed that echoed the ideas of Carlos Calvo: “a nation has not, nor recognizes, in favor of 
foreigners, any other obligation or responsibilities than those which in favor of the natives are 
established, in like cases, by the constitution and the laws”.314 This proposal was voted for by all but 
one of the states present, the dissenter being William H Trescot, the US. Delegate. Trescot stated that 
the US could not “concur in any opinions which diminish the right or reduce the power of a nation by 
diplomatic reclamation, which is the manifestation of moral strength and vitality, to protect the 
rights and interests of its citizens”.315 
 
This cleavage between the US and the other American states on the subject of intervention to 
protect citizens’ rights abroad evident at the First International Conference of American States was 
one that would persist over the coming decades.316 Indeed, while the Monroe and Calvo Doctrines 
were both aimed at the intervention of European powers in the Americas, by the turn of the century, 
and particularly with the beginning of the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, the principal 
interventionary threat to the Latin American states was beginning to be seen as their powerful 
neighbour to the north. This fear of US intervention was not without basis as between the Spanish-
American war of 1898 and the Good Neighbour Policy of Franklin D Roosevelt of the 1930s US 
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intervention was “almost habitual”.317 
 
According to Charles G Fenwick, the transition of the US position from protector against inter-
continental intervention (as under the Monroe Doctrine), to that of principal intervening power was 
a simple one: “it was merely a case of assuming the duties that logically followed from resistance to 
European intervention”.318 Fenwick is not the only scholar to link the interventions of the period to 
the Monroe Doctrine, with numerous historians characterising them as preventive interventions 
aimed at warding off European would-be interveners in the event of civil strife in Latin America.319 
Such an interpretation is not without its merit, as this protective purpose of intervention was a 
stated purpose of US policy even before the Roosevelt Corollary made it doctrine. The infamous Platt 
Amendment provided that “the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise 
the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence”.320 However, this was not the 
sole interventionary provision of the Platt Amendment and nor was it the only justification for 
intervention claimed by the US around the turn of the 20th century. The amendment also granted the 
right to intervention for the “maintenance of life, property and individual liberty”.321 This clause 
suggests that the Cuban right to control its own destiny was subject to the judgement of the United 
States as to whether or not it was fulfilling its duties as a state. The Platt Amendment, and the 
reasons given by President William McKinley for the US intervention in Cuba in 1898 that presaged 
it,322 did not make any explicit claims as to the type of state a nation was free to develop into—
monarchical, republican, democratic, etc.—but they did assert a right of judgement on other states' 
internal situations, thus showing cracks in the relationship between recognition of sovereign 
statehood and non-intervention. These fissures between independent statehood and non-
intervention continued to develop in US policy, particularly during the presidencies of Theodore 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, when non-intervention came to be linked explicitly with normative 
principles distinct from sovereignty. For the Latin American states, the rule of non-intervention was 
tightly linked not only with the principle of sovereignty (or independent statehood), but also the 
equality of states. The development of the doctrines of non-intervention and equality in Latin 
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America are closely intertwined,323 rooted in the same Categorical Idea of state freedom, and both 
grew in contestation with alternative ideas and policies emanating from the US. 
 
The presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) was notable for its strongly interventionary 
character. According to Richard A Falk, by the turn of the century, the 'protective intervention' of the 
US aimed at preserving Latin American independence in the face of European intervention became 
increasingly a “mere euphemism for a quasi-imperialistic suzerainty that the United States felt itself 
entitled to exercise over most of Latin America”. Among the ideas informing this interventionary 
behaviour were ideas about civilisation that had the same roots as beliefs of racial superiority as 
those claimed by the European empires to justify colonialism.324 Roosevelt described Colombia as a 
“corrupt, pithecoid community”, while he claimed that asking Mexico and Venezuela to aid the US in 
guaranteeing the Monroe Doctrine would be like “asking the Apaches or Utes to guarantee it”.325 
Roosevelt held a hierarchical and teleological view of civilisation and, consequently, saw it as the 
duty of the 'civilised' states to promote the collective civilisation of the world. Not only was the 
equality of states a false idea, it was also a harmful one: “In international matters, to make believe 
that nations are equal when they are not equal is as productive of far-reaching harm as to make the 
same pretence about individuals in a community”.326 It was these ideas, in addition to a spheres of 
influence logic, that informed Roosevelt's approach to intervention. His interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine was thus not as an expression of a general rejection of intervention, but rather a narrow 
rejection of European intervention in the Americas which did not prejudice the rights of certain 
powers to intervene in certain geographic areas. This position was spelled out in what became 
known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his 1904 annual message to Congress, 
Roosevelt argued: 
 
If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political 
matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. 
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, 
may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the 
Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe doctrine may force the United 
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States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an 
international police power.
327 
 
The Roosevelt Corollary contains three significant ideas with respect to intervention. The first is that 
it makes the independence of states conditional on international judgement regarding issues within 
its borders; states are required to be efficient, decent, well-ordered and financially responsible. In 
effect, this links self-mastery, or self-control, with objective measures of control. In a similar way to 
the Holy Alliance’s association of legitimate statehood with the stability of the dynastic order, this 
makes possible the reconciliation of intervention with state independence. This idea was, as we shall 
see, at odds with the direction of legal and political thought throughout the rest of the hemisphere, 
which was pulling in the direction of equality and non-intervention.  
 
The Roosevelt Corollary was also novel with respect to the normative framework upon which 
judgement of states was based. Rather than dynastic legitimacy, the ideational basis for judgement 
was a civilisational standard linked to order, power and modernisation;328 in essence this was an 
application of the arguments made by European states to justify imperial control over extra-
European territories and populations to relations between states. This standard suggested a 
hierarchy between states incompatible with the idea of inter-state equality. The hierarchical nature 
of Roosevelt's understanding of civilisation was reinforced by “the unabashed proclamation, which 
invariably accompanied the applications of this new version of the Monroe Doctrine, of the 
superiority of the United States' political and social institutions and the express denial of confidence 
in both the standards and the machinery of justice of the Latin American states”.329 
 
The third significant element of the Roosevelt Corollary was that 'civilised nations' had a 
responsibility for the development of civilisation internationally. This meant that, within distinct 
geographic spheres, these states had not only the right but the duty to intervene in other states 
when the progress of collective civilisation demanded it. This was a moral rather than legal 
imperative and Roosevelt was not afraid to flout international law to follow it, as he did when he 
intervened in Panama.330 This action not only violated international law on non-intervention but also 
an 1846 treaty between Colombia and the US, which recognised the former's sovereignty over the 
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Isthmus. Roosevelt justified the intervention both in terms of national interest and collective 
civilisation.331 
 
Roosevelt's 'civilisational' doctrine of intervention was not anomalous with respect to US foreign 
policy in the early part of the 20th century. Although the exact content of the civilisational norms 
informing intervention were in part specific to Roosevelt, the notion of a moral hierarchy between 
states that justified intervention outlasted his tenure in the White House. Woodrow Wilson's time in 
office (1913-1921) was also characterised by the frequency with which the US intervened in other 
American states.332 In his public pronouncements, however, Wilson championed both non-
intervention and the equality of peoples. He also denied that his administration intervened in the 
domestic affairs of other states.333 His vision for international relations included that “the nations 
should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the as the doctrine of the world: 
that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people 
should be free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, 
unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful”.334 Although this statement appears to leave 
little room for either hierarchy or intervention in international affairs, Wilson's position was clouded 
by the use of the term 'people', rather than state. While Wilson links his position to that of Monroe 
(and the non-intervention it implied), the change of referent from state to people has significant and 
radical implications for international relations. In Wilson's vision, a fully realised state was one that 
was an institutional expression of the ‘consent of the governed’.335  Inverting the absolutist position 
of the Holy Alliance, the true and legitimate expression of statehood was democracy, grafted to 
familiar ideas about civilisation. As Wilson stated in his declaration on Latin American policy: 
 
Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly process of just government 
based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of 
republican government everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the 
governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public 
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conscience and approval.
336 
 
Wilson's call for interstate judgement on the justice of domestic political arrangements of other 
states was significantly different from 19th century European positions—Castlereagh would have 
been deeply troubled by the notion that a state can judge the legality and justice of another, and the 
Holy Alliance would have been disturbed by the call for democracy—but this moral position was not 
in itself interventionary. What is significant is how Wilson linked this normative tenet of domestic 
order to international order. When faced with the question of whether or not to recognise the 
government of General Huerta in Mexico (which would have been consistent with the practice of the 
time and had been done by the European powers, Japan and China337), which had been installed as a 
result of a military coup, Wilson stated: 
 
The present situation in Mexico is incompatible with fulfilment of international obligations on the part 
of Mexico, with the civilized development of Mexico herself, and with the maintenance of tolerable 
political and economic conditions in Central America.
338 
 
Wilson linked the presence of a military dictatorship in Mexico with international disorder and, 
recalling Roosevelt, the impeding of civilisation. Wilson made, therefore, a state's relationship with 
its own population a matter of international concern. This was not mere rhetoric for Wilson. The US 
allowed arms to pass across the Mexican border to supply the constitutionalist rebels in the north, 
fuelling a civil war in the hope of toppling Huerta and then forcibly occupied the port of Vera Cruz. In 
the mediation that followed, the US demanded the resignation of Huerta and that he be replaced by 
a constitutionalist government pledged to agrarian reforms to ensure fairer distribution of land to 
the Mexican people.339 Despite this, Wilson maintained that he never had and never would intervene 
in the affairs of the Mexican people.340 He also claimed: “The country is theirs. The Government is 
theirs...And so far as my influence goes while I am President nobody shall interfere with them”.341 
Wilson was able to maintain this position because he held the people, rather than the state, a key 
holder of rights, even internationally. Hence he claimed: 
 
Mexico has no government. The attempt to maintain one at the City of Mexico has broken down, and a 
mere military despotism has been set up which has hardly more than the semblance of national 
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authority...*A+ condition of affairs now exists in Mexico which has made it doubtful whether even the 
most elementary and fundamental rights either of her own people or of the citizens of other countries 
resident within her territory can long be successfully safeguarded, and which threatens, if long 
continued, to imperil the interests of peace, order, and tolerable life in the lands immediately to the 
south of us..
342 
 
Mexico had “no government” for Wilson not just because of civil disorder in the country, but also 
because it was not representative of the people. The disorder in Mexico indicated an absence of 
control on the part of the Mexican state, but the military despotism also meant that the true agency 
of the state—the people—had been usurped. Without the 'consent of the governed', the 
government was illegitimate, unworthy of recognition and a legitimate target for US action. This 
action was not, in the view of the Wilson administration, intervention because “to intervene in the 
affairs of a neighboring independent state means to interfere with its domestic affairs and the 
exercise of its sovereign rights by its people”;343 as unrepresentative of the people, Huerta's 
government held no sovereign rights and therefore even forcible action by the US did not, according 
to this view, constitute intervention. 
 
International Conferences and categorical non-intervention 
 
Both the Roosevelt and Wilson administrations, then, were willing to sanction what would commonly 
be called interventions on grounds not justified by contemporary international law. It is commonly 
claimed by historians that, in response to the interventionary behaviour of the US, the other 
American states developed an “obsession to proclaim an absolute doctrine of non-intervention”.344 
Although this is true to an extent, the Latin American drive for non-intervention—and its 
institutionalisation in international law—was in evidence long before the US became the primary 
interventionary threat. In 1826 at the Congress of Panama (attended by Colombia, Mexico, Peru and 
Central American states) fear over Spanish desires to reacquire the independent states of Latin 
America led the attendees to echo the recently articulated Monroe Doctrine. The object of the treaty 
signed at the congress was stated to be to “maintain in common, defensively and offensively, should 
occasion arise, the sovereignty and independence of all and each of the confederated powers of 
America against foreign subjection”.345 So, in the Western Hemisphere, at the beginnings of Latin 
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American solidarity, we see a similar reaction to the Holy Alliance's interventionary stance as that of 
Britain's response to French hegemonic aspirations; the association and cooperation of nations with 
the purpose of resisting foreign domination and promoting the independence of states. This 
normative preference for independence was reinforced in 1848 when several Latin American 
countries explicitly institutionalised non-intervention as an inter-american rule of conduct. The 
delegates at the American Congress of 1848346 agreed it to be a “casus foederis” when “any foreign 
government intervenes or tries to intervene by force, to alter the institutions of one or more of the 
Confederated Republics”.347 In the Tratado de Paz, Amistad y Comercio of 1887, the Central American 
states pledged “that each should abstain absolutely from all interference, direct or indirect, in the 
internal affairs of the other Republics” and to “obligate themselves in the most solemn manner to 
respect the principle of non-intervention”.348 
 
These, and other, examples show a clear trend in Latin America from the early 19th century to legally 
codify the prohibition of intervention, both intra- and inter-continental. It is true, however, that 
when the interventionary threat from Europe faded,349 and that of the US rose, the attempt to codify 
absolute non-intervention into an 'American international law', and for it to be ratified by the US, 
became the “supreme diplomatic objective” of the Latin American republics.350 The form which this 
diplomatic effort took was a push for a codification of 'American international law', the institutional 
mechanism that would frame Latin American attempts to reconfigure legitimate relations of control 
between states. The forums in which the Latin American states principally made this push were the 
International Conferences of American States. These conferences were initiated by the United States 
with the idea being to promote cooperation and agreement with respect to common interests, while 
avoiding political questions and controversial issues.351 The Latin American states, however, grasped 
the opportunity to promote the ideas of equality and non-intervention between states. Since the 
inaugural meeting in Washington in 1890, the American states had met in 1902, 1906, 1910 and 
1923. Some effort had been made in these conferences to develop an American rule of non-
intervention, and to develop and codify a hemispheric international law in general. Proposals to 
create a Commission of Jurists to codify public international law in the Americas were made at both 
the Second (1901-2) and Third International Conferences of American States. Due to slowness of 
ratification, the opposition of the US, and the disruption of World War I, however, despite meeting in 
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Rio in 1912 the Commission was largely moribund until the Fifth International Conference held in 
Santiago in 1923.352 Here, at the behest of the US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes 
(sympathetic to the development of international law, although sceptical towards an American 
international law), the Commission of Jurists was put on the Conference agenda. At Santiago, the 
Chilean delegate and noted jurist Alejandro Alvarez presented a report to the Juridical Committee of 
the conference on the meaning and expression of American international law. In it, he drew a 
distinction between the international law of Europe and that of America which also implied 
fundamentally different modes of conduct for continental relations and suggested a future of inter-
American politics that rejected the balance of power order that had dominated 19th century Europe. 
He argued: 
 
The States of America, even before reaching a mutual agreement, have proclaimed certain regulations 
or principles different and even contradictory to those ruling in European countries, and which these 
latter are compelled to respect in our Continent, for instance, non-intervention and the non-occupation 
of territories of the States of America by ultra-continental countries. 
 
There are institutions, practices and law applied in Europe which are not enforced on the American 
Continent, because the States that form it are not in favor of them. It is said, for instance, that political 
equilibrium, and armed peace are contrary to the principles of American Public Law.
353 
 
Alvarez's ideas on the codification of American law were highly influential, and the Santiago 
Conference not only re-established the Commission of Jurists but also urged the Commission to 
accept Alvarez's report as the basis for its work.354 The Commission met, for the first time since 1912, 
in Rio in 1927, having as its purpose “the codification of public and private international law as a 
means of consolidating and developing the good relations which should exist between *the States of 
the New World+”.355 In addition to the work of Alvarez and several other projects, the Commission 
also received numerous proposals from delegates of individual states, a significant proportion of 
which pertained to intervention. Haiti, for example, suggested that “any action carried out by a State, 
whether by means of diplomatic pressure or by armed force, in order to force its will upon that of 
the other State, constitutes intervention”. Argentina proposed that “a State may not intervene in the 
internal affairs nor in the external affairs of another State”. Paraguay put forward that “intervention 
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or any act of a state within the territory of another State without a previous declaration of war, with 
the intent to decide by force, material pressure, or moral coercion, internal or external questions of 
the other State, will be considered as a violation of international law”. 
 
These proposals, along with the projects submitted by Alvarez and others were considered by the 
Commission in deliberations on its second project, “States: existence—equality—recognition”. Article 
3 of that project stated simply: “No State may intervene in the internal affairs of another”. Although 
it is somewhat less comprehensive than the Argentinian suggestion, which included the external as 
well as internal affairs of states to be free from intervention, Article 3 was nonetheless a radical 
proposal, constituting an absolute prohibition on intervention detailing no exceptions, while the 
prevailing doctrine of international law permitted numerous exceptions. Taken together, Article 3 
and the broader project to institutionalise a hemispheric law that broke from European practices of 
inter-state coercion represented an important legitimacy claim for a transformation of relations of 
control between states. 
 
The projects of the International Commission of Jurists were to be debated at the Sixth International 
Conference in Havana, 1928, presenting for the first time in such a conference the opportunity for 
controversial political issues to be raised. The work of the Commission thus opened up the possibility 
that at Havana the major fissures in interventionary doctrine in the Americas could be cast open in a 
major public forum. When the US State Department reviewed the Commission's proposal, it 
considered much of its work to be a presentation of what it thought international law ought to be, 
rather than codifying existing law. Principal among the Department's objections was the 
“unqualified” statement on non-intervention.356 The Havana Conference was taking place in the 
context of both continuing interventionary behaviour on the part of the US and, significantly, an 
increasingly vocal opposition to that behaviour within Latin America, and even the US itself.357 
Against this backdrop, the US State Department was seriously concerned about the possibility of 
criticism of the US position and action with respect to intervention and made every diplomatic effort 
to control the discussions both at the Conference and in the run-up. Secretary of State Frank B 
Kellogg instructed the US delegates that “every effort should be made to have the topics discussed at 
the conference confined to those on the pre-arranged agenda, or such additional topics as do not 
                                                          
356
 Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, 249. 
357
 David Sheinin, ‘Argentina and the United States at the Sixth Pan American Conference (Havana 1928)’, ISA 
Research Papers, no. 24 (1991): 4; Charles Evans Hughes, David Joseph Danelski, and Joseph S. Tulchin, The 
Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), 274–
5.In fact, the Conference began just as the US military was escalating its activity in Nicaragua (Sheinin, 
‘Argentina and the United States at the Sixth Pan American Conference (Havana 1928)’, 1; Hughes, Danelski, 
and Tulchin, The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes., 274.). 
 106 
 
involve any discussion or criticism of the foreign policy of this or any other country”,358 and the 
delegation also understood that it was to “resist the doctrine of absolute non-intervention”.359 A US 
diplomatic effort to identify and discourage potential dissenting voices had yielded assurance in 
advance that Peru would support the US position “without fail”, as well as similar pledges from 
numerous other governments.360 They were also reassured that the Cuban President of the 
conference would guard against “any injection of undesirable matter into the discussions”.361 
 
The Havana Conference has been described as a “diplomatic battleground between the rights and 
duties of states”.362 Without US influence, the Latin American states would have been willing to 
adopt the projects of the International Commission, meeting their principal objectives of tying the 
US to a commitment to the equality of states and absolute non-intervention.363 Bemis characterises 
this position as one of “sovereign irresponsibility” whereby the Latin American states aimed to 
confirm their rights but were “less eager to pledge their 'duties'”,364 an interpretation consistent with 
how US officials considered the Commission's projects at the time.365 The unqualified non-
intervention article in particular provoked resistance for its asymmetry with respect to rights and 
responsibilities of states366. Even President Calvin Coolidge's opening address to the Conference 
emphasised that “*i+n the international system which you represent, the rights of each nation carry 
with them corresponding obligations, defined by laws which we recognize as binding upon all of 
us”.367 The first major clash on this diplomatic battleground, however, took place not in the opening 
session, but in the Committee on Public International Law. On 4 February, the committee dealt with 
the first two projects of the International Commission of Jurists, those on the “Fundamental Bases of 
International Law” and “States: existence—equality—recognition”. According to Bemis, the Chairman 
of the US delegation, Charles Evans Hughes—present in the Committee on Public International Law—
had, after considering the advice of the State Department solicitors, determined before arriving in 
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Havana, to oppose these two projects.368 According to another of the US delegates at Havana, James 
Brown Scott, however, there was little objectionable in the two projects, and that “trifling 
modifications” would have made them acceptable.369 Little objectionable apart from, that is, the 
“keystone to the arch of the structure...upon which every eye was fixed”.370 This 'keystone' was the 
non-intervention article, and it was this article that was to provoke intense disagreement at Havana. 
 
According to Scott, the article as adopted by the Commission of Jurists (“No State may intervene in 
the internal affairs of another”) was an “abstract statement which needed to be interpreted to be 
applied”. In this abstract form, the article could mean “everything and nothing” and the US delegates 
in the Committee asserted reservations on the prohibition of intervention in cases of self-defence 
and “intervention in the name of humanity”. Such reservations were necessary, Scott subsequently 
claimed “in a system of law based upon juridical equality”, the reason being that “the right of one 
State implies the duty of all States to recognize, observe it and, if need be, to cause it to be 
respected”.371 This mode of thinking encapsulates the conceptual ambiguity and, ultimately impasse, 
that is in evidence in so much discussion on state sovereignty and intervention, both in practice and 
in scholarship. On the same grounds—the legal equality of states, or, to put it another way, a system 
of independent states coexisting in the absence of formal hierarchy—one can derive opposed 
perspectives on intervention. For the advocates of non-intervention, juridical equality is a bulwark 
against predation by materially powerful states. It institutionalises the right to independence of 
states, thus denying the right to interfere with that independence. For others, however, the rights 
provided by juridical equality also bestow on states duties. These duties imply that in certain 
circumstances intervention may be justified in order to ensure compliance. The US delegates argued 
that the reservations to the rule of non-intervention put the article in line with international practice. 
'International practice' with respect to intervention was, of course, what the Latin American states 
had been trying to change; their position was that the interventions of the US were arbitrary and 
incompatible with the independence of states, and that any exceptions to the rule of non-
intervention opened the door to their abuse by materially stronger nations. The advocates of the 
Commission of Jurists' proposal thus resisted the US criticism. 
 
The effort at Havana to codify the rights and duties of states was understood as reinforcing a mode 
of conducting international relations based on a fundamental and legally-enshrined equality, 
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sovereignty, independence and liberty of states. The language of the fundamental rights of 
independence and equality was pervasive in Havana, and was understood as a reconfiguration of the 
power relations of Europe, where “old instincts of domination neutralised only by the balance of 
power” reigned.372 In the Americas, international relations were to be based on the legal equality of 
states, a doctrine which, protected by the cardinal principle of non-intervention, configured relations 
of control between states according to justice and right rather than material power. 
 
The pre-conference diplomacy of the US had been successful, however, and it was not without allies 
for its rebuttal of absolute non-intervention. The rapporteur of the committee, Peruvian delegate 
Victor Maúrtua (whose government had pledged to support the US position “without fail”), argued 
against the International Commission of Jurists. Implicitly criticising the tentatively legislative nature 
of the Commission projects, he stated that the fundamental principles of international life are a 
product of the coexistence of states and are therefore declared rather than created. He further 
claimed that they were in no need of reformulation given that they had already been articulated 
satisfactorily by the American Institute of International Law (AIIL).373 
 
The AIIL was a non-governmental organisation designed to bring together thinking on international 
law from throughout the republics of the Americas. It was founded by JB Scott (the President of the 
Institute) and Alejandro Alvarez (Secretary General), and had Theodore Roosevelt's former Secretary 
of State Elihu Root as its Honorary President. In 1916 it published a “Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Nations” based upon decisions of the US Surpreme Court.374 Among other things, this 
Declaration stated that “*e+very nation has the right to independence in the sense that it has a right 
to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself without interference or control from other 
states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states”. It also 
declared “*e+very nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitled to have that right 
respected and protected by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the right of one 
is the duty of all to observe”.375 Although the Declaration of the AIIL contained a clear statement of 
the freedom of states to control their own destinies without the interference of others (and 
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elsewhere affirmed the equality of states), it made this right conditional rather than absolute.  
 
On both sides of the debate, the freedom of states was claimed as a foundational principle upon 
which their approach to the right of non-intervention, and the relations of control between states it 
would give legal force to, was based. Maúrtua claimed a “spiritual continuity” across the Americas 
“from the point of view of the supreme necessity to root international life in the respect of the 
liberty of nations and in its regulation by law”.376 He claimed that he was putting forward a 
“categorical and decisive article the basic principles on which rest the liberty and autonomy of the 
American nations”.377 Nonetheless, Maúrtua also stressed the emphasis put on duty in the AIIL 
Declaration, suggesting that this “new conception of international law” by “eliminating the old 
assertion of exclusive rights of the States to replace it by the assertion of rights and duties” could 
“mark a new epoch in the legal history of humanity”.378 He laid out a conceptual position on state 
independence that had responsibility at its core: 
 
Independence is not an absolute right. It is limited by justice and cooperation...Independence 
presupposes that States should not be subject to the arbitrary and unorganized imposition of a foreign 
law. Sovereignty is a supreme internal power, and its external aspect is independence. In these two 
respects States are their own masters. They are the arbiters of their proper destiny. They are master of 
their actions, precisely because they are responsible for them. They may not exercise their power to the 
injury of a right as legitimate as their own, or to the detriment of the sovereign rights as ample as theirs. 
They may not exercise their independence so as to ignore the duties of the society in which they live. 
They may not refuse their assistance to undertakings of an international order. They may not develop 
themselves as if they were living in a desert.
379 
 
For Maúrtua, it was the “limitation” of independence by the “just right of the others” that was the 
very essence of international order; it is this that “renders possible the existence of nations 
associated with one another” for “*t+here can be neither society nor cooperation if each one should 
exercise its right to the limits of its proper power, or of its arbitrary will”.380 Maúrtua's interpretation 
of the Declaration and his understanding of international order stemmed from an understanding of a 
state's independence and self-mastery as resting on the fundamental principles of self-control (in the 
sense of self-restraint) and responsibility.  
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He set up this vision of the international sphere in opposition to the excessive freedom and 
insufficient duty implied by the absolute right of non-intervention. The necessary conditions to 
realise the freedom of states was not just an equality of rights, but an equality of duties; not a “wild 
independence”381 but “subjection of all to justice and common well-being…the same limitation on all 
for the just right of the others”.382 According to Maúrtua, society and cooperation is impossible if 
each state “takes its faculties to the limit of its own power or its arbitrary will, or if the exercise of 
rights does not take into account that other equivalent rights must also be exercised”.383 It is 
precisely in the notion of self-limitation that the New World held the possibility of transcending the 
international relations of Europe: “The new aspect of international law consists precisely in 
eliminating the old exclusive affirmation of the rights of states to be replaced with the affirmation of 
rights and duties”.384 
 
For the advocates of the proposal of the Commission of Jurists, however, it was precisely the 
absolute nature of the right to intervention that would prevent the 'arbitrary will' of powerful states 
from impinging on their independence. To make the freedom of states to develop their own destinies 
conditional, was to open the door to interference; the schema laid out by Maúrtua was overly 
ambiguous, playing into the hands of the US in leaving them room to interpret it according to their 
interests.385 El Salvadorian delegate Jose Gustavo Guerrero claimed: “The rights of States to 
independence, liberty and sovereignty must be proclaimed in precise and categorical terms, and not 
encompassed in obscure formulas that give place to misunderstandings that can later disrupt the 
consciousness of peoples”.
386
 Jacinto R de Castro of the Dominican Republic similarly argued: 
 
The sovereignty of States consists in absolute right, in complete internal autonomy and in complete 
external independence. This right is guaranteed in strong nations by their strength, in the weak by the 
respect of the strong. If this right is not established and practised in an absolute form, international 
juridical harmony does not exist.
387
 
 
The El Salvadorian delegate Héctor David Castro, among others, argued for the importance of the 
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categorical nature of the rejection of non-intervention. If any room for interpretation was left, the 
interpretation of the strong would prevail.388 Underlying all of these arguments was a fundamental 
belief in the need of a state to “search for its own wellbeing and evolve freely, without any 
intervention”389 and states’ “right to complete independence, liberty and sovereignty”.390 
 
The opponents to the AIIL doctrine were not concerned without reason. Not only did they have the 
recent history (and indeed contemporary actions) of the US with respect to intervention to make 
them fearful, the Declaration of the AIIL itself also suggested that independence was contingent on 
the embodiment of higher values. Reflecting the Wilsonian ideology of the time of its drafting, the 
preamble of the Declaration states that “nations or governments are regarded as created by the 
people, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”.391 Thus, despite the assertion 
present in both the Declaration itself and the accompanying commentary of the rights to 
independence and equality,392 the AIIL's code implies duties not only to other states, but also to 
higher order principles than the independence of states. Moreover, despite the preambulatory claim 
that the Declaration expresses the “universal practice of the American Republics”,393 the Declaration 
nonetheless has a distinctly US-specific foundation. An analogy is made between the rights of 
nations and the rights of individuals; the rights of nations are claimed to be codifiable in 
international law just as “the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit of happiness the 
right to equality before the law, the right to property, and the right to the observance thereof” of 
individuals are codified in national law. Of course, the rights to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness' as well as the notion that governmental authority is derived from the 'consent of the 
governed' are borrowed directly from the US Declaration of Independence. Indeed the introductory 
address of the President of the Institute JB Scott, when introducing the Declaration in 1916, stated 
explicitly that “the conception of the American State is based upon the Declaration of 
Independence”, and its legal basis was decisions of the US Supreme Court.394 He further claimed that: 
 
*No+ conception of the state is or can be satisfactory to Americans which does not recognize the people 
of the American continent as possessed of...*inalienable+ rights, and that no form of government will be 
tolerated by the American peoples which does not protect them in the enjoyment of these rights... 
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*The+ Government of the United States not only recognizes these rights, in so far as its citizens are 
concerned, but that it instists that governments in American countries in which the United States has 
influence shall secure to the people thereof the protection and enjoyment of these rights... 
 
It would seem to be beyond question that the framers of the Declaration of Independence recognized 
the right and the necessity of peoples to create states which, however, were not to be the masters but 
the servants of the creators.
395
 
 
That such sentiments lay behind the Declaration will have done nothing to temper the notion that 
the rights to independence and non-intervention it proclaimed were contingent on a state 
embodying values in accordance with the US' own. Given that the rights of citizens abroad had been 
the justification for numerous US interventions in the recent past, it was not surprising that some of 
the delegates took umbrage at Maúrtua's statement. On Maúrtua's finish, Hughes stood to confirm 
his approval, reiterating that the purpose of the Committee was the codification of international law 
rather than its creation, and that they ought not “attempt to change fundamental principles”.396 He 
was followed by Guerrero who defended the International Commission's project and insisted that its 
article on non-intervention should form the basis of the committee's discussion.397 He was supported 
by Honorio Pueyrredon of Argentina, who argued that state sovereignty consisted of the absolute 
right of internal autonomy and external independence. This right, he asserted was guaranteed in 
powerful nations by their power, but in weak nations only by the respect of the powerful. If this right 
is not consecrated and practised absolutely, he claimed, international judicial harmony could not 
exist. Further, diplomatic or armed intervention, either temporary or permanent was a threat to the 
equality of states given that weak states were not able, in turn, to exercise such a right.398 
 
After all the delegates had spoken, the majority position supported absolute intervention. However, 
Cuba, Nicaragua and the US supported Maúrtua, with several other states taking neutral positions.399 
A sub-committee of seven members was formed in an attempt to resolve the issue, but Guerrero and 
Pueyrredon maintained their position, as did Hughes and his allies. In a diplomatic victory for 
Hughes, it was decided, therefore to postpone consideration of the International Commission's 
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projects until the next International Conference of American States.400  
 
In the closing plenary session of the conference, however, this postponement came up for 
confirmation, the Argentinian delegate Laurentino Olascoaga stood to express regret that the 
conference had been unable to make progress with respect to intervention and arguing in favour of 
non-intervention. His sentiment was echoed by “delegate after delegate”,401 before the Guatemalan 
delegate formally asked the Committee on Public International Law why it had been unable to reach 
a solution given that all delegates appeared in agreement on the question.402 In the midst of this 
tense revival of the intervention issue, Guerrero suggested that if the conference was, as it seemed 
to him, unanimous in support of non-intervention, there was no reason why it ought not go on the 
record affirming so. He thus suggested the resolution: 
 
The Sixth International Conference of States, 
Considering that at this time the firm decision of every delegation has been expressed to the effect that 
the principles of non-intervention and of the absolute juridical equality of states be established in a 
categorical manner, 
RESOLVES: 
That no state has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another.
403
 
 
At this point, the highly charged atmosphere—accompanied by applause for non-intervention and 
anti-US cat-calls from the press gallery404—was broken by the entrance of Cuban academic 
dignitaries to deliver formal closing speeches.405 Hughes used this break in proceedings to rally his 
diplomatic allies, and, following the resumption of the session, Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica all 
made fiery criticisms of Guerrero. Hughes himself then rose and stated he had: “never had a 
moment's desire to escape a discussion of this question. There is nothing to conceal. There are no 
hidden motives. There are no desires or ambitions which my country entertains which are opposed 
to the desires and aspirations of our sister republics”.406 He renounced any desire on the part of the 
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US to compromise the independence of the Latin American states: 
 
We yield to none in the establishment of the idea of sovereignty and independence for every one of the 
American Republics from the greatest to the smallest...We desire to respect the rights of every country 
and to have the rights of our own country equally respected. We do not wish the territory of any 
American Republic. We do not wish to govern any American Republic. We do not wish to intervene in 
the affairs of any American Republic. We simply wish peace and order and stability and recognition of 
honest rights properly acquired so that this hemisphere may not only be the hemisphere of peace but 
the hemisphere of justice.
407
 
 
Addressing specifically the case of Nicuragua, however, Hughes stated: 
 
Let us face facts. The difficulty if there is any, in any one of the American Republics, is not of any external 
aggression. It is an internal difficulty, if it exists at all. From time to time there arises a situation most 
deplorable and regrettable in which sovereignty is not at work, in which for a time in certain areas there 
is no government at all, in which for a time and within a limited sphere there is no possibility of 
performing the functions of sovereignty and independence. Those are the conditions that create the 
difficulty with which at times we find ourselves confronted. What are we to do when government breaks 
down and American citizens are in danger of their lives? Are we to stand by and see them killed because 
a government in circumstances which it cannot control and for which it may not be responsible can no 
longer afford reasonable protection?...I am not speaking of those distressing incidents which may occur 
in any country however well administered. I am speaking of the occasions where government itself is 
unable to function for a time because of difficulties which confront it and which it is impossible for it to 
surmount.
408
 
 
Having turned around the problem from one of intervention to one of internal order, echoing both 
Roosevelt's policeman409 and Wilson's denial of the Huerta government's sovereignty, Hughes went 
on to invoke international law for the legitimacy of its interventions: 
 
Now it is a principle of international law that in such a case a government is fully justified in taking 
action—I would call it interposition of a temporary character—for the purpose of protecting the lives 
and property of its nationals. I could say that that is not intervention...But if I should subscribe to a 
formula which others thought might prevent the action which a nation is entitled to take in these 
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circumstances, there might come alter the charge of bad faith....Of course the United States cannot 
forego its right to protect its citizens. No country should forego its right to protect its citizens.
410
 
 
Hughes continued, reiterating his arguments from the committee that international law cannot be 
changed by the resolutions of the conference, and re-emphasising the duties of states as well as their 
rights, culminating in the withering claim: “we cannot codify international law and ignore the duties 
of states, by setting up the impossible reign of self-will without any recognition upon the part of a 
state of its obligations to its neighbors”.411 
 
The combination of Hughes' oratory and the US diplomacy succeeded in taking the wind out of the 
sails of the late push for non-intervention.412 Guerrero withdrew his proposal, and the conference 
voted unanimously to defer consideration of the question of intervention to the next conference.413 
Although the push for absolute non-intervention was repelled in Havana, it was nonetheless an 
important moment in the history of the codification of the rule. Havana was the first time that Latin 
American states openly challenged the US over intervention, forcing it to articulate a defence of its 
policy, and beating the path for continued Latin American opposition to US practice. Although the 
question of the contours of a non-intervention rule was deferred at the Sixth Conference, the 
momentum in Latin American thought toward absolute prohibition continued to build in the 
subsequent years. The movement for equality, unfettered independence and non-intervention in 
Latin America was accompanied by increasingly significant questioning from within the US of its 
superintendence of the hemisphere, both in popular opinion and within government.414 The 
counterproductive nature of unilateral intervention, especially when motivated by the 
uncomfortable bedfellows of both state independence and the consent of the governed, was 
beginning to be recognised and closer ties with the Latin American states sought.415 By the time of 
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the Seventh International Conference of American States, which took place in Montevideo in 1933, 
the US also had a new president, Franklin D Roosevelt, who had, in his inaugural address, declared a 
new era for US foreign policy based on the principle of the 'good neighbour'. This neighbour, in a 
“world of neighbors…resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of 
others”.416 Although the US rhetoric of respecting the independence of the other American states 
may have seemed familiar, it was reflective of a change of social role from that of a hemispheric 
policeman that was accompanied by a change in practices of intervention.417 This, coupled with the 
increasing unity of the Latin American states on the subject, made the debates at Montevideo 
markedly different from the fraught atmosphere of five years earlier. 
 
The Second Sub-Committee of the conference, charged with re-examining the issues postponed in 
Havana, witnessed a resurrection of the work of the International Commission of Jurists, which had, 
in the words of the delegate of El Salvador, been “thrown aside, trampled on” in Havana, to be 
replaced by “declarations of correlated principles so interwoven that they might be used to defend 
either the positive or the negative side of intervention”.418 Here delegates freely and openly criticised 
the actions of the US. Cuba and Nicaragua, which had supported the US position throughout the 
Sixth Conference, under conditions akin to protectorates, now admonished the “imperialist 
extension of the Monroe Doctrine” of the Roosevelt Corollary,419 and proclaimed the “holy principle 
of non-intervention”.420 Other delegates addressed directly Hughes' arguments from Havana, urging 
their rejection on the basis that the absolute prohibition of intervention would remove any 
ambiguity and thus remove distrust from American inter-state relations.421 Hughes' argument that 
intervention was “indispensable” on occasions was rejected as dangerous and that an alternative 
idea to necessity must be found to harmonise hemispheric relations on the “superior plane” of 
international law. The delegates were urged: 
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Let us seek in the talk of Law the means by which Law may be the solution of our interests, of our 
comforts, of our reciprocal needs...In order to do this we must vote for non-intervention. Intervention is 
an elemental principle in juridical matters. There exist no rights against rights. Sovereignty is a right. 
How then can there be rights, or laws, against sovereignty?
422
 
 
The absolute nature of sovereignty was a common theme, linked to its often-cited corollary non-
intervention, as a guarantor of the freedom of states: 
 
*Full+ sovereignty is contrary to and does not tolerate foreign domination; for that reason the Chilean 
people are willing to consecrate, in the International Law which is being elaborated for the future of our 
relations, the principle *i.e. non-intervention+ which shall establish perfect freedom, absolute autonomy 
of Nations, to rule their own destinies in all the aspects of their activities.
423
 
 
Among this torrent of support for non-intervention, the US delegate, Cordell Hull, affirmed that the 
US was “as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the 
sovereignty, or other international affairs or process of the governments of other nations”, and 
reassured the delegates that “no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United 
States under the Roosevelt Administration”.424 In the debate on non-intervention, Hull also referred 
to a speech he had made earlier in the conference where he had stated that “every nation alike 
earnestly favors the absolute independence, the unimpaired sovereignty, the perfect equality, and 
the political integrity of each nation large or small, as they similarly oppose aggression in every sense 
of the word”. He also assured the conference that the US was doing its “upmost” to reverse any 
treaty arrangements, such as that with Cuba, providing for US intervention.425 
 
When it came time to vote on the proposals, Hull cast his vote in the affirmative, acquiescing to an 
article that stated: “No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of 
another”.426 He did, however, attach a reservation; due to the lack of time at the conference to 
prepare interpretations and definitions, the US would “follow scrupulously the doctrines and policies 
which it has pursued since March 4”, Roosevelt's inauguration, “and the law of nations as generally 
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recognized and accepted”.427 This reservation was a significant one, given that it suggested the US 
was not willing to relinquish the justifications for intervention traditionally claimed under 
international law, such as intervention to protect citizens. However, Montevideo was the first time 
that the US had committed itself to the codification of the non-intervention principle to which it had 
often rhetorically claimed adherence. It also marked a shift in US behaviour away from unilateral 
intervention, matching Roosevelt's pronouncements. This shift was formalised in 1936 at the Buenos 
Aires Special Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Called by the US, this conference repeated 
the absolute prohibition of intervention, to which the US agreed without reservation, renouncing the 
right as well as the practice. 
 
In the 1920s and 1930s, then, the Latin American states succeeded in progressively drawing from the 
US a binding commitment to absolute non-intervention. In doing so, they espoused a Categorical 
Idea of state freedom. In this idea, states were not free by virtue of formal independence, but rather 
when they were free of outside interference in their affairs. Crucial to this idea of freedom was the 
institution of positive international law; it was only through law that the interference of powerful 
states in the affairs of weaker states could be reined in and relations of control between states 
reconfigured. Although the states advocating this position did not deny that they had duties under 
international law, to make their right of intervention conditional on such duties would be to leave the 
door to open to domination of weak states by the strong.  
 
The Categorical Idea of state freedom was challenged, both in practice and in debate, by the 
Paternalistic Idea of state freedom. Espoused by the US and, in Havana, its closest Latin American 
allies, fundamental to the Paternalistic Idea was the notion that in order to be self-mastering, and be 
in control of their destiny, states must meet certain pre-determined conditions. At Havana, this was 
brought together under the terminology of responsibility, but US interventionary practice and 
broader discourse shows that it also rested on notions of civilisation, order and democracy. If a state 
failed adequately to embody such values, outside intervention was sometimes required in order to 
develop its self-mastery.  
 
 
Conclusion 
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In this chapter I have examined debates about intervention that took place in the Concert of Europe 
between 1818 and 1822 and in the western hemisphere focusing on the first decades of the 20th 
century. I have done so in order to piece together the ideas of state freedom held by the human 
actors involved in those debates and to show how they are implicated in structuring legitimate 
relations of control between states. 
 
In the Concert of Europe I identified two ideas of state freedom, the Dynastic Idea and the Self-Help 
Idea of state freedom. Both of these ideas developed out of 18th century ideas that associated the 
liberty of states with an absence of a hegemonic state, but both extended those ideas in 
incompatible ways. At the heart of the Self-Help Idea was a pluralist understanding of states. States 
were unique individuals, each with their own internal characteristics which determined their 
individual sentiments and interests. Self-mastery for such agents was the uninhibited translation of 
these sentiments into action. The necessary conditions for the realisation of that self-mastery 
included the absence of a supreme state power, and hence a balance of power between states that 
was watched over by the great powers. Another necessary condition was the absence of general, 
non-specific obligation and commitment to other states. The type of system legitimated by such an 
idea of state freedom was then a self-help system in which states were free from general 
commitments to one another and free to determine their own responses to international events, on 
the proviso that they did not jeopardise the balance of power.  
 
In contrast to the Self-Help Idea, the Dynastic Idea of state freedom was solidarist in nature, 
espousing a common idea about the nature of legitimate statehood based on historical dynastic 
privilege. The state, in this idea, was directly identifiable with its monarch and hence the self-
mastery of states was linked with the control of monarchs over their domestic population and the 
control the dynastic order had over Europe in general. The key necessary condition for the 
realisation of this self-mastery was the suppression of popular revolt, carried out by the joint 
commitment of the dynastic powers. The type of system legitimated by this idea was thus one of a 
collective security system based on shared values regarding legitimate political authority. The 
relations of control made possible by these two ideas of state freedom shared some key 
characteristics: interference in the affairs of other states was permissible, as was great power 
management of European affairs. The contours of legitimate intervention and great power 
management were significantly divergent, however, with the two ideas demanding different 
justifications for intervention and different extents of great power mutual commitment. A shared 
heritage of the association of the freedom of states with the absence of hegemony enabled a novel 
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degree of cooperation between the great powers. However, the boundaries of possible cooperation, 
and the purposes for which it could be practiced, were limited by the idea of state freedom 
dominant in Britain, which prescribed a self-help system of security. The incompatibility between the 
Self-Help Idea of state freedom and the Dynastic Idea and its prescriptions for the collective 
prevision of the dynastic order ultimately led to the withdrawal of Britain from the collective 
management of European affairs. 
 
In the Americas in the early 20th century, two further ideas of state freedom were identifiable. 
Across the western hemisphere the rights of states to independence and to be masters of their own 
destinies were widely proclaimed. However, what was understood to constitute control over one’s 
destiny differed fundamentally in two different ideas of state freedom. In the Paternalistic Idea, 
states were understood as self-mastering if they acted responsibly and embodied certain modernist 
values, principally civilisation, stability and democracy. It was in acting responsibly, either through 
their own capacity or with the assistance of foreign powers—whether requested or not—that states 
realised their freedom and independence. The kind of system legitimised by the Paternalistic Idea 
was, then, one of independent states regulated by international law, but policed by powerful 
representatives of civilised values. 
 
The Paternalistic Idea was challenged by Latin American states who, through the Categorical Idea of 
state freedom, rejected interference in the affairs of the states of the western hemisphere, be it 
formal or informal domination. This absence of the domination and interference of large states was 
the essence of state self-mastery in the Categorical Idea, and the necessary condition for its 
realisation was the institutionalisation in consensual international law of an absolute principle of 
non-intervention. This was the mechanism through which Latin American states hoped to 
reconfigure relations of control and transform a politics based on power into one based on state 
independence and state rights. The shared history of resistance to colonial rule throughout the 
Americas left a legacy of shared ideas about the importance of state independence and equality, and 
a shared resistance to the interference of European states in the affairs of the western hemispheres. 
For a period, the US was able to justify its interventions in the affairs of other states on the basis of 
preventing European intervention, arguing that its ‘interpositions’ facilitated the independence of 
states. Though this was not the only justification given for intervention, it was a prominent rhetorical 
resource. However, such reasoning was incompatible with the Categorical Idea of state freedom, 
and the majority of American states made increasing use of international forums to forcefully 
contest the legitimacy of such practices. In response to this growing criticism of interventionary 
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practices, the US redefined its social role from one of policeman to good neighbour, a shift that 
brought its practices into line with what had become the prevailing idea of state freedom in the 
region, reconfiguring hemispheric relations of control in the process.  
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Chapter Four 
Sovereign Equality 
 
Introduction  
 
In Chapter Three I analysed debates about intervention in the Concert of Europe and International 
Conferences of American States in order to identify ideas of state freedom and the role they have 
played in the politics of legitimate relations of control between states. I showed how the rejection of 
universal monarchy shared by the Dynastic and Self-Help ideas of state freedom facilitated the 
maintenance of a balance of power in 19th century Europe but that the incompatible understandings 
of state self-mastery at the heart of those ideas stymied greater levels of mutual commitment 
between the great powers. I then showed how the absolute rejection of inter-state interference of 
the Categorical Idea of state freedom progressively delegitimised intervention as a practice in the 
western hemisphere. This discredited the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom which held that the 
self-mastery of states could, in certain circumstances, be augmented by intervention.  
 
In this chapter, my focus shifts to the concept of sovereign equality, or the equality of states, and 
relations of authority, or rightful command. Broadly, sovereign equality is the idea that solely by 
virtue of their statehood states are in some sense equal. Historically, debates about the equality of 
states have been concerned with the distribution of rights and obligations in the international 
system, and it is through debates about rightful and wrongful elements of hierarchy among states 
that ideas about the equality of states have been implicated in the politics of legitimate relations of 
control. Since its original articulation by natural law theorists in the mid-18th century, assertions of 
the equality of states have repeatedly been bound up with ideas about the freedom of states. I begin 
this chapter by analysing Emmerich de Vattel’s classic account of state equality. I show how Vattel’s 
understanding of state equality, set out in his 1758 treatise Le Droit des Gens (‘The Law of Nations’) 
was inextricably intertwined with what I term the Natural Idea of state freedom; an idea in which 
the state is conceived of as a moral person, naturally free to determine its own conduct according to 
the dictates of its own conscience. I do so partly because of its historical influence; Vattel’s 
arguments were highly influential in legal and diplomatic circles throughout the 18th and 19th 
centuries. I do not, however, attempt to trace the direct impact of Vattel’s ideas on the politics of 
legitimacy in his contemporary period. I am interested, rather, in the way in which Vattel’s 
 124 
 
theoretical approach to state freedom and equality, and the difficulties he wrestled with, are echoed 
in the politics of legitimacy of the 20th century. 
 
The first section, then, lays out some important intellectual groundwork for the chapter and the 
subject of state freedom as a whole. In the second and third sections I shift my focus to ideas of 
state freedom embedded in the practical discourse of international relations. I examine two 
historical moments in which discussion of the equality of states has been highly prominent: first, the 
negotiations to create a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice that took place at the second Hague 
Peace Conference of 1907; and second, the debates about the creation of a general international 
organisation that took place between the allied powers in San Francisco in 1945.  
 
I argue that the strong idea of state equality that was insisted upon at the Hague Peace Conference 
was an instantiation of the Categorical Idea of state freedom introduced in Chapter Three. Animating 
arguments about the equality of states was the same understanding of self-mastery seen at the 
International Conferences of American States; that to be self-mastering a state had to be free to set 
its own direction without the interference of other states. Just as in Havana states argued that 
absolute non-intervention was necessary to prevent the domination of one state over another, in 
The Hague absolute equality was argued to be a necessary condition for the realisation of self-
mastery. This was in contrast to the civilisational logic of the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom 
which legitimated elements of legal pre-eminence of the great western powers over other states. 
The incompatibility of these two ideas of state freedom ultimately prevented agreement on the 
creation of the Permanent Court. 
 
In the third section I show that at the San Francisco Conference of 1945 the agreement reached 
regarding the creation of a general international organisation was facilitated by a shared 
understanding of state freedom that had echoes of, but transformed, both the Categorical and 
Paternalistic Ideas of state freedom. In this idea of the freedom of states, the Civil Idea, self-mastery 
was understood in a similar way to the Categorical Idea; self-mastery meant being able to set one’s 
own direction free from the domination of other states. In the Civil Idea, however, this 
understanding of self-mastery had the crucial addendum that it was enjoyed under the subjection to 
international authority. The necessary condition for the realisation of this self-mastery was that 
international authority was characterised by both an element of legalised hierarchy between states 
and the active participation of all states subject to it. 
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The equality of states in international theory 
 
Although the term sovereign equality has a short history relative to modern international relations, 
having been first used in 1907 at the Hague Peace Conference,428 the broader idea that inspires that 
concept—that a form of equality exists between states by virtue of their being states—has a much 
longer history. Sovereign equality—or the equality of states, as this idea was generally expressed 
prior to 1945—has been consistently prominent in legal theory since the 18th century, though both 
its meaning and its relationship with the practical politics of international relations have varied. In 
this section I give an account of the original conception of the equality of states, which was given its 
classic formulation in Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations; a book that sold widely in 18th 
century Europe and was used by diplomats as a handbook as well as being hugely influential on 
international legal thinking.429 Vattel’s text is important for my purposes not only because of its 
influential account of state equality, but also because that account is bound up with the first truly 
modern account of state freedom. Vattel was perhaps the first author to conceive of the 
international realm as one populated by autonomous moral persons, each free to determine and 
follow their own will, subject to no other authority, and to explore at length the consequences of 
that conception. At the same time as being autonomous individuals states were, by virtue of their 
existing as part of a natural society, subject to obligations and duties. Reconciling both the freedom 
and obligation of states is Vattel’s principal concern, and the problematic that he sets up and 
explores has been an enduring one in world politics. 
 
Vattel’s approach to the equality of states is beguilingly straightforward. In a famous passage from 
the Preliminaries of The Law of Nations he states: 
 
Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails in their rights and obligations, as equally 
proceeding from nature,—nations composed of men, and considered as so many free persons living 
together in the state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from nature the same obligations and 
rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man 
as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.
430
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Vattel’s understanding of states as naturally equal was greatly influenced by the natural law theorist 
Samuel von Pufendorf, who had argued that in the state of nature, men possessed “natural liberty” 
in the sense that “no one is subject to another” and that, because there is “no relation of 
subjection”, “every man is held to be equal to every other”.431 Pufendorf, as well as other influential 
authors,432 had also made the analogy between the state of nature and the interstate realm. Once 
this comparison had been made, the logical conclusion was that “Commonwealths and their officials 
may properly claim for themselves the distinction of being in a state of natural liberty”.433 
 
The starting point for Vattel was this observation of the natural liberty of states, based on an analogy 
from natural law as it was understood with respect to individuals. Where Vattel differed from 
Pufendorf was in his assertion that changing the subject of natural law from individuals to polities 
necessitated a change in the way that law was applied.434 In doing so, he was drawing on the work of 
his greatest influence, Christian Wolff, whose Jus Naturae and Jus Gentium inspired the writing of 
The Law of Nations. Rather than applying the law of nature directly to states, Wolff derived from the 
law of nature the necessity of a civitas maximae, a sort of “great republic”—something between a 
federation and an overarching super-state—the civil law of which was termed by Wolff as the 
'voluntary law of nations'.435 This solution was akin to that of human individuals coming together to 
form states. The civil laws of this civitas maximae were termed by Wolff the voluntary law of nations 
in distinction from the necessary law of nations that was prescribed by natural law. In Wolff's 
system, the voluntary law is derived from the necessary law because the laws of nature prescribe a 
common good that can only be achieved through a civitas maximae—that is to say, through a 
hierarchical dimension in international relations.436  
 
For Vattel, however, the international hierarchy implied by the civitas maximae was inconsistent 
with the freedom and equality of nations.437 This rejection of the civitas maximae is consistent with 
Vattel's refusal to compromise the independence of states. Although he holds, on the one hand, that 
states are subject to the maxims of natural law, he also holds states to be naturally free and 
independent. Because of this, Vattel argues: 
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A nation then is mistress of her own actions so long as they do not affect the proper and perfect rights 
of any other nation,—so long as she is only internally bound, and does not lie under any external and 
perfect obligation. If she makes an ill use of her liberty, she is guilty of a breach of duty; but other 
nations are bound to acquiesce in her conduct, since they have no right to dictate to her. 
 
Since nations are free, independent, and equal,—and since each possesses the right of judging, 
according to the dictates of her conscience, what conduct she is to pursue in order to fulfil her 
duties,—the effect of the whole is, to produce, at least externally and in the eyes of mankind, a 
perfect equality of rights between nations, in the administration of their affairs and the pursuit of 
their pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their conduct, of which others have no 
right to form a definitive judgment; so that whatever may be done by any one nation, may be done by 
any other; and they ought, in human society, to be considered as possessing equal rights.
438
 
 
Vattel holds, then, that states are by their nature both free and equal—they have the right to 
determine their own conduct according to their own, internal decision-making procedures—yet he 
also recognises that they are necessarily subject to authoritative obligations. The fact that states 
exist in a “natural society”439 (the state of nature) imposes upon them the obligations of natural law. 
Beyond this natural society derived from natural law, however, the practice of international relations 
creates further, societally generated, obligations between states. According to Vattel, “*t+he 
continual attention of sovereigns to every occurrence, the constant residence of ministers, and the 
perpetual negotiations, make of modern Europe a kind of republic”.440 States may be both naturally 
and perfectly free but in Vattel's understanding of international relations there nonetheless exist 
both universal obligations derived from natural law and societal obligations derived from the 
practice of statehood. Vattel is aware that just as the natural freedom of individuals in the state of 
nature would render that freedom meaningless, so would the unconstrained freedom of states 
render the international system threatening to that very freedom. 
 
The way Vattel reconciles state obligations with their freedom to determine their own conduct is to 
maintain a clear distinction between the necessary and voluntary laws of nations. The former 
derives its authority from Nature to which states are inescapably obligated. The judgement as to 
whether a state’s actions are in conformity with its obligations to the international law of nature, 
however, can only come from that state itself; this leaves states free to determine their own 
conduct. States are also beholden, however, to the voluntary law of nations—that is to say, 
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obligations that rest on states by virtue of their forming part of a society. How can Vattel reconcile 
states being obligated to other states with their being naturally free and equal? He does so by 
refusing to derive (as Wolff does) voluntary law from natural law—obligations to which are 
unavoidable—instead deriving voluntary law from state practices; voluntary law derives its authority 
from its recognition by states, and hence is based on a presumed consent.441 In Vattel's words: 
 
[A] nation ought never to lose sight of [necessary law] in deliberating on the line of conduct she is to 
pursue in order to fulfil her duty: but when there is question of examining what she may demand of 
other states, she must consult the voluntary law, whose maxims are devoted to the safety and 
advantage of mankind.
442
 
 
It is through this double system of the laws of nations that Vattel attempts to reconcile the tension 
between the liberty of states and their societal duties, and it is this system that precludes any state 
from claiming a higher status than the others.  
 
What Vattel understands by state freedom, then, is that states ought to be left to form their own 
judgements as to what they can and cannot do or, rather, what is proper and improper for them to 
do.443 In other words, states have their own moral conscience and it is only by this conscience that 
they should be constrained and directed. The consequence of this liberty of conscience is Vattel's 
general law that “each nations should be left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty which she 
inherits from nature”.444 Thus the natural freedom of nations, seemingly paradoxically, generates a 
duty on states to respect the natural rights of each other. Indeed, as we have seen, states are duty 
bound in several respects by natural law. However, because of the natural freedom of states, it is 
only for a state itself to judge whether or not it is complying with those duties. By maintaining the 
freedom of states, then, Vattel ensures a pluralistic international society that does not permit states 
positions of superiority or inferiority on the basis of their behaviour. In this way, then, the freedom 
of states demands their equality. Likewise, the equality of states, which precludes hierarchical 
relations, ensures they are subject only to their own conscience. Together, it is the fact that states 
are “free, independent and equal” that creates the “perfect equality” of rights between them—a 
position that is blind to the “intrinsic justice of their conduct”.445 The only exception to the freedom 
of states that Vattel permits is when they are subject to an external perfect duty; that is to say, a 
                                                          
441
 Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought, 79. 
442
 Vattel, The Law of Nations, 79 my emphasis. 
443
 Ibid., 74. 
444
 Ibid. 
445
 Ibid., 75–76. 
 129 
 
duty to another state that is accompanied by the power of compulsion. Although the existence of 
such an obligation appears to contradict Vattel's position on the freedom and equality of states, it is 
permitted because it is the corollary of the perfect right of states to self-preservation. Nations have a 
right, therefore, to forcibly repress a state which “openly violates the laws of the society which 
nature has established between them, or who directly attacks the welfare and safety of that 
society”.446 Nonetheless, care must be taken in the exercise of this perfect right not to “prejudice the 
liberty of nations”.447 
 
Undergirding Vattel’s theory of the liberty and equality of states is a conception of states as 
individual moral agents. The equality of states that Vattel posits is a natural equality that stems from 
their essence as individuals. Each state, according to Vattel, possesses an “understanding, volition, 
and strength peculiar to itself” and by virtue of this should be considered as a “moral person”.448 For 
this reason, I term the idea of state freedom explored by Vattel the Natural Idea of state freedom. 
The important intellectual foundation of the natural freedom and equality of states supporting 
Vattel’s approach was influential even after the natural law theory from which it sprang fell out of 
favour. The publicists of international law that followed Vattel in the 18th and 19th centuries largely 
accepted his formulation of the equality of states, often uncritically and with very little 
modification.449 Although the explicit reliance on a system of natural law waned, the notion of 
equality as a ‘natural right’ persisted, often mutated slightly into an ‘essential’, ‘fundamental’, or 
‘basic’ right or attribute of states, irrespective of territory, wealth or power.450 This position was not 
unanimous, however, and the equality of rights and duties between states was contested in legal 
theory. James Lorimer was one of the most strident critics of the doctrine of equality, stating that 
although “all states are equally entitled to be recognized as states, on the simple ground that they 
are states”, all states “are not entitled to be recognized as equal states, simply because they are not 
equal states”.451 The disconnect between the theory of equality of states and the empirical 
evidence—Lorimer asserted that the doctrine can be “safely said to have been repudiated by 
history”452—was a challenge to advocates of sovereign equality who had to resolve their position 
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with not only material differences between states, but also evident differences in international rights 
and duties.  
 
Theorists responded to this disconnect by positing an equality in capacity for rights and duties of 
states, rather than an absolute equality of rights themselves.453 The justifications given for the 
equality of capacity for rights and obligations of states vary between 19th century international legal 
authorities. Some publicists—such as Bluntschli, Phillimore and Wheaton—maintain, similarly to 
Vattel, that equality is a “natural” condition between states.454 Others have dropped Vattel’s basic 
reason for attributing equality to states, but nonetheless maintain the analogy between individual 
persons as equals and states as (equal) international persons.455 Though the justification for this 
analogy is regularly left implicit, the attribution of equality seems to rest on a fundamental 
commensurability and similarity that all states possess by virtue of their personhood. As Giuseppe 
Carnazza Amari argued: 
 
States and nations, resulting from the union of a large number of human beings, have the same 
characteristics which appear in their members. Now if men are equal by type and in their rights, 
states, which are collective persons composed of men, are likewise juridically equal beings. Whatever 
the form of government, the more or less, extensive area, the degree of power, the varied 
development of knowledge, arts, and riches, the military strength, the more or less favourable climate 
in which they are located, the fertility or aridity of soil, the difference in the origin of the inhabitants, 
the different nature of the territory, whether adjacent to the sea or in the interior, states are always 
juridically equal because they are always collective persons who deserve the same juridical respect.
456
 
 
On this view, differences in form, territory, wealth and character do not bear on the equality of 
states because they share an equality of “type” by virtue of what they are—collective persons. In 
other words, states are equal because they are all states; or, more precisely, because they are 
sovereign states.  
 
The sovereignty of states as a justification for equality is one that has been given greater emphasis 
by later authors than it was in Vattel. Abandoning natural law as a justification for equality, a 
number of authors have looked to the nature of the international system for a theoretical 
foundation. Just as the liberty and independence of states was an important element of Vattel’s 
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position on equality, later publicists have seen a logical connection between the two: “The equality 
of sovereign states is the necessary consequence of their independence. They are all equally 
sovereign. They have no power above them. No one of them is placed above the others.”457 The 
difference between this position and that of Vattel is, of course, that rather than being based on a 
doctrine of natural law, it is based on the principle of sovereignty and the flat structure of 
international relations that it implies. 
 
However, this novel justification for treating states as equal—the anarchic international structure—
also opened up the way to undercutting the principle of equality entirely. Shorn of a more 
fundamental reason for holding states as equal, arguments for equality based on the independence 
of states face the criticism that “the equality of sovereign states is merely their independence under 
a different name”, as John Westlake put it.458 The scepticism of Westlake and others is, according to 
Sinclair Armstrong, typical of a shift in the position of publicists toward the latter part of the 19th 
century.459 While earlier publicists were generally content to uncritically follow the positions of the 
classical theorists of state equality, heading toward the turn of the 20th century authors were 
doubtful as to whether the doctrine of equality of states could be meaningful. 
 
The broad shift in scholarly opinion during the 1800s toward a questioning of the doctrine of the 
equality of states is not a great surprise given the unfolding political and juridical context. If 
anything, it is surprising that the idea of retained so much currency given the alternative modes of 
organising interstate relations that were dominating Europe during that period. As noted in Chapter 
Three, 19th century Europe was dominated by the great powers who, in a loosely institutionalised 
manner, managed international affairs with little concern for the interests and opinions of materially 
weak states.460 
 
While the principle of sovereign equality did not disappear with the development of the Concert of 
Europe, it was superseded as a mode of governing European inter-state relations. Heading toward 
the 20th century, however, with the Concert system breaking down as a successful method of conflict 
prevention, the relationship between great power primacy and sovereign equality continued to 
evolve. Not only did representation at congresses of the Concert of Europe become more 
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egalitarian,461 but a parallel regime of  management of European affairs emerged that was more 
consistent with the doctrine of state equality; functional conferences—such as the 1863 Geneva 
Convention on Soldiers Wounded in Battle—were convened in which the hierarchical mode of 
organisation was much less salient.462 It was in this context that states came together as formal 
equals in 1907 at The Hague to discuss the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice; the 
subject of the next section. 
 
 
Strong equality and state sovereignty: The Hague Peace Conference (1907) 
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, in the first decades of the 20th century a Categorical Idea of state 
freedom was identifiable in western-hemisphere debates about non-intervention. In the Categorical 
Idea, self-mastery consisted in the total absence of outside influence in the affairs of independent 
states. The necessary condition for the realisation of this idea of self-mastery was the unqualified 
codification of state rights in international law. The previous chapter reconstructed the development 
of the Categorical Idea of state freedom through western hemispheric debates about intervention, 
detailing how its repeated articulation in American forums was implicated in the politics of the 
legitimacy of intervention which eventually saw the US transform its role identity in the hemisphere 
from one of ‘policeman’ to ‘good neighbour’. Intervention was not, however, the only issue area 
through which the Categorical Idea of state freedom was articulated. Latin American arguments for 
the codification of an absolute right to non-intervention developed alongside a prominent discourse 
about the equality of states. The equality of states, their independence and their right to non-
intervention were relentlessly linked in American diplomatic forums in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. Both non-intervention and equality were held to be essential for states to realise their 
essential, and rightful, nature as sovereign and self-directing entities. 
 
Perhaps the high-watermark of the assertion of the equality of states came not in an inter-American 
diplomatic setting, however, but in an even wider international forum; the Hague Peace Conference 
of 1907. A follow up to the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, 45 states came together at the second 
Hague Peace Conference to negotiate the expansion of the international juridical order in a self-
conscious attempt to regulate international affairs through law rather than power, right rather than 
might. At the turn of the 20th century, the balance of power, which had previously been understood 
                                                          
461
 Ibid., 128. 
462
 Ibid., 129. 
 133 
 
as the key to the preservation of state freedom, was viewed with increasing scepticism as a 
mechanism to prevent the domination of militarily strong states. In its place, “multilateralism and 
contractual international law” were promoted at the Hague Conferences as alternative “basic 
institutional practices” in the international system.463  
 
The keystone of the second Peace Conference was the aim of establishing a Permanent Court of 
Arbitral Justice (PCAJ) to replace the ad hoc system of arbitration agreed on in 1899, and to which 
states were to be required to refer their disputes. Ultimately the conference would fail to agree on 
the creation of the PCAJ, with the major sticking point proving to be disagreement over the principle 
of the equality of states. In the debate about the PCAJ and the equality of states we can again see 
the incompatibility of the Categorical and Paternalistic Ideas of state freedom. As detailed in the last 
chapter, the Categorical and Paternalistic Ideas of state freedom outwardly shared a pluralism and a 
basic notion that states ought to be free to be self-directing and self-governing in whatever direction 
they so wished. In the Categorical Idea, this was an absolute and essential right of statehood that 
had to be codified unconditionally in international law in order to be realised. In the Paternalistic 
Idea, however, this pluralism was underpinned and limited by a universalist civilisational discourse 
which held the realisation of statehood to be bound up with the realisation of ‘civilised’ values. 
States had a right, and even a duty, to promote these values even if it meant exerting control 
beyond their own borders.  
 
Debates about intervention were not prominent at The Hague, but the uneasy tension in the 
Paternalistic Idea between, on the one hand, the notion that states were individuals with the right to 
develop as they see fit and, on the other, the belief in a value-based hierarchy of states was exposed 
by discussions about the PCAJ. The Western powers put forward a number of proposals which 
attempted to marry state equality with the institutionalisation of a pre-eminence for the ‘civilised’ 
powers.464 The aspect of the PCAJ in which these twin aims were manifested was the composition of 
its judges. With over 40 states to be party to the convention on the PCAJ, it was argued that allowing 
each state to nominate one judge to sit on the court—a structure that would ensure perfect 
equality—would render the court unwieldy and unworkable. The Western powers suggested various 
permutations of court composition which they claimed to be consistent with equality but which 
nonetheless afforded them pre-eminence.  
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The suggestion for court composition that gathered most support and generated most debate was a 
joint British, German and US proposal which organised states into a number of rankings. In 
introducing this proposal, the US delegate and esteemed jurist James Brown Scott began by quoting 
the US Chief Justice Marshall’s claim that “no principle of general law is more universally 
acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations”.465 Accepting the doctrine of state equality, Scott 
contrasted international law with the unequal realm of brute force, asserting that the “conception of 
great and small Powers finds no place in a correct system of international law”.466 He also claimed 
equality of right to be “axiomatic” in international law.467 This proclamation of equality was 
consistent with a growing prominence of the equality of states in US diplomatic discourse; a year 
earlier at the Third International Conference of American States, held at Rio de Janeiro, US Secretary 
of State Elihu Root used his opening address to boldly proclaim the equality of states and their equal 
rights regardless of differences in material power.468 This language of equality was warmly embraced 
by other American states and, according to Robert Klein, Root’s speech was “referred to constantly 
by Latin American delegates attending the Hague Peace Conference”.469 
 
It was, however, during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency that this discourse of state equality was 
growing in prominence, and, as we saw in Chapter Three, Roosevelt (along with other US Presidents 
of the period) saw state rights as conditional on meeting standards of civilisation. Intermingled with 
assertions of equality, the language of civilisation abounded at The Hague, with the development of 
the PCAJ claimed to be a “triumph of civilization and justice”.470 This logic of civilisation was reflected 
in the reduced prominence of judges nominated both by small states but also large but “uncivilised” 
powers Turkey and China.471 In the proposed composition, Scott asserted the basis of 'one state, one 
judge' unworkable and insisted that the delegates must find “some other principle” upon which to 
base the court.472 Scott claimed that such a principle could be found in the form of material 
interests. On this view, while states should be considered legally equal, and have the same interest 
in justice considered in the abstract, this interest is made concrete in an unequal manner. Based on 
this reasoning, the joint proposal was to classify states according to population, wealth and industry; 
variables held to affect the likely need for arbitration. The proposal was for the court to be 
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composed of 17 judges for a 12-year period. Each state would appoint one judge, but not all judges 
would serve for the same length of time; rather, judges nominated by ‘first-class powers’ would 
serve the full 12 years, judges of second-class powers for ten years, third-class for four years, and 
fourth-class for one year. This arrangement would mean that each state would have the right to 
nominate a judge to the court, and hence preserve the equality of states, while also reducing the 
number of sitting judges at any one time to a manageable number.  
 
Scott’s claim that the proposed composition of the court was consistent with the principle of 
equality was highly contentious. Provided every state had the right to appoint a judge, he argued, 
there was “no derogation from the principle of sovereignty and equality that the judges so selected 
may sit at various times and in rotation”.473 At the same time as maintaining that his proposal was in 
harmony with sovereign equality, Scott made a distinction between theory and practice; while the 
“theorist and logician” may be able to elevate a principle above all other concerns, the “practical 
man” he claimed “—the man of affairs, the statesman—must many a time modify, indeed sacrifice, a 
principle, however just, to meet a present and pressing need”.474 As well as repeatedly affirming that 
the proposal was “based on the juridical equality of all the states represented in or invited to the 
Conference”,475 Scott nonetheless also attempted to legitimise the proposal in two other ways. First, 
he suggested that material differences between states entitled some states to a greater participation 
in the court.476 Second, he argued that despite the differences between states in the amount of time 
their individual judge would sit for, the proposal was nonetheless representative of all states 
interests thanks to the balance among the judges sitting at any one time of geographical location, 
language and legal system.477 
 
Despite Scott's attempts to present the proposal as legitimate, strong opposition to the plan was 
voiced by a significant number of states. Principal among them was Brazil, who's delegate Ruy 
Barbosa criticised the scheme relentlessly on the grounds that it violated the principle of the 
equality of states. Barbosa described the argument that the proposal upheld sovereign equality on 
the basis that every state could appoint a judge as “sophistical”.478 He analysed the right to be 
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represented in the PCAJ and scoffed at the suggestion that the right can be equal when lengths of 
service are unequal. Would equal right be preserved, he asked rhetorically, if, instead of a year, the 
judges of some states were in service for one month, or one week, or for only 24 hours, while those 
of others sat for the full 12 years? He then went on to elaborate his point conceptually; the equality 
of a right is maintained, he asserted, only when the conditions of exercise of that right are equal. 
Inequality of exercise, on the other hand, “implies inequality in the right itself, for the value of a right 
can be measured only by the juridical possibility of exercising it”.479 Barbosa further clarified that 
there were, in fact, two rights at stake in the composition of the court; the right to appoint and the 
right to sit. While equality of the right to appoint was preserved in the proposal, he argued, in the 
right to sit states would be “absolutely unequal” and the equality of states would be violated. 480 
 
Barbosa’s lengthy exposition on the equality of states articulated a number of conceptual points 
which demonstrate that the Categorical Idea of state freedom had implications beyond its 
importance for practices of intervention. Barbosa’s position on equality rested on an understanding 
of states as analogous to individuals, diverse but nonetheless equal. According to Barbosa, 
differences exist between individuals with respect to “intellectual and moral capacity”, as well as 
honesty, wealth and strength, but individuals nonetheless enjoy the same “essential rights”, rights 
that structured individuals’ relationship with political authority: 
 
Civil rights are the same for men everywhere. Political rights are the same for all citizens. Lord Kelvin 
or Mr John Morley have the same vote in electing the august and sovereign Parliament of Great 
Britain as the ordinary workman dulled by work and misery.
481
 
 
Through this analogy Barbosa argued that the allocation of rights is based on a commensurability of 
category rather than individual characteristics: as “organized and independent” states, states are 
sovereign and, by virtue of being part of this category, states are equal—“sovereignty means 
equality”.482 
 
The principle of sovereignty was at the heart of Barbosa’s conceptual schema. Not only was 
sovereignty the essential attribute of states on which equality and state rights were based—
“absolute” and their “elementary right par excellence”483—but it was also the principle through 
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which the freedom of states was realised. Sovereignty, and the absolute equality it demanded, 
constituted the self-mastery of states by guarding against two threats to states’ control over their 
own lives; the domination of powerful states and subjection to higher authority. Given the reality of 
inequalities of power between states, and the resultant possibility of the domination of the strong 
over the weak, it was the juridical principle of sovereignty that enabled the self-mastery of states, 
free from the control of others:  
 
Hitherto…States, however diverse because of their extent of territory, their wealth, their power, had 
nevertheless, among themselves one point of moral commensuration. This was their national 
sovereignty. Upon this point their juridical equality could be established unshakably. In this fortress of 
an equal right for all, and equally inviolable, inalienable, incontrovertible, each State, large or small, 
felt that it was so truly its own master and even as safe with regard to the rest, as the free citizen feels 
safe within the walls of his own house. Sovereignty is the great fortress of a country. It constitutes the 
basis of the entire system of its juridical defense within the field of international law.
484
 
 
The proposed PCAJ, by ranking states and affording them unequal rights, was “derogatory” to the 
sovereignty of states,485 and would leave it “despoiled”.486 As a result of this compromising of the 
sovereignty of states, the proposed PCAJ would compromise the “independence of States in their 
mutual relations”.487 State independence would be compromised because the PCAJ would have the 
opposite of its proclaimed effect; rather than furthering the move from a world of power politics to 
one of international justice, the PCAJ would enable the domination of weak states by the strong by 
“proclaiming…the legal predominance of might over right”.488 Although states might have believed 
they were furthering international justice, by disturbing the “equality of right” that was the “last 
brake to the ambition and to the pride of the peoples”, in creating a PCAJ that enshrined inequality 
they were opening the door to domination.489 By establishing a “basis of justice whose nature would 
be characterized by a juridical distinction of values between the States according to their greatness 
of power”, the PCAJ would mean great powers would “no longer be formidable only by the weight of 
their armies and fleets. They would also have a superiority of right in the international 
magistracy”.490 Differences in material power would thus be institutionalised “in the very heart of 
the tribunal whose function it should be to re-establish the balance of justice between the weak and 
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the strong”.491 Sovereign states should “take care not to multiply the instruments of might, when we 
imagine we are protecting ourselves against them, by taking shelter under the aegis of pacificatory 
institutions” because “*p+eace in servitude would be degrading”.492 Barbosa rejected the argument 
that the composition of the court should reflect the “material importance” of states because 
differences in “wealth and power” meant differences in the level of interest in the arbitral court: 
 
Even supposing that such a difference really existed, the situation in that case, it seems to me, would 
call for new guarantees to be afforded the weak against the strong, rather than for the increase of the 
privileges of the strong against the weak. Very rarely do the small dare to encroach upon the rights of 
the great. On the contrary, it is quite natural that the pride of the great should tend to disregard the 
right of the small.
493
 
 
Alongside the fear about the consequences the court would have for power relations between 
states, Barbosa also questioned its implications for the international configuration of political 
authority. He made a distinction between two types of juridical body, jurisdictional and arbitral, 
which implied very different types of authority. Arbitration was the proper “form of justice of 
sovereignties”, but the proposed court, by taking away from states the choice of arbiters would 
transform the arbitral court into a jurisdictional authority.494 According to Barbosa: 
 
[W]hen disputes arise between nations, the only available means for their settlement is through 
arbitration. The jurisdictional authority disappears. For jurisdiction presupposes a dependence of 
subjection, of obedience, such as that of the subjects of the same nationality with regard to the 
sovereignty governing them, and between States one can conceive only of the bond resulting from a 
free will which freely engages itself, that is to say, the contractual bond of obligations which they 
agree to impose upon themselves mutually.
495
 
 
Jurisdictional authority, then, is inappropriate for international matters because it implies 
submission to a necessary authority, while the sovereign nature of states precludes obedience to 
anything other than a self-imposed obligation. “Arbitration”, for Barbosa, “has its source in liberty” 
and it rests on no authority higher than its “contractants”.496 This is why “the arbitral form is the only 
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one applicable between…nations”; to substitute juridical authority for arbitration would be to 
“replace voluntary consent with constraint”.497 
 
To take away the right of states to appoint a judge of their choosing in any particular case of 
arbitration would be to take away “the very essence of arbitration”, for “the appointment of judges 
for an international arbitration court constitutes and always has constituted a discretionary act, a 
non-transferable act of the sovereign Power”.498 Denying states the freedom to choose judges 
meant “tossing overboard” arbitration, replacing it with a system “which signifies obedience of 
subjects to a necessary authority”.499 For Barbosa, the taking away of free choice, and the 
submission to authority it implied, was “incompatible with the notion of sovereignty in international 
law”.  
 
The ‘notion of sovereignty in international law’, then, serves state freedom in two ways. First, it 
precludes the subjection of states to any higher authority and, second, it guards against the 
domination of powerful states. These two potential threats to state freedom are linked because any 
attempt to institute an international authority would necessitate the development of means to 
enforce the obligation that authority entails. “Repression”, according to Barbosa, “would, therefore, 
have to be imposed”, and this requirement for a repressive function would “naturally” fall “upon the 
strongest nation, or upon a concert of the strongest”, resulting in “legalizing the domain of force”.500 
 
Barbosa’s exposition on the fundamental right of states to equality and sovereignty, and its 
relationship to subjection and domination, was set up as an explicit counterpoint to the civilizational 
discourse of the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom. Barbosa did not challenge the idea of a 
developmental hierarchy between nations itself, though he did lambast the notion that the Latin 
American states should be placed low down in that hierarchy; he argued that they were “nations in 
the full exuberance of youth” and “in the full boom of a marvellously robust life”.501 More forcefully, 
however, he argued that any hierarchy between states was immaterial for the distribution of 
international rights. The Latin American states were “not tributary States”, they were sovereign and, 
in that respect—the respect that mattered—were “equal of any other sovereign State”.502 Criticising 
                                                          
497
 Ibid. 
498
 Ibid., 2:692. 
499
 Ibid. 
500
 Ibid., 2:662. 
501
 Ibid., 2:646. 
502
 Ibid. 
 140 
 
the “calumny” of the “European daily press”, Barbosa scathingly quoted criticism of the arguments 
in favour of equality for jeopardising the creation of the court: 
 
From a juridical and diplomatic point of view the argument [for equal representation in the tribunal] is 
perfect, but, unfortunately there is no sense to their conclusion. No other illustration can be found to 
set into stronger relief the faulty composition of the Conference. Hence, in view of the fact that the 
great Powers are not at all disposed to put over them, as their judges, the most corrupt and the most 
backward States of Asia and South America, we shall not yet have the arbitral court.
503
 
 
Although the implications of strong notions of equality were resisted by the great powers, the 
principle nonetheless enjoyed currency throughout the conference. Outside the immediate 
diplomatic circles in The Hague, however, it was subject to strong criticism. The Times in the United 
Kingdom dismissed the equality of states as an “absurd fiction”. The great powers “will not, and can 
not, in any circumstances [allow small states] to have an equal right with themselves in laying down 
the law by which their fleets, their armies, their diplomatists, and their jurists are to be guided on 
matters of the supremest moment”. To give small states an equal right to representation on the 
court “would involve the subjugation of the higher civilization by the lower, and would inevitably 
condemn the more advanced peoples to moral and intellectual regression”.504 
 
Inside the conference, however, Barbosa’s position garnered significant support. A large number of 
states voiced support for Barbosa’s arguments and rejected the proposed court composition on the 
grounds that it violated the principle of the equality of states. Barbosa’s arguments “effectively killed 
the big power proposal”;505 the pessimistic prediction of the European press proved accurate and 
because of the inability of the delegates to agree on the requirements of the equality of states, the 
creation of the PCAJ was deferred. In the vote on the resolution to defer the creation of the PCAJ, 
numerous states underlined their insistence that any court must be constituted in harmony with the 
principle of the equality of states.506 
 
The inability of the Conference to make progress on the creation of the PCAJ was in contrast to its 
deliberations regarding an International Prize Court (IPC). An agreement on this court, proposed not 
for the purpose of arbitration but rather to hear cases relating to the capture at sea of goods and 
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vessels during war, was reached and a convention adopted.507 This agreement was reached despite 
the IPC also facing questions regarding the equality of states. The British proposal was to grant each 
state whose merchant marine was more than 800,000 tons at the time of the conference the right to 
designate one judge. The German delegation objected to this proposal on the grounds that it was 
unequal, and a compromise proposal was formed (by Britain, France, Germany and the US) which 
recommended a court of 15 judges. Eight of these 15 would be appointed by the states with the 
largest marine tonnage, value of maritime trade and naval forces, with the other nine appointed by 
the other states according to rota.508 
 
Despite the addition of extra judges, the proposed constitution nonetheless seemed to be subject to 
the same deviations from sovereign equality as did the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice; states 
would not enjoy equal representation of their own judges on the court, but rather be classified into 
groups, unequal with respect to the right of judges to sit, according to material differences. There 
was even a widespread recognition that the apportionment of judges left “much to be desired from 
the point of view of the principle of the equality of sovereign states”.509 How then, were the 
delegates able to reach an agreement on the IPC while the proposed PCAJ was rejected because of 
its incompatibility with sovereign equality? 
 
The decisive factor for the delegates—so immovable with respect to the equality of rights in the 
composition of one court and ready to compromise it in another—was the relative competencies of 
the IPC and PCAJ. While the latter was to be a general court of arbitration, with competency to judge 
on a wide range of issues, the IPC was created for a narrow, specific purpose. As the Norwegian 
delegate put it, though they may have objected to the composition of the court, its purpose was 
“solely to safeguard a certain class of special interests”.510 Hence, there is no violation of the 
“fundamental principle” of the equality of states given that consideration was given to the relative 
“importance of the interests” that were at stake.511 The “distinct”, or “special” nature of the court 
being instituted was a common theme among comments from the delegates,512 and it was much 
repeated that that project was “essentially different” from the arbitral court.513 
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A distinction was made, then, at the second Hague Peace Conference, between general interests and 
special interests. In the case of the PCAJ, the majority of states deemed general interests to be at 
stake, and a connection was made with the general right of sovereignty. The US delegation did 
attempt to make the argument that, because of their likelihood to be embroiled in conflict, some 
states had a special interest in the PCAJ, but this line of reasoning was rejected by the majority of 
states.514 When it came to the IPC, however, it was largely accepted as legitimate that special 
interests were being invoked, and that these special interests justified special rights on the part of 
certain states.  
 
The few scholars that analysed the Second Hague Peace Conference through the lens of the equality 
of states have tended to characterise the position taken by Barbosa—and the other states that 
followed his lead—as exhibiting an “extreme” version of sovereign equality,515 based on which an 
“effective tribunal simply could not be created”.516 However, the negotiations to institute the Prize 
Court suggest that Barbosa and the other ‘small states’ were not wholly intransigent with respect to 
the equality of state rights; where special interests were demonstrable, compromise was made. 
They were not willing to compromise equality, however, on an issue deemed to pertain to general, 
sovereign rights. Equal participation in international instruments of justice was not a first order 
principle, valuable in and of itself. Rather, equality was valued, and defended in The Hague, because 
it was understood as a necessary condition to prevent the domination of strong states over weaker 
states. It was when unequal participation was deemed to augment the power of strong states over 
the materially weak, and to damage the “fortress” of sovereignty within which states are their own 
maters, that absolute equality was demanded. 
 
 
Special responsibilities and special rights: The San Francisco Conference 
 
At The Hague in 1907, the majority of delegates were willing to sacrifice agreement on the 
Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice in order to avoid violating the principle of the equality of states; 
if agreement on proposals for a court in accordance with equality could not be reached, it was 
“better not to create it”.517 In April 1945, when 50 Allied states came together in San Francisco to 
discuss the creation of what would become the United Nations, two wars of unprecedented 
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destructive impact within a generation had horrifically exposed the inadequacies of previous 
attempts to organise relations of control between states.518 Both ideas of state freedom prominent 
in the early 20th century explored above and in Chapter Three—the Paternalistic and Categorical 
Ideas—were tainted by the world wars. The hierarchical discourse of civilisation that was a key 
element of the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom had been implicated in the aggressive 
expansionism of Nazi Germany that triggered the war. The strident equality asserted in The Hague 
and, to a lesser extent, instituted in the League of Nations was, meanwhile, seen as a factor in the 
failure to maintain peaceful international relations.  
 
In this context, in San Francisco the delegates negotiated a compromise between equality and 
hierarchy which reconfigured international relations of authority. The debates which constituted this 
process evidenced an idea of state freedom distinguishable from both the Categorical and 
Paternalistic Ideas. In San Francisco, a normative goal of the self-mastery of states similar to that of 
the Categorical Idea was identifiable—that of states setting their own direction without the 
interference and domination of other states. However, the necessary conditions for the realisation 
of that self-mastery were transformed from a categorical rejection of all subjection and obedience, 
as they were in the Categorical Idea, to recognition of the need for liberty under law. For states to 
realise their self-mastery, international authority that contained elements of institutionalised 
hierarchy was needed. Unlike in the Paternalistic Idea, however, the consent and participation of 
small states was necessary to prevent self-mastery from being compromised. The notion of ‘liberty 
under law’ is reminiscent of liberal political theories in which ‘natural’ freedom, understood as the 
absence of subjection, is exchanged for ‘civil’ liberty in a consensual political community based on 
the rule of law. It is for this reason that I term the idea of state freedom negotiated at San Francisco 
the Civil Idea of state freedom. 
 
The discussions at the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) centred on 
a set of proposals presented by the ‘big four’ allied states—China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union 
and the US—drafted during a conference which took place at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington DC in 
1944, participation in which was limited to the great powers. The so-called ‘Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals’ themselves built upon the Moscow Declaration issued by the four powers in 1943 which 
recognised the “necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international 
organization [the United Nations], based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-
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loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of 
international peace and security”.519 It was through debates about the notion of sovereign equality, 
which had an ambiguous position within the proposals for a general international organisation, that 
the Civil Idea of state freedom was articulated, and it is on those debates that I focus in this section. 
 
The idea that the organisation should be based on a principle of equality between states is striking 
and seems to have originated in a meeting between US President Franklin D Roosevelt and a number 
of officials which took place in August 1943,520 with the phrase ‘sovereign equality’521 itself is likely to 
have been suggested by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.522 The idea of the equality of 
states was, therefore, clearly in the minds of the major allied powers with respect to questions of 
post-war order. However, there was also a strong current of great power decision-making running 
through the discussions between, principally, Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin that took 
place towards the end of the war which suggested little or no regard for the equal rights of weaker 
states. Even at the San Francisco conference itself, the language of great and small powers was 
pervasive, intermingling with assertions of equality.523 At the conference—which was wide ranging in 
the scope of issues addressed—there were two areas of debate where discussion of sovereign 
equality was particularly prominent; discussions of what the underlying principle or principles of the 
organisation should be, and discussions about the membership and powers of the proposed Security 
Council. In the end, a charter was agreed upon to create a general international organisation that 
has as its basic principle the “sovereign equality of all its Members”.524 At the same time, however, 
the Charter also establishes a Security Council that clearly affords its five permanent members (the 
four major allied powers plus France) rights that surpass those of the other member states. In the 
remainder of this section, I will show that the delegates were able to endorse both of these, 
apparently contradictory, elements of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals because both were consistent 
with the normative goal of the self-mastery of states as part of the Civil Idea of state freedom. In 
order to demonstrate that, I first lay out what was understood by sovereign equality in San 
Francisco, showing that it was understood in a broad sense which amounted to a rejection of the 
domination of one state over another. Second, I show how that principle was implicated in the 
debate about legitimate relations of control between states prompted by the proposed rights of the 
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permanent members of the Security Council. That debate ultimately resulted in the compromise of 
both the Categorical and Paternalistic Ideas of state freedom and the institutionalisation of the Civil 
Idea. 
 
As we have seen, at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, Ruy Barbosa conceptually linked the two 
principles of sovereignty and equality even if he did not use the compound phrase and, at the same 
conference, the explicit coupling was used by the Guatemalan delegation.525 The US Under Secretary 
of State Sumner Welles had also used the phrase “sovereign equality of peoples” in a speech in 
1942,526 but not all the delegates in San Francisco were satisfied with this formulation, suggesting it 
obscured other important terms such as juridical equality and state personality.527 The Peruvian 
delegate in San Francisco, Victor Andres Belaunde, was one of those that took issue with the phrase, 
claiming it has “no technical or scientific meaning”. In his criticism of the terminology, Belaunde 
introduced a number of conceptual themes that ran through much of the discussion on state 
equality at the conference. Belaunde’s dissatisfaction with the term, aside from its ‘unscientific’ 
nature, was that using it meant “putting aside” other important concepts. Chief among them was 
the “idea of personality”, which he presented in the following way:  
 
International order is based on the personality of the states as the juridical order is based on the 
personality of the man. States ought to be respected, not only because they are sovereign and have 
territory. The elements that ought to be respected in states are not only the political elements 
embodied in the physical state, and the material element, that is the territory. The states are a living 
synthesis of moral values which assume other elements, and the elements of the state most worthy of 
respect are its cultural values, which are the essence of personality.  
 
Every country has a personality, and this personality ought to be respected. Because a country is a 
personality, it is sovereign and has the right to juridical equality and has a right to territory.
528
 
 
Echoing Vattel, then, the conceptual starting point for Belaunde’s position is that a state constitutes 
a kind of ‘moral person’, and the chief right that “small countries” ask for in international society is 
“respect for their moral personalities”.529 It is this view of the state as a normatively valuable, ethical 
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entity which generates both the right to juridical equality and a thick understanding of the obligation 
of non-intervention that takes the form of ‘respecting’ the material, territorial and also moral 
aspects of other states. Supporting this approach to state equality is the familiar analogy to the 
individual in domestic society. 
 
Although the Peruvian objection to the terminology of ‘sovereign equality’ was rejected, the ideas 
behind it were not. During the course of the discussions in Committee I/1 of the conference, the 
representatives debated the meaning of the new term and established that the phrase “sovereign 
equality” incorporated four ideas: “(1) that states are juridically equal; (2) that each state enjoys the 
right inherent in full sovereignty; (3) that the personality of the state is respected, as well as its 
territorial integrity and political independence; (4) that the state should, under international order, 
comply faithfully with its international duties and obligations”.530 Considering each of those four 
elements in turn allows us to establish the shared understanding at the conference of the phrase 
‘sovereign equality’. 
 
The first element of sovereign equality highlighted by the committee—the juridical equality of 
states—was a much heard phrase at the San Francisco conference, generally being used to refer to 
the international legal doctrine of the equality of states. The Ecuadorian understanding was typical, 
which saw juridical equality as “an expression of *all sovereign states’+ identical significance before 
the common law which governs their reciprocal relations and as means for correcting and repairing 
any practical or political inequality which be interposed between them”.531 Juridical equality, then, 
referred to the idea of equality before the law, understood as a corrective against the manifest 
material inequalities between states. This was a commonly held position in the first half of the 20th 
century, and one that, as I have shown in the previous section, was linked to resistance to the 
domination of powerful states. 
 
Although international lawyers have often understood equality before the law to constitute the 
entirety of the international legal doctrine of the equality of states, Committee I/1 determined 
sovereign equality to be a substantially more expansive concept. I will return below to the second 
constituent element of sovereign equality agreed upon at San Francisco—that each state enjoys the 
right inherent in full sovereignty. First I will consider the third element, that the personality, 
territorial integrity and political independence of the state are respected. Although equality before 
the law suggests that states are commensurate as legal subjects, as we have seen through the 
                                                          
530
 Ibid., 6:70, 398. 
531
 Ibid., 6:561. 
 147 
 
suggestions of the Peruvian delegation, “personality” was understood in the Committee in a more 
substantial way than the mere legal personality implied in the juridical equality of states. In this 
context, personality rather implies an essential similarity in states by virtue of their representing an 
ontological moral order. In this characteristic of states—their moral essence—there can be no 
hierarchy.  
 
The idea that states are equal by virtue of their moral worth was not confined to the discussions of 
Committee I/1 at San Francisco, with other ‘smaller states’ also asserting their value to the United 
Nations by virtue of their “moral contribution” despite their lack of consequence “militarily and 
politically”.532 ‘Small states’ also explicitly framed the problem of international organisation in moral 
terms,533 which, when paired with assertions of the “moral force” of small nations, “invisible but 
formidable”,534 implicitly asserted a right to be equal partners with militarily powerful states in 
shaping global order. Ideas about the commensurate moral worth and personality of states both 
small and large thus transformed sovereign equality from a legal, technical principle into one that 
also incorporates significant ethical dimensions. In this way, sovereign equality—as the first principle 
of the United Nations—was linked with the ethical nature of world order to be constructed more 
generally; small nations repeatedly asserted that for peace to be lasting, a just and equitable peace 
which did not exclude the materially impotent was needed.535 This reasoning inverts the traditional 
reasoning of international lawyers—also expressed by the US delegation at the 1907 Hague 
Conference—that the principle of equality of states was incompatible with effective management of 
international affairs. It also inverts the logic of the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom which justifies 
interference in the affairs of small states by virtue of the moral pre-eminence of the great powers. 
This assertion by small states of their moral worth is a key element of the Civil Idea of state freedom 
and I will return to it below. 
 
The third element of sovereign equality established by the Committee also links the personality of 
states with respect for their “territorial integrity and political independence”. This link suggests the 
inviolability of the state and connects sovereign equality with the principle of non-intervention. The 
delegates chose to connect the idea of equality with the broader idea of freedom from inter-state 
interference, imbuing equality with a deeper meaning than absence of rank. By agreeing on an 
understanding of sovereign equality that enshrined both juridical equality and mutual respect, 
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delegates delegitimised predation and domination by other states. Independence and territorial 
integrity in effect constitute a minimal right of states to exist as self-determining entities, a right that 
at San Francisco was seen as deriving from a state’s moral personality. 
 
The fourth element of sovereign equality agreed upon at the Conference—that a state “should, 
under international order, comply faithfully with its international duties and obligations”—is another 
example of the broad understanding of sovereign equality reached in San Francisco. At first blush 
this element seems to have little connection to an intuitive understanding of equality. Obligations 
and duties are, however, most often considered to be the conceptual corollary of rights, and 
historically the equality of rights and duties has often been argued to constitute the doctrine of the 
equality of states. The fourth element agreed upon at the Conference, then, reminds us that states 
are all equally subject to international duties, even if it does not necessarily suggest that all states 
are subject to equal duties. Principally, this element makes it clear that the freedom of action of 
states is, or at least should, be limited in international order.  
 
When considered alongside the second element of sovereign equality—“that each state enjoys the 
right inherent in full sovereignty”—the emphasis on duties and obligations shows that the idea of 
sovereign equality negotiated in San Francisco aims to preserve the independence of states by 
subjecting them to a higher authority. In 1907 Ruy Barbosa had argued against the proposed 
composition of the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice on the ground that taking away the free 
choice of arbiters from states signified “obedience of states to necessary authority”, a situation 
which was “incompatible with the notion of sovereignty”.536 In 1945, however, it was held: 
 
That the sovereign nations of the world must recognize that above their national sovereignty is the 
sovereignty of the law, and must, therefore, abide by international law and submit their disputes to 
the mandates of international law as interpreted and applied by a competent court of obligatory 
jurisdiction.
537
 
 
The principle of sovereign equality—which Barbosa had so ardently fought to preserve against both 
hierarchy and jurisdictional justice—had come to encompass the idea that states had to “delegate a 
part of *their+ sovereignty” and “accept the concept of liberty under law”.538 
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The fact that all states enjoy the rights inherent in sovereignty (and are, in this sense, possessing of 
equal rights), does not necessarily imply, however, that sovereign rights encompass all the rights of 
states in the international system. The second element of sovereign equality agreed upon at San 
Francisco suggests a system of general rights, equally held by all states. However, also pervasive at 
the Conference was the language of special rights and, concomitantly, special duties. The area of 
debate where such language was most prevalent was in discussions about the element of the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals most obviously in tension with the equality of states; the composition 
and powers of the Security Council. The proposal put forward by the four sponsoring powers was 
that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security would fall on 
a council of 11 members, five permanent (the four sponsoring powers plus France) and six rotating 
(nominated by the General Assembly). The wide ranging powers of the Security Council to define 
threats to international peace and security, and to establish measures against them, clearly 
formalise a differentiation in rights between members and non-members. Moreover, even within 
the council, two tiers of rights are created; permanent members have an effective veto on all non-
procedural matters given that unanimous agreement between them is required, while non-
permanent members are denied this privilege. 
 
The implications for the equality of states of this arrangement for dealing with questions of peace 
and security were not lost on delegates, and the principle was repeatedly raised in the context of 
debate about this issue. Nonetheless, there was a very broad acceptance that the five permanent 
members would, and should, have special rights denied to all other states. Although claims were 
made that the proposed composition of the Security Council was in contradiction with sovereign 
equality,539 the consensus among delegates was either that, despite the proposals, juridical equality 
was maintained,540 or that a compromise on strict equality was needed to ensure peace and security 
and that special rights could be afforded to certain states without making sovereign equality 
meaningless.541 There were two main rationales given by states as to why special privileges ought to 
be afforded the five permanent members, one backward looking and one forward looking, but both 
ultimately related to their military capacity. The first was the role that those powers had played 
(and, at the time of the conference, were still playing) in defeating the axis powers in World War II. It 
was they who had made the greatest “sacrifice” on behalf of other states,542 they who had “borne 
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the heaviest load of the war”,543 and they who had “brought the German giant to its knees”.544 In 
part, this justified the “rather exclusive” nature of the powers of those states in the future world 
order,545 but these powers were not deemed legitimate merely as a reward for past services. The 
second, and most prominent, reason given for states’ acceptance of these special rights was the 
special responsibility that the permanent five members of the Security Council would continue to 
bear for preserving international peace and security.546 The basic logic of this position was that it is 
proper for rights to be commensurate with responsibilities, hence “the Great Powers, because they 
have greater international responsibility, must likewise exert a greater functional influence in the 
organization of the world”.547  
 
Underpinning this basic argument that rights ought to be commensurate with responsibility were 
deeper ideas about state freedom that both legitimated the special privileges of the great powers 
and prescribed how those privileges should be nested within a broader configuration of inter-state 
relations of control. The fundamental problem posed by the question of the membership and 
privileges of the Security Council was how to “reconcile…two primary needs: that of safeguarding, 
not only in theory but also in practice, the juridical equality of the Member-States, with that of 
enabling the International Organization to employ efficaciously preventative measures and sanctions 
to guarantee collective security”?548 
 
The need for an effective mechanism of security preservation was emphasised by states both 
materially strong and weak. The underlying rationale behind this goal was the need to protect states 
from aggression that would threaten their independence and their capacity to be self-directing and 
controlling. The British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, for example, asserted that the big powers 
did not wish to “dictate to the rest of the world” the shape of international organisation, but to 
“provide us with that security which is today mankind’s greatest need”.549 Security, he went on, was 
“not itself a final end” but was “indispensable if we are to make true freedom possible; not 
otherwise can we hope to realize a world in which justice for nations as well as for individuals can 
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prevail”.550 The challenge for the delegations in San Francisco was to “find some means of ordering 
our relations with justice and fair-dealing, while allowing nations great and small full opportunity to 
develop their free and independent life—either we must do that—or we shall soon head for another 
world conflict which this time must bring utter destruction of civilization in its trail”.551 
 
The basic notion that security is necessary to prevent the aggressive domination of one state over 
another chimes with the Categorical Idea of state freedom and echoes the arguments reconstructed 
in Chapter Three that non-intervention is necessary for the realisation of self-mastery. Indeed, the 
understanding of sovereign equality agreed upon in San Francisco encompassed a right to non-
intervention through the demand that “the personality of the state is respected, as well as its 
territorial integrity and political independence”.552 As the Uruguayan delegation argued, “the 
concept of equality imposes necessarily the nonintervention principle”, which should be limited only 
by the requirement that the “freedom of a state may not reach at any time a point which is 
incompatible with the rights and the pacific relations of the others”.553 While in the International 
Conferences of American States, the focus had been on the codification of an absolute right to non-
intervention, in San Francisco it was held that “collective intervention” was necessary for the right to 
non-intervention to be meaningful.554 
 
The proposed hierarchical institutionalisation of the mechanism of collective intervention was in 
contradiction with the absolute equality of rights demanded by the Categorical Idea, and despite the 
arguments made about special responsibilities, the suspicion remained that small states would never 
enjoy ‘free and independent lives’ if differences in material power between states were enshrined in 
international institutions. The delegation of the Netherlands was regretful that the “special status” 
of the large powers would be “officially recognized and sanctioned” and, in terms reminiscent of Ruy 
Barbosa’s forceful arguments, lamented an institutional design which “legalizes the mastery of might 
which in international relations, when peace has prevailed, has been universally deemed to be 
reprehensible”.555 The need for effective collective security to prevent aggressive domination was 
such, however, that the Netherlands were willing to “acquiesce” to the arrangement and “accept 
certain limitations of this freedom of action which hitherto belonged to all sovereign states”.556 This 
ambivalent attitude toward the special rights of the big powers was encapsulated in a “favourite 
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phrase”557 of the Australian Foreign Minister HV Evatt (a champion of the small and middle powers’ 
attempts to amend the Dumbarton Oaks proposals) who stated: “leadership is acceptable; 
domination is intolerable”.558 
 
At the second Hague Peace Conference no solution was found to reconcile a hierarchy of rights with 
the freedom of states; transforming ‘might into right’ would necessarily mean the domination of 
powerful states over the small. In San Francisco, on the other hand, it was widely held—albeit often 
reluctantly—among the delegates that creating an effective collective security mechanism required 
a special role for the great powers. That does not mean that the self-mastery of states was set aside 
as a normative goal. The emphasis placed on responsibility of great powers shows that preventing 
the domination of the materially powerful states was crucial to the delegates of smaller states. 
Although the trust that the permanent members of the Security Council would exercise their special 
powers for the common good was an important factor in gaining agreement on the creation of the 
United Nations, small and middle powers were not content to rely purely on faith. Crucial to the 
acceptance of the small states of the great powers’ special rights was a belief that they nonetheless 
had a meaningful role in both the creation and the operation of what would become the United 
Nations. Ian Hurd has shown that “procedural correctness” was a powerful tool in establishing the 
legitimacy of the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council.559 According to 
Hurd, the “small states valued the deliberation afforded by the procedures of the conference and 
accepted the veto only once all avenues to oppose it were exhausted”.560 Hurd’s argument about the 
legitimating power of discussion and debate is a powerful explanation for why so many states 
changed their position from one of opposition to the veto to acceptance despite the lack of concrete 
concessions on the part of the big four states.561 This discursive legitimation of the veto is also 
evidence of the Civil Idea of state freedom which played a broader role in the politics of legitimacy 
surrounding the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.  
 
At the San Francisco conference there was a general characterisation of the fight against the axis 
powers as a fight for freedom.562 This freedom was associated with democracy and contrasted with 
the imperial aggression of the “totalitarian” states.563 The language of freedom and democracy in a 
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fight against the domination of aggressive states was prominent in the speeches of the major 
powers. The Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, for example, characterised the 
war as one in which “the democratic nations rallied against an imperial power…which considered 
itself master of Europe and which intended to impose its will”.564 However, smaller states also 
extended the association between democracy and the allied struggle beyond domestic political 
arrangements and to the workings of the proposed international organisation. The equal importance 
of small states and their democratic participation in its creation and operation were, it was argued, 
necessary to sustain peace and prevent the domination of one state over another. Though small 
states were weak militarily, they played an essential role in promoting justice and preventing the 
supremacy of the great powers. 
 
The arguments made by the Mexican delegation are exemplary in this regard. Mexico reversed the 
civilisational logic of the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom, arguing that rather than the small states 
needing the interference of great powers in order for them to act responsibly, the engagement of 
small states was essential to keep the great powers in check. Mexico’s delegate Luis Padilla Nervo 
argued:  
 
We are frequently reminded to be realistic but what greater and more undeniable reality than the fact 
that small nations do exist free from the lust for power and conquest. They represent the highest 
aspirations toward justice. They are the builders of the fortress of law. That is why we, the small 
nations, are here—not by reason of a military strength which we do not possess nor by virtue of a 
contribution that could be powerful in guaranteeing peace, but because of our honest yearning for 
cordial friendship and our sincere love for peace. We want security not only for ourselves—for us who 
possess no elements to threaten it—but security for the great powers who can more readily be 
tempted by the sinister advice of ambition and force.
565
 
 
After having made the link between great power and avarice, Padilla went on to explicitly call for the 
international organisation to be based on “democratic principles”. “Democracy”, he argued, 
“safeguards the brotherhood of all men. Should the great powers wish to be alone in authority they 
would also remain alone in their struggle for supremacy”.566 If the potential drive for supremacy of 
the great powers was not checked by the involvement of small powers in international authority, all 
that an international organisation could establish would “be a return to permanent insecurity”.567 
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The association made between the democratic participation of small states and resistance to inter-
state domination is what animated contestation in San Francisco as to the legitimate contours of the 
great powers’ special rights. Though willing to concede special rights to the five permanent members 
of the Security Council, numerous states nonetheless argued for an expansion of the range of 
general rights—that is to say rights possessed by all states—relating to peace and security enshrined 
in the United Nations. While accepting Security Council primacy, several states nonetheless made 
claims for expanded General Assembly powers to accompany them.568 Others made the claim that 
even if all states could not have a vote on the Security Council, they should all be granted a voice.569 
Others argued for an increase in the numbers of non-permanent members.570 The principle line of 
contestation, however, was related to the veto power of the five permanent members. The Security 
Council was granted, it was claimed, “excessive authority” and the veto could not be claimed a 
“sound basis for the building of a lasting world organization”.571 If the veto was accepted, it was 
argued, “there would be disregarded thereby the principle of the juridical equality of member states, 
reducing those which obtain non-permanent seats to a sad and decorative function within the 
Council”.572  
 
Other delegates argued for changes to the scope of the veto power to restrict its use, but the Great 
Powers made it clear that challenging the veto power meant abandoning the creation of an 
international organization.573 Given that the creation of a collective security mechanism backed-up 
by the military power of the large states had become understood as a necessary condition for the 
realisation of the self-mastery of states, small states had a powerful incentive to concede to the big 
four. Ultimately, despite their arguments, and despite minimal concessions on the part of the 
sponsoring powers, the participatory process that all states engaged in during the conference was 
enough to convince them that the proposed international organisation was not an illegitimate 
institutionalisation of might into right.574  
 
The hierarchical and democratic elements of the agreements reached in San Francisco were both 
ultimately necessary conditions for the realisation of the self-mastery of states. That is not to say 
that there was no tension between these two necessary conditions. However, the states 
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representatives in San Francisco were able to reach a balance that satisfied both. This compromise is 
encapsulated in the arguments made by the Panamanian delegation. Panamanian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Roberto Jimenez noted that “small nations and the large, the weak and the powerful” 
had “all been invited as equals to deliberate side by side and to express their own viewpoints in a 
truly democratic manner”.575 This inclusive, participatory approach was “precisely one of the 
characteristics that distinguish[ed] the democratic nations from the totalitarian, whose only 
guidance *was+ their own selfish interest and ambition”.576 Jimenez recognised that the 
“responsibility in the maintenance of peace increased proportionally to the size, the population, and 
the military force of the great nations”.577 At the same time, however, the “wholehearted 
cooperation of the small nations” was “essential to the satisfactory functioning of the World 
Organization” and that they must be “protected from aggression from any source whatsoever”.578 
Possessing as they did the greatest military force, the large states had a “supreme responsibility in 
seeing that no new conflagration” was “precipitated by their own direct action or by the action of a 
smaller power backed by any of them”.579 At the same time: 
 
No nation is big enough or powerful enough to stand against the rest of the world. No group of 
nations can claim exclusive possession of all wisdom in the settlement or conduct of international 
affairs. All nations—large and small, weak and strong—have a stake in the maintenance of universal 
peace and all should cooperate as equals in making justice the sole, the supreme, the indestructible 
basis of peace.
580
 
 
The agreement reached at San Francisco affirmed the importance of the equality of states at the 
same time as granting “greater powers” and “greater privileges” to larger states on the grounds that 
“the responsibility in the maintenance of peace increases proportionally to the size, the population 
and the military force of the great nations”.581 The potential threat to small states’ ‘free and 
independent lives’ posed by institutionalised hierarchy was recognised by the delegates. However, it 
was understood that, if counter-balanced by the participation of smaller states, this “legalised 
hegemony”, as Gerry Simpson has termed it,582 could guarantee, rather than compromise, the 
sovereign equality and freedom of all states. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have explored ideas of state freedom through the lens of the idea of sovereign 
equality. I began by analysing Emmerich de Vattel’s classic exposition of the equality of states, 
showing that it was intertwined with a theory of the freedom of states. In what I called the Natural 
Idea of state freedom, states were understood as moral persons that possessed “understanding, 
volition, and strength”.583 In other words, states were agents with the capacity to both will and to act 
upon that will. The freedom that characterised the natural condition of statehood for Vattel was the 
freedom to follow that will; to follow the “dictates” of one’s own “conscience”.584 The necessary 
conditions for the realisation of that freedom was that states should be completely independent, 
subject to no higher authority and free to follow its own reason of state.585 
 
As the 18th and 19th centuries progressed the terminology of state freedom was replaced by that of 
sovereignty, through which endured the idea that by their very statehood states possessed a right to 
be self-directing and self-determining, as well as a right to equality. It was in these terms that the 
equality of states was hotly contested at the second Hague Peace Conference. In the second section 
I reconstructed the arguments made by Ruy Barbosa, which were another instantiation of the 
Categorical Idea of state freedom introduced in Chapter Three. Like Vattel, Barbosa made an analogy 
between human individuals and states, asserting them as sovereign, right-bearing entities that ought 
to be free to determine their own existence. The idea of self-mastery exhibited by Barbosa entailed 
both an absence of the domination of strong states and the absence of subjection to higher 
authority. The necessary condition for the realisation of this Categorical Idea of state freedom was 
absolute equality in relations of control between states. Any deviation from this principle would lead 
to the domination of strong states over weak and was characterised as the legalisation of ‘might 
over right’. The structuring effect of this idea of state freedom was the rejection by the materially 
weaker states at the Hague Peace Conference of any attempt to create an instrument of 
international dispute settlement that deviated from strict arbitral justice.  
 
At the United Nations Conference on International Organization, states exhibited a shift beyond the 
incompatible Categorical and Paternalistic Ideas of state freedom. In the third section of the chapter 
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I argued that a Civil Idea of state freedom can be identified within the negotiations that states 
engaged in regarding the creation of the United Nations. In the debates surrounding the principle of 
sovereign equality in San Francisco, the state was once again understood as a moral person with the 
capacity to set its own direction. The sovereign equality of states was understood in terms broader 
than the absence of rank, but rather as respect for this self-directing capacity of the state, free from 
outside domination and interference. In contrast to the Categorical Idea of freedom, however, in the 
Civil Idea it was recognised that some subjection to higher authority was necessary in order for this 
self-mastery to be realised.586 Moreover, inverting the logic of the Categorical Idea of state freedom, 
it was conceded that without the enforcement powers of materially strong states, the rights of 
sovereign states would be meaningless. While conceding the necessity for some hierarchy, small 
states in San Francisco also recognised the threat posed to self-mastery by the power and authority 
of the great powers. Another necessary condition for the realisation of self-mastery was, therefore, 
the democratic participation of all states in the workings of the authority to which they were subject. 
As a result, the Civil Idea of state freedom legitimated relations of control between states that 
contained a limited degree of institutionalised hierarchy between states in security provision, 
provided that this hierarchy was counter-balanced by democratic and egalitarian processes. The 
structuring effects of this synthetic idea of state freedom—which contained elements of both the 
Paternalistic and Categorical ideas—can be seen in both the institutional design of the United 
Nations and the process by which it was created. The basic architecture of the United Nations was 
designed by the big four powers, and an organisation without their agreement was seen by all states 
as impotent. However, the input and deliberation of all the allied nations was crucial for imbuing the 
organisation with legitimacy in eyes of small states. Likewise the special powers granted to the 
permanent members of the Security Council are expressions of the Civil Idea of state freedom’s 
recognition of the exceptional role played by the great powers in providing for collective security. At 
the same time, however, these powers are limited in scope and were legitimised only on the basis 
that they were the expression not of privilege but of a special responsibility for preserving the self-
mastery of all states.  
 
The delegates in San Francisco were able to agree on an institutional design that adequately met the 
needs of a compromise idea of state freedom that synthesised elements of both the Paternalistic 
Idea and the Categorical Idea. That is not to say, however, that the Civil Idea of state freedom 
completely transcended either idea. The conception of self-mastery as the capacity to control one’s 
own destiny without the domination of others passed into the Civil Idea. More insidiously, the ideas 
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of racial and civilisational supremacy that undergirded the Paternalistic Idea were only challenged by 
the Civil Idea with respect to relations between pre-existing sovereign states. The extreme hierarchy 
between states and dependent peoples justified in terms of guardianship or tutelage were left 
unchallenged by the Civil Idea. Relations of dependency endured in the UN system in the form of 
Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories. Chapter Five explores relations of dependency 
through the lens of self-determination and shows that it would not be long before the remnants of 
the Paternalistic Idea in the UN system would face acute challenge from anti-colonial states 
advocating the further evolution of ideas of state freedom. 
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Chapter Five 
Self-Determination 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Three explored relations of control between states primarily through relations of 
domination; in it I analysed debates about non-intervention in order to examine how ideas of state 
freedom are implicated in contentious assertions of control between states. Examining the Concert 
of Europe, I showed how different ideas about what kind of agent the state was and what 
constituted self-mastery for that agent—the Dynastic and Self-Help Ideas—informed different ideas 
about how to manage European affairs. While these ideas made the Concert system possible, I 
argued that the Self-Help Idea also limited the scope of legitimate great power cooperation and 
ultimately wrought a separation between Great Britain and the Holy Alliance. Turning my focus to 
the Americas in the early 20th century, I then showed how a Categorical Idea of state freedom 
underpinned the arguments of Latin American states against the practice of non-intervention and 
contributed to a change in the social identity of the US from a hemispheric ‘policeman’ to ‘good 
neighbour’. 
 
In Chapter Four I analysed debates about sovereign equality in order to examine the role played by 
ideas of state freedom in structuring relations of authority in international relations. I showed how 
the Categorical Idea of state freedom precluded any inequality in the rights and duties of states that 
was deemed to facilitate relations of domination between states. I then showed how, in the 
negotiations surrounding the creation of the United Nations, states displayed a Civil Idea of state 
freedom. This idea of freedom legitimated a limited degree of legalised hierarchy in the international 
system provided that asymmetry was checked by the democratic participation of all states in 
creating liberty under law. 
 
In this chapter I explore a third aspect of relations of control in the international system; relations of 
dependence, which is to say, hierarchical relations of control that deny one political community 
formal independence. The increasing prominence of the Categorical and then Civil Ideas of state 
freedom challenged the notion of a civilisational hierarchy between states that was central to the 
Paternalistic Idea. The efforts of materially weaker states in the International Conferences of 
American States, the second Hague Peace Conference and the San Francisco Conference contributed 
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to delegitimising relations of domination between existing sovereign states by asserting their equal 
rights and moral worth. The Categorical and Civil Ideas did not, however, comprehensively challenge 
the civilisational ideas embedded in the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom. They left unconfronted 
the notion of a hierarchy of peoples occupying different stages of civilisational development and 
thus possessing different levels of capacity for self-government. Even the absolute rejection of inter-
state inequality and interference of the Categorical Idea did not challenge the extreme relations of 
domination and subjugation inherent in the institution of empire. 
 
Through the lens of self-determination, I analyse the process of contesting and reconfiguring the 
relations of dependence that were bound up with colonialism. Intuitively, there is a conceptual 
affinity between self-determination and the freedom of political communities; as Article 1 of the two 
International Covenants on Human Rights state, the right of self-determination means that peoples 
“freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”.587 However, self-determination is a term that has had a deeply contested history 
with respect to its meaning and its applicability. The politics of legitimacy that has accompanied 
debates about self-determination reveals an evolving relationship between that concept and ideas 
of state freedom, both prevailing and nascent. 
 
I examine the dynamic relationship between self-determination and state freedom by analysing two 
historical moments of debate. The first is the ‘Wilsonian moment’588 of post-World War I 
reconstruction. I analyse the rise to international prominence of self-determination in US President 
Woodrow Wilson’s wartime rhetoric and the role it played at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I 
use the prism of self-determination to explore in greater depth the Paternalistic Idea of state 
freedom that we encountered in Chapter Three.589 I argue that in the Paternalistic Idea an 
association was made between the state and its ‘people’. Peoples were thought to have a right to be 
self-governing and, hence, the ideal of self-mastery was a familiar one of equal states determining 
their own way of life, free from the interference of others. However, the Paternalistic Idea also 
involved a hierarchical view of people’s fitness for self-government, an idea which legitimated both 
great power primacy and relations of dependence between states and less ‘advanced’ peoples. I 
demonstrate that this idea of state freedom was dominant at the Paris Peace Conference and was 
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reflected in the way great powers dealt with the futures of the imperial territories of the defeated 
powers. 
 
The second historical moment I focus on is the debates about self-determination and colonialism 
that took place in the United Nations in the 1950s and at the 1955 Bandung Asia-Africa Conference. 
These debates explicitly addressed the dependency of colonial peoples which was legitimised by the 
Paternalistic Idea of state freedom and perpetuated by the Civil Idea in the Trust and Non-Self-
Governing Territories of the UN. I argue that debates about self-determination in the 1950s were, in 
significant ways, arguments about the freedom of states. Newly independent post-colonial states 
challenged the notion that the freedom of peoples could be provided through dependence, arguing 
that the freedom of statehood was applicable to all political communities regardless of their level of 
‘advancement’. In what I term the Independence Idea of state freedom, the self-mastery of the state 
was understood as independence from ‘alien’ subjugation, both formal and informal. There were 
two necessary conditions for this self-mastery to be realised. The first was for political authority to 
be consistent with the racial, cultural and geographical characteristics of a political community; an 
idea which implied the independence of all colonial peoples. The second was that, once constituted, 
these independent states should be free from the interference and domination of other states. I 
argue that although the Independence Idea of state freedom was resisted on the grounds of both 
the freedom of existing states and the freedom of colonial peoples themselves, the Independence 
Idea was implicated in anti-colonial states’ successful challenge to the legitimacy of empire and 
formal relations of dependence between political communities. 
 
 
Wilsonian ideals and post-war realities 
 
Woodrow Wilson was a vocal advocate for the independence and equality of states. He was a 
champion of the rights of small states and repeatedly asserted the right of all nations to determine 
their own political characteristics and way of life, free from the domination of the powerful. Wilson 
was also heralded as a champion of the rights of peoples, and his repeated assertions of the right to 
self-determination were echoed in the national aspirations of minorities and dependent peoples 
around the world. Nonetheless, as we saw in Chapter Three, while condemning intervention Wilson 
was perhaps also the “greatest interventionist of his age,”590 and his administration repeatedly 
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interfered in the internal affairs of Latin American states. As we will see in this section, in the 
aftermath of World War I, Wilson and his fellow great power leaders met privately to re-shape the 
political map of Europe and to institutionalise the dependency of peoples in Asia and Africa on the 
administration of established powers. 
 
Wilson’s words and political deeds had an uneasy coexistence, but the tensions between his rhetoric 
and actions are not the result of bald hypocrisy. Here I analyse Wilson’s ideas from the perspective 
of state freedom and show that the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom he displayed encouraged 
several interpretations, each implying different relations of control between states. Wilson himself, 
however, was consistent in holding a hierarchical view of relations between peoples which was 
based on the realisation of universal values. The grammar of the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom 
were expounded in Chapter Three. In this idea the self-mastery of states consisted of being a 
responsible state that was self-limiting (with respect to its ambitions of mastery over others) and 
self-controlling. As we saw in the case of the Wilson administration’s intervention in Mexico, 
responsible state behaviour was closely linked with both civilisation and democracy. The state was 
an expression of the popular sovereignty of the people and thus ought to be controlled by the 
‘consent of the governed’. However, not all peoples were equally fit for self-government and the 
‘interposition’ of civilised states was on occasion necessary to advance a political community’s 
capacity for self-mastery. Asymmetrical relations of control between states—ranging from great 
power management, occasional intervention through to on-going dependency—were, therefore, 
legitimated by the Paternalistic Idea. These practices were understood as fulfilling the responsibility 
of developed states to promote the general progress of civilisation and promoting the freedom the 
uncivilised peoples. 
 
In this section I first use the concept of self-determination as a way of demonstrating how the 
Paternalistic Idea of state freedom informed Wilson’s vision for how international relations ought to 
be conducted. I then turn specifically to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I argue that the 
deliberations regarding the political futures of the territories of the defeated empires were 
characterised by contestation between the Paternalistic and Self-Help Ideas of state freedom. In the 
Self-Help idea of state freedom—which was introduced in Chapter Three in my analysis of the 
Concert of Europe—states are self-mastering when they are free to determine for themselves the 
appropriate action to guarantee their security and essential interests. At the Paris Peace Conference, 
this idea of state freedom informed claims, notably by France and Italy, for territorial boundaries 
that protected their economic and security interests. The Paternalistic Idea put limits on these 
 163 
 
claims, demanding that they were at least minimally consistent with peoples’ national aspirations 
and the creation of viable independent states. Although the great powers took the responsibility for 
making decisions on the reconstruction of the post-war political map, this process was understood 
by those conducting it as being done not according to their own self-interests but in the interest of 
the populations in question. In accordance with the hierarchical dimension of the Paternalistic Idea, 
this interest was in some cases decided to be expressed in independent statehood but in others the 
continuation of relations of dependency. 
 
Wartime rhetoric: consent of the governed and equality of nations 
 
Although self-determination is often associated with ideas stretching back to the American and 
French Revolutions, the history of the term itself is a shorter one, first coming to international 
significance in the early part of the 20th century. Self-determination's first significant champion in the 
20th century was Lenin, whose conception consisted of the right of ethno-national groups to 
determine their own destiny and the right of colonial peoples to be liberated through 
independence.591 As we shall see below, the importance of these ideas would resurface following 
World War II and frame much of the discussion of self-determination that lead to rapid and 
widespread decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s. In the attempt to reconstruct world order 
following the First World War, however, the ideas about self-determination that dominated the 
international stage were those of Wilson. The high-minded principles put forward by Wilson as the 
basis of international relations based on justice rather than force framed the allied post-war 
settlement, with self-determination afforded a central place in its intellectual foundations. 
Throughout the war, both before and after United States involvement, Wilson's public addresses 
were replete with aspirations for an international order based on two principles; first that it should 
be people themselves that decide their political arrangements and futures and, second, that all 
nations should enjoy equality regardless of differences in size or power. In 1916, in a speech to the 
League to Enforce Peace, Wilson asserted the first “fundamental” belief of the United States to be 
that “every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live”.592 The second 
was that “the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty 
and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon.”593 
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In a 1917 address to the Senate, Wilson again argued that the peace to conclude World War I must 
be based on both equality and the consent of the governed. He stated: 
 
Only a peace between equals can last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a 
common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, 
is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and 
national allegiance. 
 
The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; 
the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, 
between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common 
strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. 
Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained 
in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or 
expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for 
equipoises of power.
594
 
 
Wilson’s political vision has a number of elements that chime with elements of state freedom that 
we have encountered in previous chapters. Wilson’s emphasis on equality between states echoes 
Vattel’s Natural Idea of state freedom and the Categorical Idea advanced by Barbosa in The Hague. 
The requirement of “common strength”, meanwhile, prefigures the collective security of the Civil 
Idea that would become central to the creation of the UN in San Francisco. Together these elements 
provide for a security which makes possible the “freedom of life”. At the same time, however, 
Wilson’s emphasis on the importance of democracy within states distinguishes it from the Civil Idea 
that would become prevalent later in the 20th century: 
 
And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peace can 
last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all 
their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples 
about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.
595 
 
Wilson thus saw the two principles of consent of the governed and equality of nations as mutually 
reinforcing; the requirement of consent delegitimised the domination of one people over another, 
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thus denying a hierarchy of rights between nations and instead demanding equality. These principles 
were more than mere idealistic aspirations for Wilson, they were claimed to be the necessary 
foundations of an enduring peace. Two months later, in his second inaugural address, Wilson 
reaffirmed the triumvirate of peace, consent and equality, stating that “the essential principle of 
peace is the actual equality of nations in all matters of right or privilege” and that “governments 
derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed and that no other powers should be 
supported by the common thought, purpose or power of the family of nations”.596 The repeated 
association that Wilson made between self-government, equality of nations and a lasting peace 
implied a programme for reconstructing international relations that had some notion of self-
determination as its foundation. 
 
This vision was further articulated in January 1918 when Wilson delivered his famous “Fourteen 
Points” speech which outlined his vision for the settlement of the war, formed the basis of the 
German surrender and was referred to throughout the Paris Peace Conference. The speech 
contained elements of both pluralism and universal values. Introducing his fourteen points, Wilson 
said: 
 
What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made 
fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like 
our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair 
dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of 
the world are in effect partners in this interest.597 
 
The idea of creating a peace in order to allow states to live their own lives suggests a pluralist idea of 
self-mastery similar to the Natural and Categorical Ideas of state freedom. However, the speech also 
implied a conception of the state as directly identifiable with its people. Although there was no 
specific mention of the term self-determination in the speech, Wilson affirmed the importance of 
the interests of colonial peoples in settling colonial claims,598 the “independent determination of 
*Russian+ political development”,599  that Italian borders should coincide with “clearly recognisable 
lines of nationality”,600 and that the “peoples of Austria-Hungary...should be accorded the freest 
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opportunity to autonomous development”.601 In the aftermath of the war, the speech also became a 
reference point for peoples claiming independence and during the Paris Peace Conference Wilson 
admitted that the Fourteen Points had “become a kind of treaty which binds *the great powers+”.602 
 
At the same time as Wilson was advocating his conception of the consent of the governed, Lenin was 
using the concept of self-determination to refer to the “liberation of all colonies; the liberation of all 
dependent, oppressed, and non-sovereign peoples”.603 The Bolsheviks' strongly anti-imperialist and 
anti-colonialist ideas translated into a clear articulation of colonial peoples' right to independence, 
either through plebiscite or forceful means. Self-determination was not limited to the colonial 
context, however, and also in the context of metropolitan sovereign states Lenin advocated the right 
to independence of all ethnic or national groups. This right could take the form of autonomy within 
an existing state, or full secession depending on the wishes of the people.604 
 
Up until 1918, though the phrase self-determination was used extensively by the Bolsheviks it had 
not been part of the Allied powers' lexicon. In January of that year, however, the British Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George claimed that the territorial settlement following the war must respect 
“the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed”, associating for the first time 
Wilson's ideals with those that had been associated with Lenin and the Bolsheviks.605 From that point 
on, Wilson himself started to employ the language of self-determination when discussing post-war 
order. The month after Wilson had presented his Fourteen Points, the US President, in his “Four 
Principles” speech to a joint session of Congress, demonstrated this shift in rhetoric. In it, he stated: 
 
Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference 
or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples 
may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not just a 
mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their 
peril.
606
 
 
The problem with this ‘imperative principle of action’ was, of course, the distinct lack of clarity as to 
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what precise imperative it imposed on ‘statesmen’. In emphasising national aspirations and hinting at 
a link between peoples and territories it was clear that self-determination for Wilson meant 
transcending balance of power as a mode of international governance. Hence, self-determination 
was inconsistent with the Self-Help Idea of state freedom articulated by Great Britain in the Concert 
of Europe. In the Self-Help Idea, states are self-mastering when they are able to determine their own 
essential interests and the appropriate means to follow it, including imposing territorial adjustments 
in the interest of securing balance of power. Wilson explicitly contrasted his vision for international 
order with the 19th century mode of conducting international relations. In response to German 
proposals that the questions of “territory and sovereignty” posed by the war should be resolved by 
the (powerful) “nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighbourhood”, Wilson replied: 
 
The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and 
will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new 
international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice,—no mere peace of 
shreds and patches.
607 
 
In the Four Principles Speech, Wilson claimed that balance of power politics was discredited and the 
principles of peace required that “peoples and provinces” were “not to be bartered about from 
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game”. Instead, “every 
territorial settlement in *World War I+ must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the 
populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst 
rival States”. Moreover, “all well defined national aspirations” were to be accorded the “utmost 
satisfaction” without introducing grievances that would threaten the future peace of Europe.608  
Beyond the attempt to transcend balance of power, however, the implications of self-determination 
for the freedom of states and legitimate relations of control between them were somewhat 
ambiguous. 
 
The 'Four Principles' speech, suggested that existing sovereign states did not have the unfettered 
right to treat peoples as possessions. Although not articulated with any specificity, peoples were 
holders of rights which imposed obligations on states. The speech also seemed to suggest that in the 
territorial settlement following the war, these peoples and their interests had priority over the claims 
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of states. Further, it indicated that satisfying national aspirations was a normative goal of the post-
war order. These three ideas were thus associated with self-determination, a concept that was not 
merely claimed as an ideal, but asserted as an “imperative principle of action”. The use of the 
Bolshevik term, combined with Wilson's acknowledgement of the national aspirations of peoples,609 
facilitated an interpretation of Wilson's wartime pronouncements as advocating the right of all 
peoples to determine their own political status. Indeed, from then on, the term 'self-determination' 
began to replace the phrase 'consent of the governed' in Wilson's rhetoric, raising the expectations 
of peoples with aspirations of independent statehood, both in Europe and in colonial territories. 
 
In the Four Principles speech, Wilson argued against the control of one nation over another, stating: 
 
I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President 
Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other 
nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of 
development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.
610
 
 
Because of a lack of specificity regarding the terms ‘nation’ and ‘people’, however, it was not entirely 
clear what were the implications of Wilson’s vision. Were the nations to be self-determining existing 
populations, implying the imposition of democracy? Were they existing states, implying non-
intervention and an end to military aggression? Or did ‘people’ mean any self-identifying group with 
aspirations for independence, implying the end of colonialism?  
 
Wilson frequently emphasised the need for “guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small states alike”.611 This was a normative aim that hinted at a pluralist 
international society in which state equality and non-intervention were shared norms at the 
international level, but where states were at liberty to develop their own values domestically. At the 
same time, however, self-determination—and the democratic values invested in it by Wilson—was 
upheld as a universal principle applicable to and in the interests of all states. The war, in Wilson's 
interpretation was a “war of emancipation”, and a fight for democratic values that would free people 
“from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers”.612 The “consent of the 
governed” was one of the principles that should guide international order, and although Wilson’s 
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proposals were “American principles, American policies” they were nonetheless, in his view, “the 
principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of 
every enlightened community”.613 They were, in short, “the principles of mankind and must 
prevail”.614 The tension between the acceptance of pluralism, with states determining and living by 
their own values, and the belief in the universal application of his values ran throughout Wilson’s 
pronouncements. Echoing the Kantian prescription for perpetual peace, Wilson claimed “only a 
Nation whose government was its servant and not its master could be trusted to preserve the peace 
of the world”.615 As G John Ikenberry has noted, Wilson believed “a steadfast concert of peace” could 
“never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations”616 but at the same time 
“understood that the architecture of a liberal order would need to be universal and open in scope 
and membership”.617 
 
According to Erez Manela, the term ‘self-determination’ was introduced into Wilson’s lexicon to 
neutralise Bolshevik criticism. However, while Lenin used the phrase to call for the right of national 
groups to determine their own international status and for the end of imperial domination, for 
Wilson this ambiguous term was synonymous with what he had previously expressed as self-
government or consent of the governed.618 Rarely was self-determination for Wilson qualified as 
specifically national and, rather than signifying the independence of ethnic groups, it was used in a 
way broadly equatable with popular sovereignty and democracy.619 Antonio Cassese asserts that self-
determination for Wilson was the “logical corollary of popular sovereignty”,620 and one can see 
running throughout the President's often ambiguous and inconsistent pronouncements on self-
determination an underlying current of democratic ideals. As Michla Pomerance shows, the terms 
'self-government' and 'consent of the governed' had an important place in Wilson's political 
philosophy prior to the outbreak of war. Both terms, although somewhat lacking in conceptual 
clarity, referred to two elements of democracy; the first was the right of the people to choose its own 
form of government, while the second was the continued input of the people in the process of 
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government.621 These principles had not been internationalised prior to the war, and nor had they 
been cast in 'nationalist' terms; the right of a “people” to choose its own form of government 
referred to the people of an existing state, rather than a 'people' in a sociological sense.  
 
This democratic aspect of self-determination notwithstanding, in the wartime period ethnic and 
cultural understandings of the term 'people' frequently appeared in Wilson's vision for peace. The 
democratic understanding of nationality was not superseded, however, and, despite obvious 
tensions between the two, both strains of thought coexisted as part of Wilson's programme for 
world order. On the question of the future of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for example, Wilson 
seemed to oscillate in his prescriptions. In an interview in 1914, he stated that Austria-Hungary 
“ought to go to pieces for the welfare of Europe”,622 but in December 1917 he implied that neither 
the boundaries no internal constitution of the multi-ethnic empire were of international concern. In 
an address to the US Senate, he affirmed the need to free Austria-Hungary from “the impudent and 
alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy”. At the same time, he stated: 
 
We do not wish in any way to impair or to re-arrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours 
what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate 
to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, 
great or small.
623 
 
In his Fourteen Points speech a month later, Wilson then asserted that the peoples of Austria-
Hungary, “whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be 
accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development”.624 The report of the inquiry upon 
which the Fourteen Points were based had suggested that US policy towards the Empire must 
“consist first in a stirring up of nationalist discontent, and then in in refusing to accept the extreme 
logic of this discontent which would be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary”.625 This changing 
position on the future of Austria-Hungary—at times suggesting its political arrangements were a 
concern exclusively for the Austria-Hungarian state alone to decide, at times concerning itself with 
the future of its constituent peoples—is indicative of the tension between the democratic, pluralist 
and sociological aspects of Wilson’s thought. 
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The application of self-determination to sociological peoples, rather than just populations of existing 
states, implied radical reconfigurations of political authority in the form of the disintegration of 
colonial empires as well as the secession of significant minorities from existing states. This 
interpretation of self-determination was the interpretation adopted by colonial peoples in their 
appeals to the Paris Peace Conference for independence or autonomy.626 However, although Wilson 
repeatedly emphasised the equality of nations as fundamental to ensuring peace, and the right of all 
peoples to self-determination, he was “notoriously unenlightened” with respect to ideas about 
“racial and civilizational superiority”.627 For Wilson, the level of development of a people dictated the 
appropriate form of their political status. Although self-determination may have been theoretically 
applicable to all peoples, what was meant by that phrase varied depending on the 'self' in question. 
This was evident in Wilson's pre-war attitude to the people of the Philippines who, according to 
Wilson, were a people unprepared for the responsibility of democracy and therefore ineligible for 
such a right. Wilson claimed in this case that “*f+reedom is not giving the same government to all 
people, but wisely discriminating and dispensing laws according to the advancement of a people”.628 
As he had written his days as a professor, the consent of Filipinos and the consent of Americans to 
government were two “radically different things,—not in theory, perhaps, but in practice”.629 Wilson 
saw the United States' task in the Philippines to make the population “fit” for independence, a 
process that ought to be gradual and could potentially be lengthy. This evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary attitude toward the self-government of peoples remained part of the Wilsonian 
conception of self-determination. As Wilson's Secretary of State Robert Lansing later wrote, 
supporters of the principle as fundamental to all peoples nonetheless did not claim it for “races, 
peoples, or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance *deprived+ them of the capacity to 
choose intelligently their political affiliations”.630 
 
Wilson’s racism was not prominent in his wartime rhetoric. However, it is notable that although the 
“interests” of populations were emphasised as crucial in determining “questions of sovereignty”,631 
that is not the same as saying that those ‘interests’ should be self-determined by the relevant 
populations. As we will see below, when it came to the process of dealing with the construction of 
state boundaries and dealing with colonial issues, the understanding of self-mastery of the 
Paternalistic Idea legitimated a prominent degree of hierarchy between states and peoples.  
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Paris Peace Conference: great power management and the Mandates System 
 
When the delegations of 32 states came together in Paris in January 1919 to negotiate the 
settlement of World War I, President Wilson's principles were faced not only with a task of enormous 
scope and gravity, but also a cacophony of competing ideas and interests. In addition to the 
delegations themselves, with their individual state interests, the conference had attracted 
representatives of manifold dependent peoples. These peoples, their aspirations for greater political 
freedom stoked by the President's proclamation of the principle of self-determination, clamoured to 
petition the leaders of the Associated Powers with their claims.632 Such claims only attempted to add 
to an already weighty list of issues to consider in which the principle of self-determination was 
implicated. First there was the question of colonies; what ought to be done with the German 
territories in Africa and the Pacific, and with the Ottoman possessions in the Middle East? Second, 
there was the question of how to configure territorial boundaries in Europe. In addition to the 
general rising of aspirations of independence among small 'nations', there was the issue of borders 
affected by annexation during the war, and the question of the defeated empire of Austria-Hungary. 
Wilson's challenge was to address these problems in ways consistent with the principle of self-
determination without creating instability and new potential causes of war. This considerable 
undertaking was to be conducted in the general interest and in a manner according to the principle 
of the equality of nations, eschewing the secret practice great power diplomacy. 
 
In the context of these grand ambitions, the peace conference has been characterised as a victor's 
peace, with the self-interest of the great powers triumphing over the morality and justice of Wilson's 
wartime promises. Wilson is often portrayed as being weak when confronted with the stubbornness 
and wiliness of his fellow leaders and, as a consequence, permitting too great a deviation from what 
the world had come to expect in light of his statements prior to the conference. While this 
interpretation may have some merit, here I advance two reasons for the inconsistency between the 
expectations and realities of the peace settlement, both of which pertain to ideas of state freedom. 
The first is that in the deliberations regarding the settlement of territorial issues, the Paternalistic 
Idea was not the only idea of state freedom in evidence. Also identifiable was the Self-Help Idea, 
which held the self-mastery of states to consist of states determining the measures necessary to 
protect their own essential and security interests. The second reason is that the Paternalistic Idea of 
state freedom itself was inconsistent with many of the hopes and expectations for the peace 
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settlement. Although the language of equality and self-determination created high expectations in 
small states and dependent peoples, the Paternalistic Idea, as we have seen, demanded hierarchal 
elements within the international system. While the Wilsonian ideal may have been a world of equal, 
independent, self-determining peoples, the realisation of this ideal was conditional on peoples 
meeting the demands of responsible self-government. This developmental dimension of the 
Paternalistic Idea informed both the process by which the peace settlement was arrived at—a 
process dominated by the great powers—and the relations of dependence that were 
institutionalised in the League of Nations.  
 
At the outset of the negotiations, there was reason to believe that the self-determination of peoples 
would be the dominant ideal driving the settlement.  In September 1919, Wilson himself claimed 
that the “fundamental principle” of the Covenant of the League of Nations was that “the countries of 
the world belong to the people who live in them, and that they have a right to determine their own 
destiny and their own form of government and their own policy”.633 This language of states 
determining their own destinies prefigures the pronouncements by the US and its allies in the 
International Conferences of American States that were reconstructed in Chapter Three. In the 
Paternalistic Idea of state freedom, states were in control of their own destiny not as a result of an 
absence of external interference, but through being responsibly self-governing. The same idea 
applied to the self-determination of peoples in 1919. Although Wilson had stated that the peace 
must be made “in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned”,634 that did not 
mean that the settlements would be made by the parties involved, or even that they would 
necessarily be consulted. Although Wilson had, towards the end of the war, criticised the German 
Chancellor for suggesting territorial matters ought to be settled in private negotiations, the heads of 
state of the four most powerful Allied states—Britain, France, Italy and the United States—
nonetheless informally decided that the decisions of the conference should be taken by a Council of 
the ten principal powers.635 These powers would be facilitated in their decision by the reports of 
commissions specifying recommendations on the issues to be resolved.636 Even this 'Council of Ten', 
however, proved unmanageably inefficient, with much of its time taken up with listening to lengthy 
pleas from smaller states regarding their aspirations for the settlement. The four principal heads of 
state, therefore, began to meet informally and in private. This 'Council of Four' met regularly 
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between March 24 and June 28 1919 and took “to themselves the responsibility of decision”.637 This 
hierarchical process of decision-making was legitimated by the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom 
because, as leaders of established great powers and bastions of civilisation, Wilson, Georges 
Clemenceau, David Lloyd George and Vittorio Orlando could be entrusted with the responsibility to 
make decisions in the general interest and for the advancement of collective civilisation. The 
decisions taken by the Council of Four were given greater legitimacy in the minds of those involved 
by their being based on—and largely following—the recommendations of territorial commissions 
which were understood to have determined the ‘facts’ of ethnic and territorial questions in an 
objective, rather than political, manner.638 
 
The records of the meetings of the Council of Four639 show repeated attempts—particularly on the 
part of Wilson himself—to adhere to the principle of self-determination and to decide matters of 
sovereignty and territory in accordance with the interests and desires of the people concerned. The 
records are also replete, however, with instances of the four leaders taking into consideration other 
factors, such as economic and military concerns, that were at odds with self-determination 
conceived either as a principle of democracy or of ethnic homogeneity. In general, however, the 
records of these meetings show that two aspects of self-determination were repeatedly prominent 
as stated concerns: first, the need for political boundaries to correspond with the boundaries of 
‘peoples’ that had been identified by the territorial commissions; and, second, the need to create 
states possessing of sufficient territory and population to viably sustain independence. As I will show 
below, where tensions between these two aims were insurmountable, the powers attempted to 
reconcile them in the form of Minority Treaties, which enforced standards of behaviour on states 
with the aim of protecting the rights of minorities. 
 
There was no shortage of cases in which the Council of Four faced problems in reconciling territorial 
borders with the principle of self-determination. In the decision taken by the powers with respect to 
Poland, for example, the requests of the Polish representatives were given great weight. While the 
construction of an independent Poland conformed to the demands of self-determination, the 
viability of that state as substantively independent and self-determining led to its boundaries being 
set in such a way as to encompass a German population of around one million inhabitants.640 
Romania and Czechoslovakia were also created as independent states in adherence to the principle 
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of self-determination but in meeting the strategic and economic interests of those new states, 
significant ethnic minorities were placed within their territory—in the case of Czechoslovakia, three 
million Bohemian Germans.641 
 
Similarly compromised solutions were found in almost all issues regarding sovereignty and territory, 
with many of the contentious decisions going against the wishes of the defeated central powers. On 
the question of the Saar Basin, for example—a mining region which France had demanded as 
compensation for the destruction of her own mines by Germany—there was debate as to whether 
France ought to be granted sovereignty of the region despite the fact that its population was clearly 
German when considered in historical and linguistic terms. Wilson declared that it would be “serious 
to do anything which taints a principle *self-determination+ to which we are committed”.642 He also 
admitted the impossibility of rigidly adhering to principle of the ethnic self-determination of peoples: 
 
*We+ can't say to these people: “You must accept the form of government which we will impose upon 
you.” That is what must be avoided as far as possible, although it must be admitted that it is inevitable, 
especially in countries where different populations are mixed, that some elements will find themselves 
detached from their national group and joined to the neighbouring group.
643 
 
Although the Council eventually decided that the people of the Saar Basin would determine whether 
they wished to live under the sovereignty of Germany or France, this right would only be effected 
after 15 years of French ownership of the mines in the entire region. Notwithstanding the clear and 
repeated articulation of a need to create viable states which were, as far as possible, consistent with 
the principle of self-determination, there were occasions where this principle butted up against 
claims which echoed Castlereagh’s Self-Help Idea of state freedom. As outlined in Chapter Three, 
self-mastery in the Self-Help idea consisted of states determining for themselves what was necessary 
for their own security and the protection of their essential interests. The boundaries of Germany, for 
example, were determined with the interests of peoples in mind, but also taken into consideration 
were what were perceived as legitimate “demands of injured neighbours”.644 Despite the request of 
the (Germanic) Austrians to be joined with Germany, this proposal met with the decisive opposition 
of France,645 whose arguments about its future security were acquiesced to. 
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One of the territorial issues on which the Council of Four deliberated the longest was that of Italian 
borders. Italy had refused to allow its territorial issues to be discussed by any territorial 
commissions,646 and was highly assertive in the Council of Four regarding what it perceived as its 
rightful claims. In this case, Wilson's attempt to establish a new mode of conducting international 
relations was confronted directly with pre-war diplomatic practices. The Treaty of London647 granted 
numerous territorial gains to Italy, including Tyrol, the Austrian Littoral and significant parts of 
Dalmatia. These acquisitions would be incompatible with self-determination and, in addition, Italy 
demanded the port town of Fiume (now Rijeka in Croatia). In the discussions, Lloyd George and 
Clemenceau—Prime Ministers of Britain and France respectively—declared themselves unable to 
renege on the commitment given in the Treaty of London, and bound to respect it unless it was 
broken by Italy herself. Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister, repeatedly invoked the right of Italy to the 
territories legally, on account of the Treaty, and morally, on account of its war effort. He also used the 
Treaty as a bargaining chip, proposing to renounce Italian claims to Dalmatia as long as Italy was 
satisfied in Fiume. Wilson, for his part, asserted that the United States was not a signatory of the 
Treaty of London—which he declared to be unjust and against the principles fought for in the war—
but was instead bound by the commitments he had made in the Fourteen Points and “the principle 
that one cannot dispose of peoples without their consent”.648 Nonetheless, against his aim to 
“endeavour to draw boundaries everywhere according to ethnonational lines”,649 Wilson granted 
Italy Tyrol as far as the Brenner pass (despite the region's Austrian population) in order to provide 
Italy a secure border to the north,650 and was willing to award it parts of Dalmatia in order to reach a 
compromise which would keep Italy in the peace settlement. He was unwilling, however, to concede 
to Italy on the point of Fiume, a disagreement that led to schism between the two countries and, 
eventually, the Italian withdrawal from the conference. 
 
The debates between the leaders on this subject demonstrate Wilson's attempt to transcend the 
politics of great power interest and the unwillingness to disregard the populations of territories 
whose futures were to be decided. However, they also illuminate how compromised and imperfect 
was the great powers’ attempt to determine territorial questions in ways consistent with the 
Paternalistic Idea of state freedom’s aim of promoting the self-mastery of other states from above. 
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With respect to Italy’s territorial demands Wilson claimed: 
 
The Treaty of London is based on the idea of former European policy—that the stronger power has the 
right to settle the fate of the weaker: from that it follows that France and England had the right to 
deliver to Italy populations which didn't belong to them. If this idea was maintained today, it would 
provoke reactions fatal to the peace of the world.
651 
 
The discussion of Italy's borders—along with the discussion of every other issue of territory and 
sovereignty—also show, however, that the self-determination of peoples was not the only principle 
to be considered. Indeed, it was much compromised by the need to also consider the need for states 
to be viably independent politically, militarily and economically. Orlando's reply to Wilson 
demonstrates a cognisance of this fact: 
 
I don't admit that the Treaty of London is a violation of justice...What was done then resembles what we 
do here every day. Every day, we have to resolve very complex territorial problems; ethnographic 
questions are mixed with economic questions; coasts, railroads, mountains must be taken into 
account...This treaty was a compromise such as we have often made for some weeks.
652 
 
To this assertion, Wilson replied: “Except where nearly impassable frontiers forced themselves upon 
us...we have followed the boundaries traced by ethnographic affinities, according to the right to self-
determination”.653 He also noted that the Council had granted a plebiscite to the population of 
Danzig despite “decisive strategic and economic reasons for giving Danzig to Poland”.654 
 
This exchange encapsulates the tensions evident at the conference in matters relating to self-
determination. Orlando’s attempt to equate the Treaty of London with the work of the Council 
implied a failure of Wilson's attempt to transcend the Self-Help idea of state freedom and to institute 
a new mode of conducting international affairs. This was true in part, given that the decisions taken 
with respect to states and populations at best with their input but without their control over the final 
outcome. On the other hand, the discussions in the Council do show that sustained and often 
agonising attempts were made to meet national aspirations and to match up territorial and 
sociological borders. The attempt made was inevitably imperfect, especially given the requirement 
for states to be viably independent. In cases where the provision for “nationalities to determine their 
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own destiny”655 was compromised and significant minorities were left under the rule of an alien 
nationality, the powers attempted to provide a solution in the form of Minority Treaties. The purpose 
of these treaties was to rectify violations of the principle of self-determination by guaranteeing the 
basic rights of religious and ethnic minorities that resulted from territorial boundary change, 
institutionalising standards of treatment to be overseen by the Council of the League of Nations. The 
Minority Treaty regime was much criticised by the states which it applied to on two grounds: first, 
that it violated the principle of the equality of states (given that the system was not extended to 
cover all states); and, second, that it violated the self-determination of the states to which it applied 
given that it subjected those states to international scrutiny of its domestic practices. The 
asymmetrical relations of control institutionalised by the Minority Treaties were justified on the basis 
of the relative fitness of peoples for the responsibilities associated with self-determination. As 
Charles Seymour, head of the Austro-Hungarian Division of the US Commission to Negotiate Peace at 
the conference noted, “new dangers” had been created in the territorial changes: 
 
It is undeniable that a considerable stretch of territory has been Balkanized, that in the place of a co-
ordinating whole we find a group of small states, which by temper and experience are not as yet well 
qualified to meet the contingencies of the future with that moderation and spirit of compromise 
which is essential to tranquillity and progress.
656
 
  
Although in the US, Seymour claimed, people thought “little of the dangers apt to proceed from a 
racial mélange”, in “this part of Europe, if a man speaks a different language from that of his 
neighbor, he becomes almost necessarily his enemy”.657 Despite the imposition of Minority Treaties, 
the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference had enabled the nationalities of the former Austro-
Hungarian empire to “secure their freedom”; in the place of a “semi-feudal system…imposing the 
edicts of hostile minorities upon subject majorities” was “political power granted in accordance with 
popular desires”.658 The Minority Treaties were an example, then of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations imperfectly expressing the Wilsonian ideal of self-mastery, which held that the populations 
of states had “a right to determine their own destiny and their own form of government and their 
own policy”.659 Nonetheless, the reason for this imperfect realisation of the self-government of 
peoples was the result of the imperative to ensure responsible government; the Minority Treaties 
were, then, according to the logic of the Paternalistic Idea an expression of the development of state 
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freedom not its compromise. 
 
The idea that varying ‘tempers and experience’ of different peoples demanded different levels of 
external control was most clearly expressed in the Mandates System of the League of Nations that 
was established in Paris. While certain areas of Europe were granted independence but with 
continued oversight, the extra-European territories of the defeated empires were deemed to require 
even greater asymmetrical relations of control. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
stated that in territories “inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being 
and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation”.660 The “best method” of 
ensuring this development was “that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced 
nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best 
undertake this responsibility”.661  
 
Even within the Mandate System, there was a hierarchy of levels of autonomy; the “character of the 
mandate” differed “according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical 
situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances”.662 The territories 
of the Ottoman Empire were deemed to have “reached a stage of development where their 
existence as independent nations” could “be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of 
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand 
alone”. Central African peoples were “are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible 
for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience 
and religion”. Territories in South-West Africa and the some Pacific islands, meanwhile, were 
deemed “best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory”.663 
While continuing the dependency of these territories, the Mandates System did imply the future 
independence of such peoples once their 'tutelage' from the 'advanced nations' had sufficiently 
progressed. However, this process was understood to be a slow one of evolution, not revolution. 
Although Wilson’s original draft for the Covenant of the League of Nations had explicitly provided for 
the possibility of “territorial readjustments” on the basis of changes in “racial conditions”,664 the final 
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draft of the Covenant had removed all reference to territorial adjustment on the basis of self-
determination.  
 
The Mandates System was an expression of an idea of state freedom that justified a variety of 
relations of control, ranging from, at one extreme, equality between ‘responsible’ states to, at the 
other extreme, formal dependence between those states and peoples that were deemed to lack the 
necessary development for independence. It has been claimed that the post-WWI order had “little 
formal institutional hierarchy”.665 While that claim is debatably accurate with respect to the 
distribution of power between independent states within the League of Nations, hierarchical 
relations of control were, as we have seen, a fundamental element of the Paternalistic Idea of state 
freedom that was dominant in Versailles. That hierarchy manifested itself both in the institutions of 
the League of Nations and the process through which they were created. While the normative ideal 
of the Paternalistic Idea may have been an equality of states and peoples, beliefs about “racial and 
civilizational superiority”666 nonetheless meant hierarchical relations of control permeated 
throughout the Paris Peace Conference and the international order it constituted. Not only did the 
great powers take upon themselves the weight of ‘responsibility’ of constructing the peace, but the 
League of Nations instituted relations of dependency between mandates and mandatory powers. 
However, the Paternalistic Idea did not legitimise license on the part of the Council of Four to dictate 
to smaller states in any way they wished. An important element of the Paternalistic Idea was that 
the control of the more civilised over the less civilised was exercised—in theory at least—in the 
interests of dependent peoples667 and with their (responsible) independence as the ultimate goal. In 
the next section, I show how the justification of the subjugation of peoples in the name of their 
freedom was challenged and ultimately discredited in by anti-colonial states in the forum of the 
United Nations. 
 
 
Self-Determination and decolonisation 
 
We saw in the last section that while the normative goal of the Paternalistic Idea was that states 
should be self-determining and free to live their own life, the necessary conditions for this goal to be 
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realised differed depending on the fitness of a people for self-government. The Paternalistic Idea of 
state freedom legitimised, therefore, both great power management and relations of dependence 
on the grounds that they facilitated the realisation of the freedom of states. As we saw in Chapter 
Four, the Categorical and Civil Ideas of state freedom challenged the notion that the freedom of 
materially weak states could be advanced through the control of the great powers. In these ideas of 
state freedom, the power of large states was associated with the subjugation of the small and was 
threatening to their freedom. Although the Civil Idea provided for a limited inequality of rights in the 
international system, those rights were only granted provided that they furthered the self-mastery 
of small states and that their responsible exercise was ensured by the participation of all states in 
the processes of managing international relations. 
 
When states came together in San Francisco in 1945 to create the UN, the Civil Idea prevailed, 
reconfiguring relations of control between states. The Civil Idea of state freedom did not, however, 
address the extreme inequality between states and dependent peoples that was legitimated by the 
Paternalistic idea; the idea that, for some peoples, freedom could be better realised through 
tutelage than independence endured. In 1945, the population of mandates, colonies and 
protectorates numbered 600 million people,668 and the new international organisation perpetuated 
their dependence in the form of trusteeships and Non-Self-Governing Territories (NSGTs). 
 
Although the delegates of San Francisco did not challenge the racial hierarchies that were expressed 
in world politics through relations of dependency, the creation of the UN was nonetheless a 
significant moment in the development of an idea of state freedom that was incompatible with 
colonialism. As we saw in the previous section, the Mandates System of the League of Nations 
justified the dependency of peoples on the basis that it was in their interest and necessary for the 
development of their fitness for independent statehood. The UN reinforced that justification for 
dependency. The Mandates System was continued in the International Trusteeship System, which 
declared as one of its basic objectives the “progressive development” of the populations of trust 
territories “towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples 
concerned”.669 The Mandates System, however, only applied to the former colonial territories of the 
defeated empires. In San Francisco, the delegates also institutionalised UN oversight of ‘Non-Self-
                                                          
668
 Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian 
Intervention (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 292. 
669
 United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, chap. XII, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml Article 76(b). 
 182 
 
Governing Territories’— “territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government”.670 These NSGTs671 were to be administered in such a way as “to develop self-
government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the 
progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances 
of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement”.672 The UN system, then, 
extended the obligation to promote self-government to the empires that had been untouched by 
World War I and uncompromised by the Paris Peace Conference. In doing so, it implicitly called into 
question the idea that a hierarchy of peoples was a natural and inevitable state of affairs. 
 
A second way in which the San Francisco conference laid the groundwork for a challenge to colonial 
ideas was through the ways in which the Civil Idea of state freedom itself constituted a shift in the 
ideational structure of the international system. As we have seen, the Civil Idea called into question 
the moral superiority of the traditional great powers, emphasising pluralism and the moral 
contribution of small states. At the core of the Civil Idea—and the Categorical Idea before it—was 
the notion that freedom could only grow from within states, rather than be propagated from 
without. Questioning the validity of great power claims to advance the self-mastery of other states 
through relations of domination made it a much shorter leap to make the same claim with respect to 
political communities that had been denied sovereign statehood. Nonetheless, the Civil Idea stopped 
short of making that leap and the core logic of the Paternalistic Idea endured in Trust Territories and 
NSGTs. As Lord Cranborne, a British delegate, argued at San Francisco: “What do these people want? 
They want liberty. Let us give them liberty. They want justice? Let us give them justice…Let us help 
them climb up the rungs of the ladder of self-government”.673  
 
Importantly, the Civil Idea of state freedom did, however, create a forum within which the idea that 
dependency could facilitate freedom could be challenged. As we saw in Chapter Four, one of the 
necessary conditions for the realisation of the self-mastery of states in the Civil Idea is the active 
participation of all states in international governance. In accordance with this requirement, the UN 
system gave plentiful opportunity for existing states to challenge the international system’s on-going 
relations of dependency. In the 1950s, states that had recently gained independence and become 
members of the UN grasped that opportunity, putting forward arguments about self-determination 
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that ushered in a radical reconfiguration of legitimate relations of control in the international 
system, delegitimising colonialism and leading to the collapse of the remaining European empires. 
While there were many elements to this profound shift in the ideational structure of the 
international system,674 here I argue that a change in the prevailing idea of state freedom was 
significant among them. 
 
In the early years of the UN, the settings for debates about self-determination were the negotiations 
to create legally binding provisions enshrining the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The negotiations of these provisions—which would become the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social 
Rights—became a key forum for debate about self-determination after, first, the Soviet Union and, 
subsequently, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia proposed that the Commission on Human Rights should 
consider how to “ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination”.675 The subsequent 
debates about self-determination676 largely centred on the issue of colonialism. In these forums, and 
at the Asia-Africa Conference that was held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, an idea of state freedom 
was identifiable that was incompatible with the notion that the freedom of political communities 
could be advanced through colonialism and dependency. The core of the arguments advanced by 
post-colonial and communist states was an unconditional association of independence with freedom 
and dependency with slavery. Carrying forward the Wilsonian association of states and peoples but 
transforming its implications, the populations of colonial and Trust territories were conceived of as 
distinct political communities that had lost their independence as a result of foreign ‘aggression’. 
Effectively, therefore, dependent peoples were states-in-waiting, whose freedom was being denied, 
not advanced, by on-going dependency. In this idea of state freedom, the state, as an agent, was 
identified with the ‘indigenous’ population of a particular territory, understood in contrast to rulers 
of an ‘alien’ geographical and cultural provenance. The self-mastery of these states-in-waiting 
consisted of the freedom of statehood itself; political independence and freedom from foreign rule. 
It is because the core of this idea of state freedom was the rejection of dependency on alien rule, I 
term it the Independence Idea of state freedom. The necessary condition for the realisation of the 
self-mastery of states was the immediate end to enforced dependency and colonial rule. The 
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Independence Idea of state freedom had radical implications, therefore, for legitimate interstate 
relations of control. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Independence Idea of state freedom was resisted by colonial powers and their 
allies. In the politics of legitimacy regarding colonial relations of dependence that was prompted by 
the Independence Idea of state freedom, conservative powers advanced three main arguments 
pertaining to the freedom of states. The first was to cast doubt on the compatibility of the self-
determination of peoples with the freedom of existing states, either because it implied UN 
interference in the domestic affairs of states, or because it implied the secession of minorities within 
all states, threatening their territorial integrity. The second was to attempt to deflect attention from 
the colonial issue by broadening the scope of self-determination to states themselves, invoking the 
Civil Idea of state freedom and criticising informal Soviet domination. The third notable argument 
about state freedom made by conservative states was a re-articulation of the paternalist logic that 
unconditional independence for political communities was a threat to freedom, rather than its 
expression. Although the traditional justification of civilisation was not prominent, arguments about 
responsibility took a new form, being linked to the fulfilment of human rights. 
 
Human rights were highly prominent in the arguments advanced by colonial states—the right to self-
determination was in part justified as a pre-requisite for the fulfilment of other human rights677—
and the potential for their indigenous repression was a principal axis of debate between recently 
independent states both within the UN and at the Bandung Conference. Ultimately, however, the 
dominant position of anti-colonial states was that this danger had to be accepted because freedom 
was impossible without independence, a position which led to demands for a radical reconfiguration 
of relations of control. 
 
The freedom of statehood and the slavery of ‘sacred trust’ 
 
In the UN debates about self-determination of the 1950s, post-colonial states asserted a historic sea-
change in world opinion regarding the justifications for colonialism and celebrated what they 
claimed to be an unstoppable rise in the desire of colonial subjects for independence. Colonialism 
was repeatedly criticised as a form of “slavery”, and contrasted with the freedom realised through 
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the recognition of a people as an independent state.678 Self-determination meant, it was argued, the 
absence of foreign domination, and was necessary to “prevent weak peoples from being dominated 
by strong”.679 Traditional justifications for colonialism based on the fitness for self-government were 
tackled head on and it was asserted that independence should be granted “as soon as the political 
consciousness of a people had been fully awakened and they had expressed a desire to be free of 
the presence of the alien Power”.680 Dependence did not augment the capacity for self-government, 
rather peoples “could learn to administer their own affairs only when they were given an 
opportunity to do so”.681 Nations that had been “enslaved” were struggling to “regain their lost 
freedom in order to rise to heights which could never be reached in conditions of servitude”.682 
 
The post-colonial states were joined in expressing such sentiments by almost all of the communist 
states and many Latin American states. The representative of the Soviet Union claimed that the 
“time had come for those who still clung to the outworn ideas of colonialism to...realise that the 
world was no longer divided between a master race and all the rest”683, while the Polish 
representative claimed that many countries “knew that freedom of the individual was a snare and a 
delusion as long as the nation of which he was a part was not free”.684 Venezuela also attacked the 
logic of the Paternalist Idea of state freedom, arguing that “the mere fact that a people had 
expressed a desire for self-government should be recognised as sufficient evidence that they were 
ready for it”, and that “no people desired to remain forever in a position of subordination”.685 
 
In attempting to subvert these calls for the independence of all peoples, the European colonial 
powers put forward numerous critiques of a revolutionary approach to the right of self-
determination. Prominent among them was to subordinate the principle of self-determination to the 
goals of peace and stability, thus implicitly casting self-determination as a threat to the Civil Idea of 
state freedom institutionalised in San Francisco. Belgium recalled Hitler's use of the term, hence 
linking the term to the moral horrors and global instability of World War II,686 and the UK stressed 
that self-determination was not as paramount a political principle as the “maintenance of 
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international peace”.687 According to these states, the existing regime of gradual evolution toward 
self-government in accordance with a people’s readiness for it was the optimum means of ensuring 
both self-determination and peace and stability. According to the UK representative, the regime of 
NSGTs and Trusteeships was “in harmony” with the principle of self-determination, which, in any 
case, should not be employed in a way that would “introduce new or perpetuate old elements of 
discord”.688 She also defended the traditional idea of a hierarchy of peoples, emphasising the UN 
Charter's provision “for the promotion of the advancement of peoples 'as may be appropriate to the 
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples'”.689 In the view of the UK, “education and 
the existence of democratic institutions were therefore a prerequisite to the application of the 
principle of self-determination”.  
 
In invoking the ideas about responsibility that composed part of the Paternalistic and Civil Ideas of 
state freedom, the UK representative implied that the discrediting of the existing system risked 
unleashing a dangerous form of freedom: 
 
It must be stressed that there was a danger in separating rights from duties. The exercise of the right 
of one people or one individual to liberty could not be allowed to infringe the liberty of another; if it 
did so, it became an abuse of the right. A people seeking to exercise its right of self-determination 
must take into account its obligations and duties towards its neighbours, or anarchy would result.
690
 
 
It was in this way, via a hierarchical understanding of peoples' readiness for self-government that 
the colonial powers linked self-determination with instability and conflict. It was much wiser, 
therefore, to be faithful to the regime of NSGTs “in which one people carried out, for the benefit of 
another, the sacred trust defined in Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations”.691 This was not 
a denial of freedom, the French delegate asserted, but rather a proper appreciation of what it 
consisted: 
 
Although France had always been in the vanguard of the struggle for political freedoms, and therefore 
whole-heartedly supported to right of peoples to self-determination, it was also aware that the 
progressive development of free political institutions was subject to special conditions in each 
territory and to the varying degrees of development of their populations.
692
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Alongside these arguments of the moral worth of colonialism and the danger to peace and security 
presented by self-determination, sat arguments regarding the rights of existing states. The UK 
representative in the Commission on Human Rights stated he “could not agree to interpret a political 
principle, even one of great moral force, as a human right, and by that means encourage an 
intervention by the United Nations that the Charter, which bound its States Members, forbade”.693 
In the Third Committee, France also rejected the draft resolution on the grounds that it was a 
“fundamental violation of the principle of the equality of all Member States” because it 
discriminated between states administering NSGTs and those not administering them and because it 
made possible “United Nations interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign State”.694 The UK 
argued that the references to “peoples” in the UN Charter were to states and, as such, the Charter 
references to self-determination “would therefore seem to be to the recognition of the sovereignty 
of sovereign states and the obligation of such States to respect the sovereignty of other states”.695 
Belgium asserted that it came down to a state being “master of its own affairs” and that the “subject 
of internal self-determination was the nation already constituted, the State”. The colonial powers 
were arguing, then, that colonial territories were an integral part of the state. For the UN to 
interfere with them was for it to engage in the kind of violation of the self-mastery of states that was 
agreed in San Francisco to be illegitimate.  
 
The self-determination of states and the Civil Idea of state freedom 
 
As it became clear that the issue of self-determination would not be swept under the carpet, the 
main vein of debate in the Third Committee and the Commission on Human Rights came to focus on 
the scope of self-determination. Proclaimed in the UN Charter to be a universal principle applicable 
to all ‘peoples’, colonial states pushed for the recognition of that universality in any reference to 
self-determination in UN human rights instruments. This was a tactical move designed to raise the 
thorny issue of ethnic minorities—a problem for many states that were not colonial powers—in 
order to discourage the inclusion of self-determination in the Covenants. Other representatives 
argued that self-determination also applied to independent states that were subject to the informal 
domination of other states. In a reflection of the Cold War battle-lines that were drawn in this 
period, communist states pushed for the linking of self-determination and colonialism, the US and its 
allies invoked the Civil Idea of state freedom and the right of states to determine their own destiny. 
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For the newly independent, post-colonial states, the most pressing application of the right to self-
determination was to peoples that did not have formal independence. According to them, any article 
on self-determination in the Covenants ought to recognise its primary applicability to NSGTs—
peoples who, under the UN Charter, were categorised as having “not yet attained a full measure of 
self-government”. 
 
At the Sixth Session of the Third Committee of the General Assembly, the Belgian representative 
made a speech that was in many respects typical of the “offensive” tactics of the European colonial 
powers and their allies as it became clear that the challenge to the old structure of international 
relations would be sustained.696 In it, he criticised the employment of the self-determination clause 
“in a negative sense, as a weapon for use against the colonial Powers”.697 In a thinly veiled criticism 
of the Soviet Union and its allies, he incorporated a broader constellation of rights into the meaning 
of self-determination, claiming that “*s+ome of the representatives who had expatiated most 
eloquently on the necessity of introducing various rights into the covenant disregarded the fact that 
in their own countries certain political parties were forbidden, religious groups were suppressed and 
the right of habeas corpus was non-existent”.698 He went on to invoke the thorny issue of minorities, 
stating that “the right of self-determination was also being advocated by countries in which national 
minorities were oppressed and where the right of secession did not exist”.699 “It was impossible”, he 
claimed, “to speak of the right of self-determination without also providing for the right of 
secession”, before asserting that the provision of self-determination ought to be made “conditional 
on the degree of political maturity prevailing in the country concerned”.700 The linking of self-
determination conceptually to potential problem issues for non-colonial states, and the assertion 
that self-determination was not a right held automatically by all peoples but rather conditional on 
their readiness were both frequent rhetorical moves by colonial states such as Belgium, France and 
the UK. 
 
In the Eighth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, the Lebanese representative, responding 
to a further Belgian reference to minorities, claimed that the Belgian representative “had given the 
impression that the main purpose of the right to self-determination was to promote that right in 
relation to minorities within countries”. The issue of minorities, however, was according to the 
Lebanese representative primarily one for European states, while the states that had “raised the 
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question in the General Assembly”—leading to self-determination being examined by the 
Commission—“were not European”. “It was therefore understandable”, in his opinion, “that the 
pivot of the whole problem was not the position of minorities, but that of countries that lost their 
independence as a result of aggression. The main issue was that of the Non-Self-Governing 
Territories”.701 
 
The back-and-forth over the scope of self-determination was a common refrain in the discussions 
regarding the Covenants. In the Seventh Session of the Third Committee, for example, the 
representative of New Zealand claimed that there were “oppressed minorities and indeed whole 
nations, to whose peoples the right of self-determination was denied, and which enjoyed none of 
the protection conferred by the Charter of the United Nations upon the inhabitants of Non-self-
Governing and Trust Territories”. In addition, there were “also many backward peoples who, 
through an accident of geography, lived within the borders of a metropolitan State and whose living 
conditions were no better than those of the inhabitants of Non-self-Governing Territories. Surely 
those two categories of peoples were”, he opined, “more deserving of special attention”.702  
 
Beyond the question of minorities, the self-mastery of states as understood in the Civil Idea of state 
freedom was also a prominent vein of argumentation. As we saw in Chapter Four, in the Civil Idea a 
state was self-mastering when it was free to set its own direction without the interference of other 
states. While in San Francisco, that idea was promoted principally by materially weaker states in 
order to guard against the domination of the great powers, in the various forums of the United 
Nations, it was used as a rhetorical tool used by colonial powers and their supporters to help sever 
the necessary link the anti-colonial states had asserted between independence and freedom.  
 
The UK noted that “self-determination was a universal principle”, applicable “not only to the peoples 
of dependent territories but also to the peoples of metropolitan territories and of some other 
nations which, like certain countries of central Europe, were theoretically independent but in fact 
controlled by another state”.703 According to the UK representatives, it was not only the populations 
of NSGTs that had “no control over their destinies”.704 In fact, “the peoples in dependent territories 
were far more free than the independent and sovereign peoples of many Member States”.705 The UK 
continued to reject the unconditional association between independence and freedom, arguing that 
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“real freedom” was rooted in “education, trained administrators and the general ability of the body 
politics to absorb and make effective use of modern techniques. It was not enough to strive towards 
total independence regardless of its nature. The only worthwhile goal was good independence”.706 
The UK then linked the anti-colonial argument to pernicious communist manipulation, linking it to 
those who had “a vested interest in propagating slavery by the simple method of calling it 
freedom”.707 
 
The US expanded on the argument that an important application of the principle of self-
determination was to states that were being denied their freedom through “political subjugation” to 
a powerful neighbouring state.708 Although self-determination should be applied “progressively” to 
dependent peoples, it was “deplorable that one country, which posed as the champion of the 
colonial peoples, would be pursuing imperialist aims and extending its domination over territories 
beyond its frontiers”.709 The US also hinted that Soviet-sponsored agitation within states was a 
danger to their self-mastery; self-determination was also applicable to “peoples currently self-
governing but living under the constant threat of foreign imperialism, which was striving to bring 
about their disintegration from within as well as form without by aggravating their difficulties”.710 
States needed to be protected from “external pressure, threat, the use of force and subversive 
activities”.711 It was only through this protection, and through the exercise of self-determination 
“with proper regard for the rights of other States and peoples”712 that “the desire of every people to 
determine its own destiny free from dictation or control by others” could be realised.713 
 
In the wake of the Tito-Stalin split, similar calls for the self-mastery of states of the Civil Idea were 
made by Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav representative claimed that “small nations were the prey of other 
States’ aggressive designs” and that “although Yugoslavia had won its independence at enormous 
price…it had to defend itself against external pressure of all kinds”.714 Self-determination was a right 
that “belonged to both NSGTs and sovereign peoples as long as their independence could be 
threatened by other States”.715 
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Latin American states also continued their tradition of advocacy of states’ right to be self-mastering 
in the sense of being able to live their own lives without the domination of other states. The Mexican 
representative argued that states “should view the principle of the right of self-determination of 
peoples in its highest sociological sense, as affecting not only dependent peoples but all the peoples 
of the world”. He argued that there “were many independent peoples in the contemporary world 
which were not yet complete masters of their destiny and there were others which were threatened 
with the loss of their freedom”.716 Self-determination did not stop at political independence, but was 
rather the right of a state to enjoy “genuine sovereignty”; the “exercise of self-determination in the 
“political, economic, social and cultural fields”, and the “power to dispose of its own natural 
resources and to preserve and develop its cultural heritage”.717 Following independence, “the 
resulting entity possessed an inviolable and indivisible personality with its own constitution and 
institutions. It was a principle of international law that States must be taken as they were; self-
determination, once exercised, had to be respected”.718 
 
Latin American states feared that as “the domination *colonial powers+ had once exercised” was 
“slipping from their grasp”, their self-mastery was at risk from a “subtler and much more dangerous 
form” of colonialism—that of “economic domination by international capital”.719 The linking of self-
determination with economic independence and a state's control over its own resources was the 
main thrust of Latin American contributions to the debates on self-determination, and Chile was 
successful in adding a clause to the Covenants that covered the freedom of peoples to “freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources”. Chile had argued that a “sovereign people should be 
free to exercise its sovereign rights in every sphere and to dispose freely of its own natural 
resources. A country could be a political as well as an economic satellite, and the United Nations 
should help all States to free themselves from such servitude” (CHR8th p49). It was a clear that the 
majority view among Latin American states was that “in internal affairs, the peoples and nations had 
an absolute right to self-determination, which included the right to choose their own form of 
government and sovereignty over their natural resources”.720 By gaining international recognition of 
the right of states over their natural resources, the Latin American states were successful in 
buttressing and extending the realm of the self-mastery of states of the Civil Idea of state freedom. 
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The conservative states successfully broadened the debate about self-determination to include 
states as a referent object and the Latin American states successfully gained recognition for states’ 
right over their natural resources. This broadening of the debate did not mean, however, that 
communist and post-colonial states relented in their assertion of a link between independence and 
freedom or their claim that dependent peoples were in special need of self-determination. The 
Indonesian representative claimed “the crux of the question” to be “not the position of minorities, 
but that of countries which had lost their independence as the result of aggression”. It was 
“perfectly clear” to the representative that “the peoples concerned were the inhabitants of colonies 
administered by foreign peoples, absolutely different in race, culture and geographical habitat”, and 
that “steps should be taken as soon as possible to give those peoples their freedom”.721 In the same 
meeting the representative of the Soviet Union claimed it to be “obvious that the principle of self-
determination of peoples had to be applied first in the colonies, the peoples of which had long been 
fighting for independence”.722 Syria, likewise, saw the “the awakening of subject peoples” as “one of 
the main characteristics of the twentieth century” and interpreted self-determination as principally 
applying to “the peoples which had not enjoyed the right to self-determination at the time of the 
drafting of the Charter, that is, the peoples of the Non-self-Governing Territories and Trust 
Territories”.723 He later stated that “its first application must be to the populations of Non-Self-
Governing Territories”, and that they “should therefore be mentioned expressly” in the covenants.724 
 
Apart from the early tactical arguments by colonial powers, the application of self-determination to 
ethnic minorities and the concomitant right to secession was consistently rejected by almost every 
state. According to the anti-colonialist states, however, colonial peoples were victims of aggression 
subjected to rule that was alien both geographically and sociologically. Hence colonial territories 
were not integral parts of existing states, but rather states-in-waiting that were being denied even 
the basic freedom of statehood. In order to defend colonial relations of dependence, colonial 
powers and their allies argued against the special application of self-determination to dependent 
peoples on two principal grounds. First, they attempted to weaken the link between independence 
and freedom by invoking the Civil Idea of state freedom and criticising informal domination of the 
Soviet Union over the affairs of satellite communist states. Second, they reasserted the link between 
colonial ‘tutelage’ and freedom, asserting the need for ‘real freedom’ and ‘good independence’ 
rather than the insidious domination of the Soviet Union that would surely await peoples if they 
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were cast adrift from their ‘sacred trust’. Neither of these arguments, however, enjoyed much 
legitimacy in the eyes of the anti-colonial states.  
 
Self-determination and human rights 
 
The link between human rights and self-determination was made repeatedly in the UN throughout 
the 1950s. As noted above, it was in debates about the International Covenants that discussion 
about self-determination was first raised. As well as the setting, however, human rights also 
provided an important justification for the self-determination of peoples. As Roland Burke has put it: 
“*a+lthough national independence was the highest priority *for the anticolonial bloc], conventional 
human rights were almost always the central justification for recognition of a right to self-
determination”.725 Christian Reus-Smit has shown that it was by “grafting” the right of self-
determination to nascent human rights norms, and reasserting self-determination in “universal 
terms” that they “undermined the foundations of empire”.726 Even in the early debates in the United 
Nations, the tight relationship between self-determination and other human rights was repeatedly 
emphasised. In the Sixth Session of the Third Committee (1951), the Lebanese representative 
claimed that the “further people progressed towards self-determination the more they would 
respect human rights and vice versa”.727 In the Seventh Session, the representative of Pakistan 
affirmed that individual rights and self-determination “complimented each other”; in the NSGTs 
human beings were being discriminated against with respect to laws and the exercise of “political, 
economic, social and cultural rights on grounds of race, colour, religion or national origin”, he 
argued. “Such discrimination could be ended” he concluded, “only if a people was master of its own 
destiny”.728 In the same session, the Indonesian representative claimed self-determination to be a 
“fundamental condition of the exercise of other human rights”. In the Commission on Human Rights, 
representatives from newly independent member states went beyond merely linking the realisation 
of collective and individual rights, and explicitly referenced threats to self-determination from both 
informal foreign domination and domestic authoritarianism. In the Commission's Eighth Session, 
Lebanon noted that there were “peoples deprived by their own government of an opportunity to 
manage their own affairs” and that “national governments were imposed on some peoples by 
foreign rule”.729 The Indian representative stated that if the right to self-determination “meant the 
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right of peoples to decide for themselves in political, social economic and cultural matters, it could 
be averred that such a right was recognised in every truly democratic State and that it was only in 
the totalitarian States and in countries subjected to a colonial regime that it did not exist”.730 
 
The former colonial peoples were not the only states in the UN to make an association between 
human rights, democracy and self-determination. Uruguay, for example, argued that limiting self-
determination would “deprive other rights of reality”.731 Mexico claimed it to be “essential to the 
exercise of individual rights”, arguing “the rights of the group necessarily supported and safeguarded 
the rights of the individual”. Therefore, “the right of self-determination of peoples was both the 
basis of, and derived from, individual human rights”.732 In the Third Committee, the Costa Rican 
representative lamented the Committee's neglect of the aspect of self-determination that pertained 
to “peoples living under the yoke of a domestic dictatorship”. “There were peoples”, she noted, 
“both in the eastern and in the western hemisphere, which were subjected to a regime of domestic 
tyranny”.733 
 
Once the justification for self-determination on the basis of human rights, it became easier to argue 
that the right to self-determination ought to be a conditional right. In terms recalling the arguments 
about responsibility made by American Delegates at the Havana International Conference of 
American States, the US representative Eleanor Roosevelt argued:  
 
 [Just] as the concept of individual liberty carried to its logical extreme would mean anarchy, so the 
principle of self-determination given unrestricted application could only result in chaos. Human rights 
and the rights of peoples could find their fullest expression only in the context of responsibility.
734 
 
Although Roosevelt acknowledged “the desire of every people to determine its own destiny, free 
from dictation or control by others” to be “one of the most deep-seated of all human feelings”,735 
that goal “could not be applied absolutely or rigidly”.736 Roosevelt also linked self-determination 
with democracy: 
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Self-determination is a process. It is in essence a process of democracy as contrasted with the process 
of dictation in any society developed or underdeveloped. It is, as has been said by other speakers, a 
process which involves responsibilities as well as rights. It is the process by which people develop their 
own laws and provide their own justice. This means not merely the right to compose a code of law, 
nor even the actual writing of a code; it also means general agreement to abide by the laws in the 
interests of society as a whole, even though one's individual or group freedoms are thereby limited.
737
 
 
The repeated links made between human rights, democracy and self-determination by the US and 
other states738 were not dismissed out of hand by the post-colonial states. In fact, as Burke has 
noted, there was a notable debate within the post-colonial bloc as to whether self-determination 
was achieved through “democracy” or through “sovereignty”.739 This was a debate that had 
significant implications for ideas of state freedom; a strong association between self-determination 
and democracy would challenge the pluralism of the Independence Idea of state freedom, and 
would imply a direct association of the agency of the state with its population.   
 
The different stances within the anti-colonial states on this issue were revealed in Bandung in 1955, 
when 29 states from Asia and Africa—many of which had only recently gained independence—came 
together for a landmark international conference to promote cooperation and oppose colonialism. 
The language of anti-colonialism was pervasive at the conference, with the formal imperialism of 
European powers consistently and unreservedly criticised. The speeches of delegates were replete 
with calls for the “freedom” of colonial and trusteeship territories at the “earliest date possible”.740 
“Freedom and independence” appeared as a couplet in the language of the delegates throughout 
their addresses.741 Alongside this talk of freedom mingled the language of human rights,742 with 
almost half of the delegates mentioning human rights in their opening addresses to the 
conference.743 
 
The connection between individual rights and self-determination that delegates made at Bandung 
was put under strain by the presence of communist China. The pronounced differences in 
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interpretations of individual freedom between socialist and non-socialist states had already been in 
evidence in the UN debates on self-determination, and such differences showed again in Bandung. 
The Vietnamese delegation referred to the “menaces of dictatorial Communism”,744 and the Iraqi 
delegation lamented that under “communist domination” the “cries of pain” of “subjugated 
peoples” were not “permitted to be heard”.745 The criticism of communism prompted the Indian 
delegate Jawaharlal Nehru to advocate a limited understanding of self-determination that remained 
blind to the domestic situations within states. With remarkable frankness he argued: 
 
If we look at this question in its entirety...and impartially, and if we examine the state of freedom, the 
state of individual or national freedom, the state of democratic liberty or democracy itself in the 
countries represented here, well, I feel many of us are lacking, terribly lacking...If we sit down and 
discuss these matters in all integrity in its entirety then we shall have to go very far and discuss how 
far countries represented here fulfil that noble standard which we laid down yesterday in the human 
rights or even the ordinary tenets of democracy and freedom.
746
 
 
This intervention by Nehru, prompted by criticism of communism, exposed the tensions lurking 
behind the happy references to the mutually reinforcing relationship between self-determination 
and individual rights. Nehru's desire to side-step the delicate issue of individual freedom was not 
shared by all states represented at the conference. The Filipino delegate Carlos Romulo—who had 
been a participant in the negotiations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—delivered a 
sustained exposition of the relationship between individual freedom and its relationship to national 
political freedom. He rhetorically questioned whether “the struggle for national independence” was 
“the struggle to substitute a local oligarchy for the foreign oligarchy”,747 “replacing foreign tyranny 
by domestic tyranny”.748 For Romulo, “autocratic rule, control of the press and the police state” 
were “exactly the worst features of some colonialist systems”. The struggle for freedom, according 
to Romulo, was as “unending, constant, unremitting demand” and that, in the Philippines they were 
“seeking to build” “a society in which the freedom of our Republic will truly become the freedom of 
every one of its citizens”.749 
 
The references to communism at Bandung did not only cast light on the differences between the 
delegates with respect to the relationship between states and their domestic populations, it also 
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demonstrated that many of the former colonial states were also concerned about the potential for 
international communist influence to compromise the freedom of states. The opinions expressed by 
delegates at Bandung echoed those put forward by the US and other states in the UN. Despite the 
presence of Communist China at Bandung and the aim of promoting cooperation at the conference, 
the Ceylonese delegate—Prime Minister John Kotelawala—nonetheless explicitly linked communist 
states and colonialism. He asserted that there was “another form of colonialism” alongside formal 
empire. He urged the delegates: 
 
Think, for example, of those satellite States under Communist domination in Central and Eastern 
Europe—of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and 
Poland. Are not these colonies as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa or Asia? And if we 
are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition 
to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?
750
 
 
Although Nehru replied denying that it made sense to talk of states whose independence had been 
recognised through membership of the UN as colonies, Kotelawala's position was supported by 
numerous other states. Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon reaffirmed the Ceylonese position, and 
Kotelawala recalls being “mobbed and congratulated by all” that evening, for the “service” he had 
done with his speech.751 
 
 Kotelawala’s direct reference to colonialism was controversial in the Bandung context, but his 
linking of the informal hierarchy between socialist states to colonialism was an example of a 
common move by the states at Bandung (and their representatives in the UN);752 to link self-
determination with the substantive, as well as formal, independence of states in a way consistent 
with the Civil Idea of state freedom. As Burke notes, alongside the frequent rights talk at Bandung, 
“non-interference and respect for state sovereignty were almost an obsession” for the leaders and 
other delegates. The emergence of post-colonial states was linked with a transcendence of power 
politics and a rejection of the privilege of the “Big Powers” to “decide of the destiny of other 
countries”.753 The Syrian opening speech was typical of this view, emphasising the “co-existence of 
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diversities”, meaning “a State is free to live its own way—free from intimidation, subversion and 
domination”. This co-existence should not be limited to the “big five”, however: 
 
Each and every state, no matter how small, is sovereign in its territory, sovereign over its people and 
sovereign in formulating its own policy without any pressure or intimidation by any stronger state. 
Our affairs, internal or external are ours. As small states, we refuse to be dominated or led this way or 
that. The choice is ours and we shall resist any intervention with all the resources at our command. 
This is how we understand co-existence.
754
 
 
This pluralist vision of international relations—based on the fundamental principles of sovereign 
equality and non-intervention—was contrasted with great power privilege and its concomitant 
denial of self-determination through colonialism. It was not only traditional colonialism that was a 
threat to states' mastery of their own fates, however. Despite the “retreat of colonialism”, “new 
forms of attempt to the sovereignty and freedom of peoples” had appeared: 
 
Where sword and guns are too dangerous to use any more, various invisible and deceiving weapons 
are tried. The more subtle aggressors of our times found new ways to achieve their aims re-inventing 
colonialism under new forms. Subversion, infiltration, economic or political interference under 
ideological disguises are thus the modern by-products of agonizing colonialism.
755
 
 
In opening address of the conference, President Sukarno of Indonesia had warned: 
 
Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual 
physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, 
and it appears in many guises.
756 
 
A similar rejection of interference with the “way of life” of other states and their “pattern of 
government” was linked to the threat of a “new and more insidious form of imperialism that 
masquerades in the guise of liberation” was made by Pakistan.757 Libya spoke against “any attempt 
to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, and to force upon her, whether openly or 
secretly, a different way of life or system of government”. This kind of interference, “whatever its 
source might be”, would be “but another kind of colonialism”.758 The Independence Idea exhibited, 
                                                          
754
 Ibid., 126. 
755
 Iran in ibid., 79. 
756
 Ibid., 23. 
757
 Ibid., 109. 
758
 Ibid., 103. 
 199 
 
then, the same idea of self-mastery as the Civil Idea and the Categorical Idea before it. Unlike those 
ideas of state freedom, however, the Independence Idea broadened the understanding of the agent 
to which that freedom was applicable, including colonial peoples; states-in-waiting that had been 
wrongfully denied their sovereignty by aggression. 
 
There were, of course, tensions and inconsistencies in the positions of the delegates. As we have 
already seen, the Filipino advocacy of democracy and human rights would not sit easily with the 
emphasis on state self-determination. Even within single delegations, evidence of two different, and 
potentially conflicting, positions was discernible. In the opening speech of Egypt, Prime Minister 
Gamal Abdel Nasser stated one of five “essential” conditions for peace was the “full respect by all 
states of their international obligations”, which he went on to link to human rights and international 
judgement on states' traditionally 'domestic' affairs: 
 
Under the Charter of the United Nations and the universal declaration of human rights the treatment 
by any state of any national or ethnic group has ceased to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction as 
certain states still advocate. It has become a question of international jurisdiction and a matter of 
world concern. Discrimination in any of its forms does not only constitute violation of state 
obligations, it impairs friendly relations among nations.
759
 
 
Nasser went on to criticise the regime in South Africa for its “racial discrimination”, before 
concluding by stating two “fundamental principles” to guide international cooperation: 
 
First: Every country has the duty to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of every 
other country and also to refrain from intervention in the affairs of other countries. 
 
Second: Every country has the right to choose freely its political as well as economic systems
760
. 
 
Alongside the references to rights, rejection of racial discrimination within states, and the fears 
voiced with respect to the potential for domestic tyranny, then, the delegates at Bandung 
articulated a strongly pluralist position that rejected interference with ways of life or systems of 
government within independent states. They proclaimed this mode of interaction both for relations 
between themselves—Indonesian President Sukarno called for “the 'Live and let live' principle and 
the 'Unity in Diversity' motto” to be the “unifying force” among the states present—and with 
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respect to other states. The Philippines was in a minority at Bandung in stressing the potential 
tensions between national independence and individual freedom, a trend which continued in the UN 
debates on self-determination that proceeded Bandung. The Philippines, making arguments 
reminiscent of those of US representatives,761 was consistent in questioning whether the right to 
self-determination was best served by unchecked sovereign power; in the 12th Session of the 
General Assembly Third Committee, the Filipino representative at the UN asked, in a move bordering 
on heresy, “whether colonial peoples were not happier under the rule of an enlightened Power 
which had accepted specific obligations towards them than under a dictatorship of their own 
people”.762 
 
Many of the other states that had been present at Bandung made it clear that they felt self-
determination pertained to specifically foreign domination—both formal and informal—rather than 
the domestic arrangements of independent states. The Syrian delegate again tightly linked freedom, 
self-determination and sovereignty, rejecting the identification of self-determination with self-
government, asserting that it rather “meant complete sovereign independence”. He stated that Syria 
would “interpret any provision of the covenants relating to self-determination in the sense of 
independence, since the aim of such a provision should be to enable the dependent peoples to free 
themselves from all forms of political, social and economic subjection”.763 The delegate went on to 
describe self-determination as a “purely colonial issue”, and claim it to be “the solemn duty of the 
United Nations, as an institution of free States, to promote the attainment of freedom, and not to 
perpetuate slavery by condoning the activities of France and other colonial Powers in Africa and 
Asia”.764 He went onto equate self-determination with rule by a non-alien sovereign power: 
 
[T]he theory of sovereignty was based on the free, and not the enslaved society. The government 
was, theoretically, the servant of the people, who held the real authority; but that was not true of a 
subjugated people, since authority remained in the hands of their alien rulers....the theory of 
sovereignty was therefore equivalent to the theory of self-determination. Unfortunately, the colonial 
Powers had confused the concept of the sovereign with that of the landowner.
765
 
 
In the Third Committee's 12th Session, the Saudi Arabian representative also emphasised the link 
between alien domination and the violation of self-determination, arguing that the right “implied 
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that it was wrong for a country, nation or people to subdue another country, nation or people”.766 In 
the same session, Iraq explicitly distinguished self-determination from “political liberty”, the latter 
being “an individual right exercised within a sovereign State”.767 In the 13th Session, the Iranian 
representative was one of many throughout the debates that denied the right to secession, arguing 
for the primacy of sovereign rights. He asserted that self-determination “must not be used to 
undermine a sovereign Power's rights over its territory and national resources”.768 India reinforced 
the importance of state rights, arguing that it was “quite obvious” there were “limitations” to the 
right to self-determination of peoples, “in particular in the idea of national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and in the rights of States under international law”.769 
 
The distinction the anti-colonial states made between individual rights and the right to self-
determination did not necessarily mean that they were unconcerned with individual liberties or 
democracy. It did show, however, a prominent fear that making the right to independence 
conditional was a sure way to open the door to the domination of strong states over weaker and a 
new form of subjection. The normative dilemma was captured by the Pakistani delegate in the UN 
Third Committee: 
 
True, some peoples might be in danger of exchanging one master for another if they fought for self-
determination; but their awareness of the right to equality among States, particularly of the equality 
of small and large States, had progressed so far that no power on earth was any longer capable of 
impeding their right to self-determination. To deny that right would be the greatest possible help to 
any aggressor bent on world domination.
770
 
 
The position of the young African, Asian and Middle Eastern states on self-determination was 
fractured between a minority conception that emphasised the political liberty of the individual 
(articulated most strongly by the Philippines), and a conception that emphasised both the swift end 
of formal colonialism and also the on-going self-mastery of sovereign states guaranteed through 
sovereign equality and non-interference (as exemplified by the Syria and India). Even this majority 
interpretation was articulated through a prominent linking of state independence and individual 
rights, but the importance of the latter was not sufficient to justify the continued denial of 
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sovereignty to colonial peoples, or interference in newly independent states.  It was the 
unconditional granting of the freedom of statehood to dependent peoples that made the 
Independence Idea of state freedom radical. The understanding of what self-mastery meant for 
sovereign states in the Independence Idea was consistent with that of the Civil Idea; states were self-
mastering if they were able to determine their own ways of life without the domination of other 
states. The contestation over self-determination in the UN was a struggle over which political 
communities that self-mastery was applicable to. The Civil Idea limited the scope of that self-
mastery to existing sovereign states, leaving unchallenged the Paternalistic Idea’s hierarchical 
understanding of peoples. The Independence Idea met this notion head on, rejecting the notion that 
the freedom of any people could be realised through enforced dependence. Over the course of the 
1950s, anti-colonial states repeatedly used their voice in international affairs (which the Civil Idea of 
state freedom afforded all states) in order to make the argument for freedom through statehood 
and delegitimise the vestiges of the Paternalistic Idea. In winning that argument, the anti-colonial 
states comprehensively delegitimised the relations of dependence that were inherent in colonialism 
and played a crucial role in the collapse of the institution of empire. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have used debates about self-determination to explore how ideas of state freedom 
have been implicated in configurations of relations of dependence in the international system. My 
analysis has focused on two historical moments. First, I examined the attempt to reconstruct 
international order following World War I and the place that ideas of state freedom had in Wilsonian 
thinking. Second, I analysed debates about self-determination that took place in the UN in the 
1950s, detailing the role ideas of state freedom played in arguments against colonialism and the 
arguments that were made to resist them.  
 
In the first section I identified Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about self-determination with the 
Paternalistic Idea of state freedom first encountered in Chapter Three. I showed that Wilson held as 
an ideal the notion that all states should be equal, and free to determine their own way of life 
without the domination of others. The state was associated with its people and the basic normative 
tenet of Wilson’s thinking was that people should be self-governing. In theory, this delegitimised 
hierarchical relations of control between states. A fundamental element of the Paternalistic Idea of 
state freedom, however, was the notion, rooted in ideas of racial hierarchy, that not all peoples had 
 203 
 
equally achieved the capacity for self-government. What the ‘consent of the governed’ or ‘self-
determination’ meant for a political community was, therefore, variable. The self-mastery of a state 
whose population was unprepared for independence would be better realised under the tutelage of 
a more advanced state. The necessary condition for the realisation of state freedom was, therefore, 
that the most advanced nations took the responsibility to nurture civilisation in the less advanced.  
 
The influence of these ideas was visible at the Paris Peace Conference, both in the decisions made at 
the conference and the processes by which they were made. At Versailles, the leaders of the four 
victorious big powers met in private to redraw the political map of the world. The dominant 
understanding at Versailles was, however, that they were doing so not in their own self-interest but 
in the interest of the political communities whose fates they were determining. The justification was 
that they took on the responsibility of decision-making not because they could, but because they 
ought to do so. The hierarchical dimension of the Paternalistic Idea justified both this great power 
primacy and the continued practice of ‘tutelage’ in the form of the Mandates System and the 
colonial empires of the victorious powers. 
 
In the second section I detailed how the relations of dependency that were legitimated by the 
Paternalistic Idea (and perpetuated by the Civil Idea of state freedom at the San Francisco 
Conference) were challenged by the Independence Idea of state freedom. I showed how anti-
colonial states used UN forums to contest the idea that the freedom of peoples could be realised 
through dependence, arguing that the freedom of statehood was applicable to all political 
communities regardless of their level of ‘advancement’. The Independence Idea of state freedom 
held the same idea of state mastery as the Civil Idea; self-mastery meant the freedom of states to 
set their own direction without the domination of other states. Where it differed from the Civil Idea 
was in rejecting the ideas about racial superiority and inferiority the Civil Idea had inherited from the 
Paternalistic Idea. As a result, rather than understanding colonial peoples as wards, the 
Independence Idea conceived of them as political communities that had lost their independence 
through an act of aggression and that were now being held in bondage. For the freedom of states to 
be realised across the international system, therefore, it was necessary to end the practice of 
peoples being ruled by political authorities of alien racial and geographic provenance. As these ideas 
became dominant, they altered the perception of legitimate relations of control between states and 
contributed to the process of delegitimising relations of dependence. In this way, the Independence 
Idea of state freedom was implicated in the most significant transformation of the configuration of 
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political authority of the 20th century; the collapse of empire and the spread of sovereignty to a 
global scale. 
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Conclusion 
 
The central concept of this thesis—state freedom—is given scant consideration by theorists of 
international relations. The limited amount of scholarly work to have addressed state freedom has 
focused almost exclusively on the early modern period and even within that small body of research 
sustained conceptual reflection is uncommon. The reason for this vacuum of research on state 
freedom is easy to guess; from the late eighteenth century onward, the terminology of state 
freedom is conspicuous by its absence from the practical discourse of international relations. World 
politics is saturated with discussion of the state in terms that resonate with freedom—independence 
or sovereignty, for example—but explicit reference to the liberty or freedom of states is rare. That 
was not always the case. As I showed in Chapter Two, conceptions of the freedom of states played 
an important role in the theoretical development of the modern state. Further state freedom was 
not restricted to the vocabulary of theorists. As the state emerged as a political entity distinct from 
transnational forms of authority, the preservation of its ‘liberty’ became a significant political value, 
implicated in the development of the balance of power as an ordering mechanism of European 
relations. 
 
The principal claim made throughout this thesis is that the recession of the terminology of state 
freedom from the discourse of international relations does not mean ideas of state freedom have 
been absent. I have shown that although they have been implicit, ideas of state freedom have 
continued to evolve and condition international relations in important ways. In order to support that 
claim, in Chapter Two I made a theoretical argument about the relationship between terminology 
and ideas and addressed the methodological challenge of identifying implicit ideas of state freedom. 
I argued that discussions of freedom have tended to be about the necessary conditions for an agent 
to realise its self-mastery. The elements of i) agents, ii) the normative goal of self-mastery and iii) 
necessary conditions together constitute a grammar of debate about freedom which I employed in 
later chapters to guide my historical investigation. Having outlined my approach to what ideas of 
state freedom are about, I went on to make a theoretical argument about what those ideas do in 
international relations. Drawing on constructivist approaches to understanding the role of ideas in 
world politics, I argued that ideas of state freedom constitute part of the ideational structure of the 
international system. The core of this claim is that prevailing ideas of state freedom are shared, or 
intersubjective, ideas which have a mutually constitutive relationship with the human agents that 
are engaged in international politics. By holding particular beliefs about state freedom, and by 
behaving in accordance with them, human agents produce and reproduce dominant ideas of state 
freedom. They do so, however, embedded in a pre-existing ideational context (or structure), which 
 206 
 
conditions their cognitive and behavioural horizons. In this way, ideational structures can both 
constrain agents’ behaviour and shape their identities and interests. 
 
The area of international politics where these dynamics can be seen to play out, I argued, is in the 
politics of legitimate inter-state relations of control. Different conceptions of state freedom permit 
or proscribe different configurations of relations of control. Ideas of state freedom are implicated, 
therefore, in the contestation that surrounds the ways in which states exert control and influence 
over one another. It is through this politics of legitimate relations of control that human agents are 
confronted with intersubjective ideas of state freedom. It is also the process through which they can 
be challenged, adapted and transformed. These moments of contestation are also the moments at 
which ideas of state freedom are defended and justified, and where their relationship with other 
ideas and principles is articulated. Ultimately, it is through the politics of legitimate relations of 
control that ideas of state freedom intersect with practice.  
 
In Chapters Three to Five I provided historical support for this theoretical argument, reconstructing 
moments of debate about ideas of state freedom and showing how they were implicated in 
contestation over configurations of relations of control between states. The historical analyses I 
undertook were structured by three concepts: non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-
determination. Debates surrounding these principles are examples of the discourses into which 
ideas of state freedom were absorbed as the terminology of state freedom dropped out of the 
international lexicon. They are also important loci of contestation about legitimate relations of 
control and allowed me to explore those relations along three axes: relations of domination, 
relations of authority and relations of dependency. 
 
Chapter Three focused on two historical moments of contestation over the principle of non-
intervention; the Concert of Europe in the early 19th century and debates in the Americas around the 
turn of the 20th century. In post-Napoleonic Europe I identified two ideas of state freedom; the 
Dynastic Idea and the Self-Help Idea. The Dynastic Idea was identifiable in the arguments made by 
and doctrines associated with the states of the Holy Alliance—Austria, Prussia and Russia. The state, 
for the Holy Alliance, was conceived of as being embodied in the person of the dynastically 
legitimated sovereign. States were self-mastering, therefore, if they had control over their domestic 
population. For the freedom of states to be realised, the dynastic sovereign order had to be 
maintained and preserved in the face of popular unrest across Europe. The Dynastic Idea 
legitimated, therefore, a joint commitment to military intervention wherever the ‘popular principle’ 
 207 
 
created turbulence for the traditional order.  This idea of state freedom existed in uneasy tension 
with the Self-Help Idea that was held by Great Britain. For Britain, the state was an individual moral 
order, each possessing its own characteristics and unique will. For this impersonal state to be self-
mastering, it had to be self-reliant; its action had to be determined by its will, unhindered by general 
commitment to, or the dictation of, other states. Although the British position within the Concert of 
Europe is often characterised as being one of non-intervention, I showed that the Self-Help Idea 
legitimated intervention provided that a state had judged for itself what action was necessary to 
preserve its essential interests. What the Self-Help idea did proscribe was a general, collective 
interventionary right which would open the door to tyranny and threaten the freedom of states to 
act according to their own individual will. A limited degree of joint commitment was consistent with 
this idea of state freedom as long as its purpose was to preserve the balance of power and prevent 
the hegemony of a single state. However, a mutual guarantee to preserve the dynastic order 
jeopardised, rather than reinforced, the Self-Help Idea of freedom.  The incompatible relations of 
control legitimated by the Dynastic and Self-Help ideas—manifested in different contours of 
permissible intervention and mutual obligation—were implicated in the withdrawal of Britain from 
the Concert system of great power cooperation.  
 
In western hemisphere debates about intervention I reconstructed two further ideas of state 
freedom. In the Paternalistic Idea of state freedom, which was identifiable in the arguments of the 
US and some of its Latin American allies, the self-mastery of states was conceived of as 
responsibility; it was through meeting the standards of responsible self-governance that states could 
be said to be self-controlling. States did not meet this standard equally, and the Paternalistic Idea 
legitimated intervention on the grounds of preserving the freedom of American states from both 
European intervention and the excesses of irresponsible sovereignty. I showed how the Paternalistic 
Idea and the interventionary relations of control it legitimated were contested by the majority of 
Latin American states. Exhibiting a Categorical Idea of state freedom, Latin American states rejected 
both the notion of a hierarchy of states and the idea that self-mastery can be furthered through 
intervention. A state was an equal sovereign entity, possessing equal and inalienable sovereign 
rights to autonomy regardless of its empirical characteristics. Such sovereign entities were self-
mastering only if each was free to determine its own way of life, absolutely free of external 
interference. This idea of state freedom could only be realised, therefore, if states possessed an 
absolute, unconditional right of non-intervention. I showed how Latin American states repeatedly 
made these arguments in diplomatic forums, gradually persuading the US to accept an absolute duty 
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of non-intervention and redefine its role in the hemisphere from one of a policeman to that of a 
good neighbour. 
 
I then turned to relations of authority between states and, in Chapter Four, I examined the concept 
of sovereign equality. I showed how the idea of the equality of states has its intellectual origins in 
Vattel’s Natural Idea of state freedom, which understood states as moral persons, bound by natural 
law but free to obey the dictates of their own conscience. I then turned to an analysis of ideas of 
state freedom in practice, focusing on two moments of contestation over the principle of sovereign 
equality: the second Hague Peace Conference, 1907, and the United Nations Conference on 
International Organisation that took place in San Francisco in 1945.  
 
The negotiations at the Hague Peace Conference regarding the creation of a Permanent Court of 
Arbitral Justice were a further instance of contestation between the Paternalistic and Categorical 
Ideas of state freedom introduced in Chapter Three. I suggested that the hierarchical logic of the 
Paternalistic Idea legitimated the pre-eminence of the western powers in international legal 
instruments, a position that met determined opposition from smaller states. I analysed the ideas of 
the Brazilian delegate Ruy Barbosa and argued that they were consistent with Latin American 
arguments against intervention; states were self-mastering if they were free to determine their own 
way of life, and absolute rights were required if they were to be so. The unequal judicial 
representation proposed for the Permanent Court was deemed inadmissible because it betrayed the 
essence of arbitration—which was for states to choose their own judges—and thus implied the 
subjection of sovereignty to a necessary authority. Such subjection was a despoilment of the 
sovereignty that protected small states from the otherwise inevitable domination and control of the 
strong. The hierarchical aspect of the Paternalistic Idea and the strong equality of the Categorical 
Idea meant that they legitimated incompatible relations of authority among states and this tension, I 
argued, contributed to the failure to reach agreement in The Hague on the constitution of the 
Permanent Court.  
 
I then showed that the incompatibility of the Paternalistic and Categorical Ideas were transcended at 
the San Francisco conference in 1945. In reaching agreement on the creation of the United Nations, 
states displayed a Civil Idea of state freedom. In this idea, self-mastery was understood in the same 
terms as in the Categorical Idea; determining one’s own way of life free from the domination of 
other states. However, in contrast to the Categorical Idea, in the Civil Idea subjection to international 
law is necessary for this self-mastery to be realised. Moreover, the international juridical order must 
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be backed up by the kind of coercive force to demand compliance that Barbosa deemed a threat to 
freedom. The Civil Idea of state freedom legitimated, therefore, a degree of legalised hierarchy 
between states on the condition that this power was checked by the democratic participation of all 
states. Both of these conditions were accepted by small and medium powers as having been met in 
the institutions of the UN and the process through which it was created. The UN, and the relations of 
authority it legalised, was therefore legitimated as providing ‘liberty under law’.  
 
Through the lens of self-determination, Chapter Five explored relations of dependency in 
international relations, showing how ideas of state freedom formed part of arguments that both 
justified and discredited the institutionalised dependency of peoples. I analysed two instances of 
contestation about self-determination and legitimate relations of control: post-World War I 
reconstruction and 1950s debates regarding decolonisation. I argued that that the Paternalistic Idea 
of state freedom permeated US President Wilson’s understanding of self-determination which led 
him to extol the equality and self-government of states and peoples simultaneous to undertaking a 
great power role and advocating relations of dependency.  While the ideal of self-mastery in the 
Paternalistic Idea was one of responsible, democratic states governing themselves as they saw fit, 
not all peoples were deemed equally prepared for self-government. I showed that the promotion of 
self-mastery was claimed to require, therefore, the supposedly benevolent influence of the civilised 
great powers in forms ranging from ‘temporary interposition’ through to potentially indefinite 
formal dependency. 
 
I then showed that extreme elements of this Paternalistic Idea persisted in the UN in the form of 
Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories. In the 1950s, however, the idea that freedom could be 
promoted by dependence was challenged by newly independent states. These states advanced 
arguments against colonialism that displayed an Independence Idea of state freedom, in which state 
self-mastery was conceived of as independence from ‘alien’ subjugation, both formal and informal. 
The idea that different races had attained different levels of ‘advancement’, and the concomitant 
idea that ‘freedom’ meant different things for different peoples, was rejected. Dependent peoples 
were victims of aggression, not beneficiaries of guardianship, and continued dependency was 
slavery, not freedom. Although colonial powers attempted to resist these arguments by invoking 
both the freedom of states and the freedom of peoples, they were unsuccessful in reasserting the 
credibility of arguments that relations of dependence could promote self-mastery. The arguments of 
anti-colonial states about state freedom contributed to a widespread delegitimation of colonialism, 
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which was confirmed when the UN declared the right of all dependent peoples to independence 
irrespective of their level of ‘preparedness’.  
 
Having summarised the principal findings of the historical chapters, it remains to reflect back on the 
research question that animated this thesis and ask: How have understandings of state freedom 
evolved, and how have they conditioned international relations over the past three centuries? In the 
remainder of this conclusion I will pull together the various strands of this thesis, empirical and 
theoretical, to give an answer to that question before going on to draw out some implications of the 
arguments I have made for the discipline of International Relations. 
 
As should be clear from Chapters Three to Five, and the summary above, ideas of state freedom 
have undergone a continuing process of evolution and transformation. In given historical contexts, 
certain ideas of state freedom have been prominent, and perhaps even dominant. Nonetheless, 
even highly widespread and institutionally embedded ideas have been subject to contestation and 
transcendence. This evolution of ideas of state freedom has played out through contestation over 
legitimate relations of control, and it is through that contestation that ideas of state freedom can be 
said to have conditioned international relations. 
 
At the broadest level, we have seen that since the consolidation of political authority into 
territorially bounded sovereign states there has been a general normative presumption that those 
states ought to be free. That does not mean that all states have been thought to be equally free, or 
that ‘freedom’ has been understood to mean the same thing for all states. Nonetheless, in all of the 
historical moments I have examined there has been a notable intersubjective belief in the freedom 
of states. This shared belief has generated a collective expectation that relations of control ought to 
be consistent with the freedom of states. Historically, however, there has been significant 
disagreement as to what constitutes that freedom. Because state freedom is concerned with the 
self-mastery of states and the conditions necessary for its realisation, and because that normative 
goal has been thought to be effected by factors external to the state, the ways in which a state is 
influenced and controlled by other states has a bearing on whether or not state freedom is realised. 
Different ideas about what constitutes state freedom—what it means for states to be free—have 
been consistent with, and incompatible with, different configurations of relations of control 
between states. Depending on the contours of ideas of state freedom, therefore, some 
configurations of relations of control have been understood as legitimate and others illegitimate.  
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This argument about how ideas of state freedom structure legitimate relations of control is my 
answer to the question of how ideas of state freedom have conditioned international relations over 
the past three centuries. This thesis, taken as a whole, is an argument that this structuring effect of 
ideas of state freedom is significant enough to warrant greater attention from international relations 
scholars.  Another way of articulating the above argument is to say that ideas of state freedom have 
played a significant role in constituting states as agents. The kind of agent that the state is thought 
to be has obvious implications for what makes that agent free or unfree; if the state is conceived of 
as the expression of the will of the people, what self-mastery is understood to consist of for that 
state is likely to be different from if the state is equated with its sovereign monarch. At the same 
time, however, through the politics of legitimacy described above, ideas of state freedom are 
implicated in putting states in a particular configuration of social relations with other states. By 
virtue of their social position, states embody different social roles and are granted certain 
prerogatives and responsibilities while being denied others. In this way, ideas of state freedom can 
constitute states as particular kinds of agents imbued with particular kinds of social power.  
 
The argument made in this thesis about the way in which ideas of state freedom have conditioned 
international relations is bounded and limited in significant ways. In Chapters Three to Five I 
examined particular historical contexts demonstrating both the presence of ideas of state freedom 
and that those ideas were implicated in debates regarding legitimate relations of control between 
states. I also connected those debates with state practices; I made links between arguments about 
what kind of interstate behaviours and relations are legitimate with historical developments in the 
international system. However, I make no deterministic causal claims in the Humean sense of ‘if A, 
then B’;771 European empires did not collapse because of the Independence Idea of state freedom, 
for example, just as the Civil Idea of state freedom did not cause states to form the United Nations. 
Ideas of state freedom are not explanatory variables in this sense because they are not independent 
of the social object for which they are consequential, but rather constitutive of it.772 That is not to 
claim, however, that ideas of state freedom are the only factor in the social construction of the state 
and interstate relations of control. Conceptions about what makes states free have not determined 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a particular relationship of control between states; rather, they have 
existed and had their structuring effect in relation to a broader and evolving constellation of 
principles and interests that shape international politics. The historical investigations of this thesis 
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do suggest, however, that ideas of state freedom have been an important, and understudied, 
element of that milieu. 
 
As well as being bounded with respect to the way in which I claim ideas of state freedom to have 
conditioned international relations, the arguments made in this thesis are also limited with respect 
to their range. Although the scope of the investigation spans the past three centuries, my argument 
is limited to the historical contexts I directly analyse. Focusing on specific historical moments 
allowed me to cover a large historical sweep. It also enabled me to consider relations of control 
across several dimensions; relations of domination, authority and dependency. By limiting my 
historical investigations to discrete historical moments, I was able to marry a breadth of scope of the 
overall project with depth of analysis of the arguments employed by representatives of states. The 
detailed examination of the reasoning and justifications employed by states people in debates about 
non-intervention, sovereign equality and self-determination provided a window onto the 
constitutive effects of ideas of state freedom in specific contexts. This approach has precluded, 
however, both a detailed diachronic examination of state freedom and a deep analysis of state 
freedom in a truncated historical period across diverse geographical contexts and issue domains. As 
the first sustained investigation into state freedom, this thesis has been exploratory in nature and 
has been motivated by a desire to illuminate the concept in a broad variety of contexts. Potentially 
fruitful avenues for studying the concept further would be to examine the dynamism of ideas of 
state freedom, both through time and across different aspects of world politics. The method 
adopted here means I have abstracted from the processes of international relations and drawn out 
analytically distinguishable ideas of state freedom in order to make their structuring effect visible. 
That does not mean, however, that they should be understood as static or in any way separate from 
the practices in which they are embedded. As the contestation between different ideas 
reconstructed in this thesis shows, ideas of state freedom can develop and evolve in relation to one 
another and further work could be done to examine the processes by which they may not only 
structure but also continually re-structure legitimate relations of control.  
 
Although I make no claim to be able to generalise the importance, or even presence, of ideas of 
state freedom beyond the boundaries of the historical cases presented in Chapters Three to Five, 
some conclusions regarding the dynamics of the evolution of state freedom can nonetheless be 
synthesised within the bounds of those cases focused on in this thesis. The first observation is that 
there is no simple pattern to be observed in the evolution of ideas of state freedom. As noted in 
Chapter One, Adam Watson saw in states systems “an inevitable tension between the desire for 
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order and the desire for independence”.773 These conflicting goals pull in opposite directions and 
operate as a pendulum swinging from extreme independence at one end to empire at the other. He 
observed a tendency in systems of states towards elements of hegemony which limits states’ 
freedom of action but also provides order. Although I use different conceptual tools to Watson and 
we have different primary focuses, there is nonetheless a degree of overlap in the phenomena in 
which we are interested; at root we are both concerned with the ways in which states’ freedom of 
action is conditioned by their existence within a states system. However, while Watson sees a 
process of constriction and loosening along a spectrum of freedom of action and constraint, my 
historical research suggests a process of transformation and radical reinterpretation. Pace Berlin, the 
question states have repeatedly asked is not ‘How much am I governed?’774 but rather ‘How am I 
governed?’. Ideas of state freedom have been implicated in shifts in changing levels of obligation 
and freedom of action, shifts between greater and lesser hierarchy and equality, and in movement 
between pluralist and universal values, but these changes are not easily characterised as a general 
pattern.  
 
What seems clear, however, is that there has been a persistent relationship between ideas of state 
freedom and international order. If Watson is correct that states systems are characterised by a pull 
toward some degree of integration and mutual commitment, then ideas of state freedom seem to 
be deeply implicated in that process. Ideas of state freedom are not, however, a counter-weight to 
the desire for order, pulling in the opposite direction. To be sure, at times ideas of state freedom 
have stymied attempts to increase levels of mutual commitment and centralised authority in the 
international system, as at the second Hague Peace Conference or in the Concert of Europe. This 
suggests that if efforts to collectively manage international politics are inconsistent with prevailing 
ideas of state freedom they will struggle to gain legitimacy and support. However, a recurring finding 
of this thesis is that the normative preference for the realisation of the freedom of states has 
supported, and even prompted, attempts to develop levels and types of mutual obligation and even 
subjection to authority in the international system. One prominent recurring feature in all of the 
ideas of state freedom identified in this thesis, then, is that they are distinct from license. Arguments 
in favour of state freedom have not been calls for lawlessness or the atomisation of international 
politics, but rather the opposite. Even the Categorical Idea of state freedom—in which states’ 
freedom to control their own development without outside interference was most stridently 
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asserted—was bound up with high levels of international cooperation and multilateral management 
of international affairs. The arguments about intervention associated with the Categorical Idea of 
state freedom were made in multilateral forums whose purpose was to cooperatively manage 
interstate relations. Moreover, the arguments made were arguments about the rights of states and 
presupposed rule-bound relations based on positive international law. In this regard the Categorical 
Idea of state freedom is consistent with all of the ideas considered in this thesis; all of them reflect 
conceptions of international politics as being a rule-governed domain. 
 
Although the historical investigations of this thesis are not characterised by a tension between 
freedom of action and order, the various ideas of state freedom do point toward two recurring 
tensions that, in the historical contexts examined, have repeatedly animated debate and 
disagreement about how relations of control ought to be configured. The most fundamental of these 
tensions, as I have already alluded to, is that between a basic understanding of states as 
autonomous entities and their existence as part of a system or society. The problematic that Vattel 
explored at length of how to reconcile the natural freedom of states with their obligations to one 
another can repeatedly be seen in debate about how international relations ought to be conducted. 
Although the historical moments examined here show variation regarding how the state has been 
understood, in all cases there has been an underlying view of states as entities that have the 
capacity to form preferences and desires, and to pursue them. The debates reconstructed in this 
thesis reveal, however, an acceptance that the will of states cannot be pursued unconditioned and 
unbound. Autonomous states need, therefore, to be subject to rules and principles that guide their 
behaviour and compromise their freedom to follow their own will and caprice. In the historical cases 
examined here, the recognition of the need to compromise the autonomy of states is manifested in 
attempts by states to consciously, and collectively, manage and shape international relations 
through principles, rules and institutions.  
 
This thesis shows that there has been a high degree of variation in what ways and modes of 
managing international relations have, in different historical contexts, been seen to be consistent 
with the freedom of states. While Castlereagh saw collective security as a morally unacceptable 
fetter on the freedom of states, for Wilson, it was a crucial mechanism for the preservation of that 
freedom. For Barbosa, obedience to international law was a form of subjection, while for states at 
the San Francisco conference it meant liberty under law. Colonial powers justified the dependence 
of uncivilised peoples as a freedom-promoting guardianship, but newly independent states  
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Table 1 Evolving Ideas of State Freedom 
 
denounced that practice as a form of slavery. Moreover, the thesis shows that the (in-)consistency of  
international principles and institutions with ideas of state freedom is of import for whether or not 
they are accepted as legitimate.  
 
The historical investigations conducted in earlier chapters also suggest that a second tension has 
repeatedly been significant in animating contestation between ideas of state freedom; the tension 
between state freedom and material power. As I have argued above, the tension between state 
Idea of State 
Freedom 
Historical 
Context 
Conception of the 
State 
Conception of 
Self-Mastery 
Necessary 
Conditions 
Relations of 
Control 
Legitimated 
Natural  Emmerich 
Vattel’s Law of 
Nations 
Abstract moral 
person 
Following 
dictates of 
conscience 
Sovereignty; 
balance of 
power 
Raison d’état 
Self-Help Concert of 
Europe; Paris 
Peace 
Conference 
Abstract moral 
person 
Acting 
according to 
own 
judgement 
Balance of 
power; self-
help security 
system 
Limited great 
power 
management; 
Intervention to 
protect essential 
interests 
Dynastic Concert of 
Europe 
Embodied in 
dynastically 
legitimated 
sovereign 
Control over 
population 
Stability of 
dynastic order 
Great power 
joint guarantee 
of  dynastic order  
Paternalistic Early 19
th
 
century 
Americas; 
Paris Peace 
Conference  
Abstract moral 
person/Expression 
of will of the 
people 
Acting 
responsibly 
Benevolent 
influence of 
civilised 
powers 
Variable 
depending on 
characteristics of 
‘people’: Equality 
through to 
empire 
Categorical Early 19
th
 
century 
Americas; 
1907 Hague 
Peace 
Conference 
Abstract moral 
person 
Determining 
own way of 
life, free from 
interference 
Consensual 
international 
law and 
absolute right 
to non-
intervention 
Absolute equality 
and non-
intervention 
Civil San Francisco 
Conference; 
1950s United 
Nations 
Abstract moral 
person 
Determining 
own way of 
life, free from 
interference 
Liberty under 
international 
law 
guaranteed by 
great powers 
Great Power 
special 
responsibilities; 
Active 
participation of 
all states; Empire 
Independence 1950s United 
Nations; 
Bandung 
Conference 
Abstract moral 
person/Expression 
of geographical, 
racial and cultural 
characteristics 
Political 
independence 
and 
determining 
own way of 
life, free from 
interference 
Absence of 
foreign rule 
and foreign 
interference 
Independency of 
all territories 
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autonomy and societal obligations has been a recurring theme in debates about state freedom. The 
historical moments explored here suggest that this tension is made acute by differentials in material 
resources and military capability across states. A broad trend can be seen across the majority of 
ideas of state freedom identified here to limit the arbitrary power of materially strong states over 
weaker states. This is most clearly evident in the Categorical and Civil Ideas of freedom, both of 
which became prominent in assertions by smaller states of their right to determine their own 
destinies, free from the domination and interference of their larger neighbours. Similarly, the 
Independence Idea was articulated in arguments made by materially weak states against extreme 
levels of control by imperial cores over their colonial territories. In these cases, state freedom was 
invoked in arguments demanding reconfigurations of relations of control between states to 
constrain the exercise of coercive power by large states.  
 
Relatedly, although espoused by materially powerful states, the Self-Help and Paternalistic Ideas of 
state freedom also implied the limitation of the arbitrary power of states in significant ways. The 
Self-Help Idea was an assertion of state freedom against the threat of domination by the hegemonic 
power of a single state or group of great powers, while the Paternalistic Idea suggested that the 
material power of strong states should be used only in the service of collective civilisation. At the 
same time, of course, the Self-Help and Paternalistic Ideas also permitted highly unequal relations of 
control. The Self-Help Idea not only justified intervention according to states’ individual judgement 
as to its necessity, but also granted a privileged social position to the great powers to manage the 
balance of power in the European system. The Paternalistic Idea, although often accompanied by 
the language of equality, was complicit in the hierarchies of both empire and standards of 
civilisation. Although the Categorical Idea provided an unconditional challenge to hierarchy between 
states, the absolute equality it demanded, along with its absolute rejection of subjection to any 
authority, meant that it legitimated no remedy against states that might refuse to self-limit the 
exercise of their material power. The Civil Idea (and, later, the Independence Idea) provided a 
corrective to that lacuna, conceding special rights to the great powers but only to the extent that 
they served to prevent the arbitrary assertion of power of one state over others.  
 
The above observations about the ways in which ideas of state freedom constitute states as agents 
and are implicated in collective organisation and management of international relations beg a 
question as to the relationship between ideas of state freedom and what is perhaps the discipline of 
IR’s central concept: sovereignty. The orthodox narrative of sovereignty in the discipline of IR is well 
known. Sovereignty is said to have developed in 17th century Europe, gradually spread outward 
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across the globe and reigned as the organising principle of world politics ever since. In what Luke 
Glanville has recently called the “conventional story of sovereignty”, the advent of this principle 
“meant that states had a right to govern themselves however they chose, free from outside 
interference or intervention”.775 Sovereignty is like a “protective shell”776 or a “moat”777 
guaranteeing the independence of states. The consequence of this sovereign organising principle is 
that the international system is anarchical rather than hierarchical; the distribution of political 
authority is flat, with no over-arching central authority. Reciprocal recognition of sovereignty 
becomes, then, the fundamental social institution of the international system, generating the basic 
principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality that regulate international life.  
 
If sovereignty provides freedom from subjection to higher authority and freedom from external 
interference, a conception of state freedom seems, then, to be built-in to sovereignty; it both 
constitutes and guarantees the freedom of states. I do not dispute that this conception of 
sovereignty is intimately bound up with ideas of state freedom. My historical analyses have shown 
that sovereignty constitutes a prominent part of the lexicon of debate about state freedom. It is also 
surely no coincidence that the intellectual origin of the doctrines of non-intervention and sovereign 
equality is also the scholarly work that has most thoroughly and profoundly investigated the 
freedom of states—Vattel’s The Law of Nations. This thesis does, however, add to the body of 
research that calls into question the categorical nature of the ‘conventional story’ of sovereignty, 
embedding the authority of states within a broader and evolving constellation of institutions and 
values.778 The investigation conducted here shows that sovereignty and sovereign institutions do not 
exhaust the relations of control that constitute the international system. It also demonstrates that 
ideas about sovereignty—and related principles such as non-intervention and sovereign equality—
are in part informed by ideas about the freedom of states. Crucially, there is much greater depth to 
ideas about state freedom than the atomisation and isolation of political communities. Ideas about 
state freedom are about states’ interrelations; dynamics of power, influence and control between 
them. They are about how political communities are organised and interact, and how those basic 
facts of political life relate to our political purposes and values.   
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For those that believe that ideas play a role in the constitution of the social world, the concepts that 
we use have weighty implications for how we see that world and the limits and boundaries of what 
is possible within it. The idea, and the institution, of sovereignty is surely an important one in 
shaping international life but, as this thesis demonstrates, it is not the only one. Looking at 
international politics from a different conceptual perspective—in this case that of state freedom—
alters what we can and cannot see.  Within the international system of sovereign states, questions 
of how states are organised and configured with respect to their relationships of control and 
authority continue to be disputed, debated and transformed. Not only is anarchy what states make 
of it,779 but anarchy is only one aspect of the structure of relations between states. If we want to 
fully understand that process, and the limits and opportunities within it, we need to recognise the 
important role played in it by ideas of state freedom.   
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